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INTRODUCTION
In a series of writings over his career, Professor Peter
Westen has subjected important legal and moral concepts
to rigorous exegesis and critique. Equality,1
unconstitutional conditions,2 waiver and forfeiture,3 and
duress4 are just some of the objects of his penetrating
analysis. Now he has turned his gaze to consent.
The idea of consent is pervasive, in ordinary language,
in morality, in law. In the criminal law, and especially the
criminal law of rape and sexual assault, conceptual and
normative disputes about how consent should be
understood are both common and difficult to resolve,
inevitably resulting in intractable factual disputes about
whether consent exists in a given case. The task of
Westen's book is to show that conceptual confusion about
the meaning of consent is rampant, and that conceptual
clarity would permit a sharper focus on the significant
issues about which we really disagree. In this task, he
succeeds admirably.
In a comprehensive, wide-ranging exploration of legal
doctrine and policy, Westen demonstrates beyond cavil that
legislators and commentators frequently confuse different
senses of consent, or use the term inconsistently. He also
1. Peter Westen, Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of
"Equality" in Moral and Legal Discourse (1990); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982). Responses to Westen's critique of the use of
equality arguments include Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 Col. L. Rev. 1167 (1983); Kenneth W. Simons, Equality As a
Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 387 (1985); Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of
Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 693 (2000).
2. Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. Rev. 977
(1985); Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"-Virtue Words and Vice Words,
1985 Duke L.J. 541.
3. Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional
Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 741 (1981); Peter Weston,
Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214 (1977).
4. Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A
Justification, Not an Excuse-And Why It Matters, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 833
(2003).
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reveals the variety of legislative approaches to consent.
Some explicitly define it as a subjective mental state,
others as an objective expression of an acquiescing state of
mind, and still others leave the matter obscure.
In response to this pervasive confusion, Westen
provides his own highly illuminating framework. The book
displays many virtues: originality, subtlety, honesty, a
willingness to question received wisdom. It is sprinkled
with vivid examples, drawn from a remarkable range of
sources: case law and psychological case studies, fairy tales
and film, not to mention fanciful philosophical thought
experiments. These illustrations enliven a painstaking
analysis that could otherwise be forbiddingly dry. The
doctrinal exploration, too, is impressively wide. A range of
different statutory approaches are examined, encompassing
the laws of many different states and of European nations
as well.
I do have some significant reservations about Westen's
framework, and I believe that some of his specific
arguments are incomplete or unsound. But I have no doubt
that his analysis will be a necessary point of departure for
any serious future scholarly inquiry into the concept of
consent in criminal law.
This review is organized as follows. After a brief
exegesis of his overall framework, I proceed to a closer
analysis of its various elements. A later section addresses
his controversial claim that both "force" requirements and
"resistance" requirements are essentially gratuitous. A
conclusion follows.
I. BRIEF EXEGESIS OF THE FRAMEWORK
The following chart summarizes the framework that
Westen recommends for analyzing problems of consent to
sexual relations.
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Factual consent
[or "actual" consent']
Factual attitudinal consent (FAC) "Factual "expressive" consent (FEC)
(unconditional preference, conditional (A's interpretive community understands S's
preference among available alternatives, or words and conduct to satisfy FAC)
"indifference")
Legal consent
[or legally binding consent]
Prescriptive consent Imputed consent
(legal fictions of consent)
Prescriptive Prescriptive Constructive "Informed" Hypothetical
attitudinal expressive consent consent consent
consent consent (S does not (S consents to (S would have
(requires FAC (requires FEC consent to x but a risk of x consented if she
and additional and additional voluntarily rather than to had been capable
conditions of conditions of participates in a x itself) of doing so at the
competence, competence, social practice that time)
etc.) etc.) includes x)
In simplified terms, and disregarding for now some of
Westen's careful qualifications, the categories are used as
follows. A person S gives factual consent to sexual relations
with A if she chooses that option as what she most prefers
under the circumstances. Thus, factual consent comprises
not only S's eager, active response to A's initiative, but also
her reluctant and passive submission to his advances. And
unenthusiastic acquiescence counts as factual consent not
only when the reluctance stems from milder forms of
pressure such as fear that A will otherwise be in a foul
mood, or will break off the relationship, but also when it
5. In a recent article, Westen restates some central themes from his book.
Peter Westen, Some Common Confusions about Consent in Rape Cases, 2 Ohio
St. J. Crim. L. 333 (2004). In the article, unlike the book, he employs "actual"
consent as an important category. Unfortunately, its scope is uncertain. He seems
to use "actual" consent to describe factual, empirical consent, see id. at 349, but
elsewhere he contrasts "actual" consent with "imputed" consent, thus apparently
using the category to encompass all forms of non-imputed consent, both factual
and prescriptive consent. See id. at 337.
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stems from a threat of serious violence if she fails to
submit. Needless to say, factual consent is not a sufficient
condition of legally valid consent that will preclude
criminal liability, since every jurisdiction prohibits
acquiescence induced by threats of violence. But it is,
Westen contends, ordinarily a necessary condition.
Factual attitudinal consent (FAC) occurs when S
subjectively agrees to sexual relations, while factual
expressive consent (FEC) occurs when S expresses FAC-
by, for example, verbally agreeing to have sex, or engaging
in other types of conduct by which she objectively expresses
her positive desire or acquiescence. But again, neither of
these two forms of factual consent is sufficient for legal
consent.
The concept of prescriptive consent identifies those
instances of factual consent (whether attitudinal consent or
factual expressive consent) that do constitute legally
binding consent. For example, a fourteen-year-old girl who
eagerly engages in sex with an adult gives both attitudinal
consent and "expressive" consent, but she doesn't
prescriptively consent, because states require additional
conditions before factual consent is deemed legally valid,
including the condition of being of sufficient age and
maturity to be competent. And competence, along with
freedom and knowledge, is a basic condition of legal
consent. Similarly, a woman who agrees to have sex (and
thus factually consents) only to avoid A's threat of serious
injury does not satisfy a critical condition of freedom-
freedom from violent threats in deciding whether to engage
in sexual relations-required to convert factual into legal
consent. And a woman who is defrauded by a man
impersonating her husband into believing that she is
having intercourse with her husband might fail to satisfy
the condition of sufficient knowledge.
Prescriptive consent is divided into two categories,
depending on whether it incorporates as a necessary
element factual attitudinal or factual expressive consent.
Thus, if a jurisdiction makes legally valid consent depend
on whether a woman actually subjectively chose sex as the
20061
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best option under the circumstances, it is employing the
concept of prescriptive attitudinal consent. If instead it
makes consent depend on whether a woman gave outward
expression to her subjective preference, it is employing the
concept of prescriptive expressive consent.
Finally, Westen identifies three categories of consent
that he considers "fictional," in the sense that legally valid
consent is imputed to S even though she fails to satisfy the
standards of prescriptive consent that, for Westen, are the
only genuine conception of consent. The first such category
is constructive consent-a rule of law to the effect that
voluntary participation in a social practice in which x
occurs is treated as legal consent to x. In this category falls
the traditional marital exemption from rape, which deemed
a married woman to consent to acts of violence by her
husband, even if she did not satisfy the criteria for consent
that would have applied had she not been married to him.
A second category Westen denominates "informed consent,"
or what is more commonly described as assumption of risk.
Here, S does not give either factual or prescriptive consent
to the conduct x that would otherwise be criminal (sexual
relations or a physical contact), but instead merely
consents to the risk of x. (A professional hockey player does
not choose to be pummeled when a fight breaks out, but he
might legally consent to the risk of such a contact or
injury.) The third category, hypothetical consent, is
counterfactual: it deems S to consent, even though she did
not actually do so (in the sense of either attitudinal consent
or "expressive" consent), if S would have consented had she
been capable of doing so at the time. (An unconscious
patient might be deemed to consent to emergency medical
treatment under this standard.)
II. CLOSER ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS
It is worth taking a closer look at the details of
Westen's arguments for the framework, both to see its
value and to identify some problems with his account.
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A. Factual Attitudinal Consent
Westen's account of factual consent is initially
counterintuitive. For he counts as instances of factual
consent decisions by victims of terror and violence to
submit to sex rather than risk suffering future physical
harm, even death. To be sure, he does distinguish
"compulsion," by which he means A's use of physical force
to overwhelm S. (I will note some problems with
"compulsion" below.) And, of course, his categorization of
this scenario as "consensual" is heavily qualified: the
jurisdiction might (and indeed, every jurisdiction does)
further provide that mere factual consent of this sort is
insufficient for legally valid consent. Still, one might
wonder why he dignifies with the label "consent" a decision
by a victim of threatened violence to acquiesce to the
coercer's demands.
But this classification is not as absurd as it might first
seem. One reason why Westen employs the factual consent
category is this: it usefully reminds us that S might be
subject to any of a broad range of pressures on choice, only
some of which are illegitimate and vitiate consent. That is,
one can easily fall into the mistake of thinking that legally
valid consent to x requires that S eagerly embrace x as that
which she desires or chooses in an unqualified way, i.e.,
that which she would also desire or choose if she believed
she was facing a different and more favorable set of
options. But this view is too narrow, Westen emphasizes,
for it would entail that a woman does not legally consent to
sex if she chooses it only because she prefers this to her
partner breaking up with her, or even if she merely prefers
this to waiting until later in the evening and thereby
temporarily disappointing her partner. (For in each case,
she does not obtain what she most prefers-the ability to
decline intercourse without suffering the loss of the
relationship, or the ability to decline intercourse at a
particular time without suffering the emotional harm of
upsetting her partner.) Even if a jurisdiction chooses to
embrace such a stringent standard for valid consent, no
58320061
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jurisdiction currently does so, and Westen wishes to give an
account of consent that makes sense of the full range of
plausible doctrinal approaches. And he is quite right that,
under current law, individuals are very often treated as
legally consenting to sex in the face of certain types of
constraint or pressure even if what they would most prefer
is not to be faced with any negative consequences
whatsoever from their choice.6
A second legitimate reason for employing the factual
consent category is that it accurately describes how people
often employ the term. And since people do use the term
this way, it is important to distinguish quite clearly the
very different meanings of factual and legal consent, so
that legislators, judges, jurors, lawyers, and commentators
do not assume that mere factual consent is legally
sufficient simply because it does, indeed, count as a type of
consent.
Westen gives numerous examples where "consent" is
used in a merely factual sense but is improperly given
undue weight for legal purposes. One famous instance is
the so-called condom case, in which a Texas grand jury
refused to issue a rape indictment even though the
defendant was a stranger who suddenly attacked the victim
with a knife; jurors might have been swayed by the
circumstance that the victim agreed to submit to
intercourse with the defendant if he would wear a condom
(1-2). Such factual consent obviously does not constitute
legal consent, but the grand jury might not have
understood the distinction. Another telling instance is
Blair v. State, a case in which the defense lawyer
successfully confused the jury by falsely implying that
6. As he lucidly explains, the relevant question is not whether the victim
"really wants" to engage in x:
In reality .... a subject S who reluctantly submits to conduct, x, both does
and does not want x. On the one hand, she really wants x, in that she
consciously chooses x for herself under the circumstances, "all things
considered." On the other hand, she really does not want x, in that she
would not choose x if, counterfactually, she were not being subjected to
pressures from which she wishes she were free. (233)
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factual consent is legal consent.7 The lawyer emphasized a
police officer's explicit statement in a police report that the
victim, who said she had been threatened with violence,
"consented" after the defendant said he wanted to have sex.
On the stand, the police officer struggles to explain himself,
agreeing that "consent" was the terminology he used, and
then explaining, "That was, I believe, an error on my part.
'I submitted' would have been the proper word, rather than
'consent.' 8 Westen concludes: "[B]ecause the police officer
realized that the defense counsel was exploiting the
ambiguity to mislead the jury about what he meant, the
officer was forced to repudiate a perfectly sensible use of
'consent' on his part by stating that he meant to say
'submitted"' (312).
Fair enough. But one could also draw a different
conclusion. Perhaps using the term "consent" in the factual
sense is simply too confusing. Perhaps, in other words,
Westen should recommend a change in usage, by legal
actors and others. "Factual consent" could then be replaced
by alternative language, such as factual "agreement,"
"choice," "acquiescence," "willingness," or "submission." At
the very least, it seems clear that the language employed in
criminal legislation should explicitly differentiate factual
from legally valid consent, using the term "consent" only to
identify legally valid consent, and using alternative
language in lieu of factual "consent."9
An analogous terminological difficulty is the criminal
law's "voluntariness" requirement. This requirement is a
very minimal one: it requires that the actor have control
over, or a substantial capacity to control, his movements,
but it does not require that the actor's choice to act be free
of unfair or coercive threats. So a decision to assist a
criminal in order to avoid a threat of death counts as a
7. 735 P. 2d 440 (Wyo. 1987), discussed at 310-12.
8. Id. at 442-43.
9. Occasionally Westen himself endorses this last suggestion, e.g. 340
(suggesting that statutory language might be clearer if "incapable of consent"
were defined as "physically unable to communicate unwillingness to submit to
[the] act...").
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"voluntary" act, although of course it might be excused by
the doctrine of duress. Now we could have two
"voluntariness" doctrines: minimal voluntariness
(analogous to factual consent) and legally sufficient
voluntariness, defined as a (minimally voluntary) choice
that is not unduly coerced (analogous to legal consent). But
it is much less confusing to employ "voluntariness" for one
idea and "duress" for the other; and a similar
disambiguation of "consent" would be preferable.
Turning to the details of Westen's account of factual
consent, his analysis is quite illuminating. As he suggests,
factual consent can properly include not only S's
unconditional enthusiasm but also her conditional
preference: "given the circumstances that she believes
exist, she consciously prefers sexual intercourse to what
she believes to be the alternative" (29)-for example, she
prefers intercourse to serious injury or death (on one
extreme) or to disappointing her lover by waiting until
later (at the other). ° Westen also argues, against several
commentators, that factual consent does not and should not
depend on S possessing a subjective attitude by which she
consciously authorizes what would otherwise be a moral
and legal wrong. Westen is persuasive here. Although legal
consent has the effect of permitting A to do what would
otherwise infringe S's legal rights, it hardly follows, Westen
10. The language "conscious preference" is more apt than the language of
"desire" that Westen sometimes employs here, for several reasons. First, S might
choose intercourse with great reluctance, and thus with none of the positive affect
implicit in "desire." Second, a desire need not be an occurrent mental state. If I
desire to marry Christine, then fall asleep, it is not the case that while asleep, I
no longer desire to marry her. By the same token, if my desire is, "Please kiss me,
Christine, when you enter the room, whether or not I am asleep," it would be
incorrect to say that when she does kiss my slumbering hulk, I do not desire this.
This is relevant to Westen's later claim that a sleeping or unconscious S does not
factually consent. The claim is plausible but difficult to maintain if desire rather
than conscious preference suffices for factual consent. (That claim is consistent
with my consenting to be kissed in the last example, since I give prospective
consent, a form of consent that is independent from contemporaneous consent, as
Westen lucidly explains in a later chapter.) And third, the language of "desire" is
susceptible to the mistaken view that if a woman experiences sexual desires and
feelings of arousal when she is violently forced to have sex, she factually consents.
(Westen properly rejects this view (36).)
correctly claims, that S's state of mind must itself consist of
consciously granting A legal permission (31). After all, S
might be completely ignorant of her legal rights, or might
even mistakenly believe that she lacks the authority to give
legal consent, and yet her state of mind of acquiescence
might be sufficient to constitute legal consent (32).
Torts scholars will find Westen's argument familiar.
"Express" assumption of risk consists in an explicit waiver
of one's legal right to sue in case a risk materializes, but
this is sharply distinguished from "implied" assumption of
risk, which (in jurisdictions that still recognize it) consists
in a knowing and voluntary choice to confront a risk. One
can impliedly assume a risk without expressly assuming it,
and vice versa. (If I choose to ski a very challenging course,
this can consist in implied assumption of risk even if I
believe that notwithstanding my choice, I retain the legal
right to sue;12 and if I sign a valid waiver of liability when
joining a health club, I am barred from recovery even if I
am unaware of the particular risk that caused my injury,
so long as the waiver encompassed the risk of that injury.)
The most interesting subcategory of factual consent
recognized by Westen is "indifference." This is a state of
mind, not of indecisiveness, but of affirmative willingness
11. See Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L.
Rev. 481, 487 (2002).
12. But there might be a disanalogy between criminal law and tort conceptions
of authorization. In criminal law, Westen points out, a jurisdiction might want to
require subjective authorization, which would then be a subset of factual consent.
"Mental states of authorizing are nothing more than mental states of desire, plus
awareness of one's right to refuse" (33). Then it would be contradictory for S to say
"I do not authorize you to kiss me, but I fervently desire that you do so." But tort
law does not employ the notion of subjective authorization in this way, at least when
consent to a risk is at issue. One can subjectively decline to waive a right to sue and
yet act in such a way as to impliedly assume a risk (as in the skiing example in the
text). Note, finally, that there is nothing in the slightest contradictory in S wanting
to have sex with A but also wanting A to be prosecuted for it. (This is precisely what
occurs in one of the final, pivotal scenes in the 1994 film noir, The Last Seduction.)
But in this last example, presumably Westen would say that S did legally authorize
sex, though she also wishes the legal system would ignore her authorization or
would mistakenly treat her as not having given such authorization. (In the film, S
pretends not to consent and secretly records the encounter in order to frame A for
rape.)
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to delegate the decision to another. A jurisdiction might
well decide to count such indifference as factual consent
with respect to sexual relations, but not with respect to
termination of one's life support by a doctor (30); for the
latter, it might require either unconditional endorsement
or conditional preference. Thus, Westen believes that an
unconditional or conditional preference always suffices for
factual consent, while indifference might or might not
suffice (31).
One striking benefit of the indifference conception is
its ability to explain and legitimize some of the
spontaneous decisions that frequently occur in sexual
encounters. Although Westen does not develop this point, I
believe that this idea of delegation of decision making helps
explain why it can be acceptable for a couple that has
agreed to a certain level of sexual intimacy to permit one
party to initiate a surprising and novel form of sexual
encounter (such as a different mode of sexual contact or of
intercourse). To be sure, one could conceptualize the
permissibility of such decisions by requiring S only to
consent to "sexual intercourse" rather than to "sexual
intercourse with the woman on top" or to "anal
intercourse," and so forth. Yet we avoid some of the
difficulties of accurately characterizing the object of S's
consent if we expand the meaning of factual consent to
encompass indifference. So even if S only meant to
acquiesce (in the sense of conditional or unconditional
preference) to vaginal intercourse with A in the
"missionary" position, and even if that is the most
appropriate level of generality at which to characterize her
factual consent, the broader idea of indifference or
delegation of decision making permits us to count as
factual consent S's express or implied authorization to A to
initiate other sexual contacts-e.g., those of a similar level
of physical intimacy.
Nevertheless, Westen's analysis of indifference as a
type of factual consent presents some potential difficulties,
of interpretation and also of substance. First, indifference
to x in Westen's sense does not really amount to S's choice
588
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of x under the circumstances, or even to S's desire for x. It
is not enough to point out, as Westen does, that in such a
case, S desires what A desires, and thus in some sense
consciously chooses x (conditionally, in case A desires it).
Although we could indeed speak of such a case as involving
voluntary submission or acquiescence, characterizing this
as a choice or desire for sexual intercourse is an
exaggeration. Still, it might indeed be appropriate to say in
this case that S acquiesces in x, and in that less robust
sense "consents" to x.
Second, Westen's analysis of indifference has a crucial
implication for a highly controversial issue in contemporary
rape law. Presumably one reason (among many) for the
view of some jurisdictions that (to put it crudely) only a
"yes" means "yes"'13 is that only an affirmative verbal or
nonverbal expression of preference genuinely constitutes
sufficient consent. Such a jurisdiction might conclude that
a woman who is merely indifferent in Westen's sense, who
passively permits sexual acts without affirmatively
welcoming or choosing the act, or without preferring the act
to the alternatives, is not acting with sufficient autonomy
to have legally consented. And it might so conclude even if
the woman explicitly says to the man, "I don't care what
you do; go ahead [with sexual intercourse] if you want to."
14
It is, of course, highly controversial whether this approach
goes too far, criminalizing conduct that is insufficiently
culpable and effectuating a notion of autonomy that is
overly paternalistic. But Westen's framework should be
13. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). See also Wis. Stat. § 940.225
(2005), recognizing as third-degree sexual assault nonconsensual intercourse, and
defining consent as "words or overt actions by a person ... indicating a freely
given agreement to have sexual intercourse .... " Of course, another reason for
the MTS view is the difficulty of distinguishing indecision or psychological
paralysis from genuine willingness to permit the sexual conduct to occur.
14. Whether MTS would criminalize sexual intercourse in this scenario is
unclear. But suppose a first date in which A persists over an extended period of
time in seeking S's consent to sex, and S repeatedly declines, but eventually is
worn down and says, "Well, OK, do what you want to do," still hoping that he will
give up. She then submits to sex. It is possible that this would not count as
"affirmative" and "freely-given" permission.
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capacious enough at least to make this approach
conceptually intelligible.
Westen might reply as follows. His framework does not
assume that factual consent is legal consent. A "'yes' means
,'yes'" jurisdiction might conclude that indifference counts
as factual consent but not legal consent. But this conclusion
does not fit the rest of Westen's approach, under which
factual consent fails to qualify as legal consent only if it
does not satisfy prescribed conditions of competence,
knowledge, and freedom, and it does not seem plausible to
characterize the failure to give affirmative consent as an
instance of incompetence or lack of sufficient freedom.
Alternatively, and more plausibly, such a jurisdiction
might say, at the outset, that only unconditional or
conditional preference, not indifference, counts as factual
consent, at least in certain circumstances (such as the first
sexual encounter between S and A). 5 While Westen
identifies this possibility, he should clarify that this is at
the very heart of one important contemporary debate about
the proper scope of criminal liability for sexual assault.
Third, I wonder whether Westen too quickly dismisses
the possibility that S's actual indecision (as opposed to her
decision to delegate the choice to A, as he characterizes
"indifference") should count as a (fourth) possible category
of attitudinal consent. Because his framework is meant to
apply to all forms of sexual contact, not just sexual
intercourse, I think it is at least an open question whether
a jurisdiction should criminalize A's conduct in this
scenario: A asks S for a kiss, S says nothing because of
hesitation or indecision, and A proceeds to kiss her. Indeed,
15. A refined and contextual approach is much more plausible than the
absolute view that indifference is never sufficient for legal consent. So even in a
jurisdiction that ordinarily requires one of the two core types of factual consent,
i.e., unconditional or conditional preference, in some cases indifference might be a
third option. Perhaps in the first sexual encounter between S and A, one of the
two core types of factual consent should be required, while in later encounters,
indifference suffices. Or perhaps a core type of factual consent should be required
with respect to the first instance of (any form of) sexual intercourse, while
indifference suffices for new forms of sexual intercourse that the individuals have
not previously practiced.
590
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whether A's proceeding to engage in sexual intercourse
with S in the face of her indecision should count as rape (or
some other crime) is also a question that some jurisdictions
would answer negatively.
To be sure, Westen does have another route to a
conclusion of non-liability in these cases. He can say that
they fall within a larger category of cases in which S
constructively consents, one of Westen's three categories of
fictional consent (which I discuss further below). For
various policy reasons, including protection of the non-
culpable, a jurisdiction might elect to deem S to consent
here, even though she doesn't really consciously acquiesce
to the contact or intercourse (just as a fastidious football
fan who prefers not to be touched by other fans and is
deemed to consent to minor, predictable physical contacts
does not actually acquiesce to such contacts, an example
discussed further below). But this solution seems ad hoc.
Don't we want a general rule about acts of physical and
sexual contact by A in the face of S's indecision? Doesn't
that general rule reflect a general principle about the
proper scope of S's autonomy, rather than a fiction of non-
consent? I think it would be more straightforward to
classify indecision as a fourth category of consent that a
jurisdiction might (or, of course, might not) elect to
recognize, depending on the sexual assault policies that it
endorses.
Towards the end of his discussion of attitudinal
consent, Westen identifies the minimal cognitive and
volitional content of S's preference for x that he believes is
required for attitudinal consent. 16 Let me briefly comment
16. Westen identifies the minimum cognitive content of factual consent as
follows: "the description of the conduct she has in mind is an instance of what the
criminal statute at issue describes to be the conduct that it prohibits in the
absence of legal consent" (41). Thus, if S decides to have sex with A whom she
believes is her husband but is actually an impersonator, then whether this counts
as factual consent depends on whether the statute defines the prohibited act as
sexual intercourse simpliciter or as sexual intercourse with a specifically chosen
partner. Of course, even on the former interpretation, S's factual consent is not
necessarily legally valid consent; A's fraud about his identity might vitiate factual
consent.
2006] 591
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on the volitional requirement, since Westen here makes a
surprising but, I believe, convincing claim: S can factually
consent to x even if (without knowing this) she is
completely unable to prevent x. Drawing on Meir Dan-
Cohen's distinction between subjective willing and
selecting from within a set of genuine options, Westen
argues that only subjective willing is required for
attitudinal consent. He imagines variations of the Snow
White story, in which "Snow Blanche" and "Snow Bianca"
appear to be asleep but are conscious, yet still are unable to
prevent the prince's kiss. Suppose Snow Blanche
unconditionally wishes to be kissed by him, because she
would like to be kissed by him even if she were not under a
spell. And suppose Snow Bianca only conditionally wishes
to be kissed as the best option then available to her (i.e.,
the only way to avoid continued paralysis). Both should be
understood as factually consenting despite their inability to
prevent the kiss (44-45).
This is an important and underappreciated point,
especially in the context of less intimate forms of sexual
contact. If S says to A, "please kiss me," he or she might
well be unable to prevent a kiss that immediately follows. S
might also subjectively welcome an impetuous, completely
unexpected kiss by A (222). And by the same token, as
Westen points out, disabled individuals who wish to have
sexual intercourse with their partners yet are physically
unable to prevent it certainly should not need to fear that
their partners have committed rape.
One last issue about attitudinal consent concerns the
range of the relevant choice set over which we evaluate S's
At several places in the book, Westen's analysis illuminates the cognitive
requirements for both factual and legal consent, especially with respect to the
problematic distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement,
but I do not have the space to address the arguments here.
Westen also identifies a minimum degree of competence required for factual
consent-namely, "a minimal capacity to adjudge what one desires for oneself
under the circumstances as one perceives them to be" (35). He later emphasizes
that jurisdictions require additional conditions of competence (for example,
minimum age requirements) to be satisfied before they will treat factual consent
as legal consent.
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preferences. Clearly enough, Westen intends to include all
the options that A presents to S, including unpalatable
threats if S does not submit and attractive benefits to S if
she does. But he also indicates that he includes as options
actions that S herself could take to avoid the options that A
presents (see 87). So S factually consents not only when she
agrees to have sex in order to avoid a threat of physical
harm, or to obtain a job benefit, but also when she submits
rather than taking the affirmative step of pushing him
away-or, for that matter, rather than taking the
extraordinary step of killing him with a knife, if that would
prevent intercourse.
Now this might seem unproblematic, insofar as factual
consent is merely the first step of analysis. So just as an
affirmative decision by S to submit to sex rather than face
a violent threat will certainly not satisfy the "freedom"
condition required for legally valid consent, so her decision
not to push A away or not to kill him when she has the
opportunity to do so might not satisfy that condition. Yet
there is a certain awkwardness to this way of framing the
issue. Suppose A meets S at a party, takes her to his room,
initiates minor sexual contact, then makes it clear that he
is about to initiate sexual intercourse. Suppose S is then
passive and silent, but wishes he would stop. Suppose she
also believes he will stop if but only if she slaps him. On
Westen's account, she factually consents if she does not
slap him but submits passively to his initiative. (Indeed,
she also factually consents if she believes he will stop if but
only if she mortally wounds him with a knife, which she
declines to do.)
Of course, the jurisdiction might have a rule to the
effect that preference for submitting to sex when the only
practical alternative is resistance to the utmost, or even
resistance entailing A's death, is not sufficiently "free" to
qualify as legally valid consent. But that is a strange
conception of "freedom," and it seems much more
straightforward to deny at the outset that S's option of
taking affirmative steps to avoid A's advances (even to the
point of violently disabling A) is within the choice set for
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determining factual consent. With such a denial, we can
say that when S does not express a conscious preference for
submitting to sex over any alternatives offered by A
(because A offers no other alternatives), then S does not
unconditionally or conditionally prefer sex to any relevant
alternative, and factual consent is lacking from the outset.
I raise this point because it will be crucial later in
examining and critiquing Westen's controversial claim that
resistance requirements are entirely unproblematic
because they are merely logical corollaries of a
jurisdiction's force requirement.
B. Factual "Expressive" Consent
We have thus far been discussing attitudinal consent.
But Westen persuasively argues that a distinct category of
factual consent, factual expressive consent, is also
commonly used in legal and academic discourse, ordinary
language, and criminal legislation-for example, when
courts say that S "expressly consented" or "verbally
consented." (If, however, they say that S "communicated
consent" or "conveyed consent," they are referring to what
is being expressed, that is, to attitudinal consent (65).) In
Westen's view, "expressive" consent is properly defined by
reference to what A's interpretive community (essentially,
a reasonable person in A's shoes 7) would understand the
words and conduct of S to mean, and not by reference to
what A alone understands them to mean, nor by reference
to what S intends them to mean.
Westen describes two extremely provocative cases that
clearly illustrate the distinction between attitudinal
consent and "expressive" consent. In the first, People v.
Burnham, the victim enticed passing motorists to have sex
in order to avoid her husband's threat of violence (of which
the strangers were unaware).8 In the second, People v.
Bink, the victim, a prison inmate who had been previously
17. For some reason, Westen avoids the more familiar "reasonable person"
language, but his notion appears to be substantially equivalent.
18. 222 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1985), discussed at 139-40.
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raped by the defendant, worked with the jail authorities to
entrap the defendant: he pretended to be in fear of physical
harm and allowed the authorities to secretly observe the
defendant commit sodomy, knowing that the police would
be able to intervene before the defendant could actually
make good his violent threat.' 9 As Westen persuasively
analyzes the cases, the strangers' sexual contact in
Burnham involved "expressive" consent but not attitudinal
consent: although the victim did not subjectively acquiesce,
she did actively express such acquiescence to the
strangers.2 ° By contrast, the sexual encounter in Bink
involved attitudinal consent but not "expressive" consent:
although the victim did subjectively acquiesce in order to
entrap defendant, his outward expression was of non-
acquiescence.
Given his definitions, Westen draws two conclusions.
First, "expressive" consent is derivative of attitudinal
consent, insofar as what must be "expressed" in some
manner is any of the species of attitudinal consent that the
jurisdiction recognizes (unconditional preference,
conditional preference, and perhaps "indifference"). Second,
attitudinal consent defines the actus reus of rape, while
"expressive" consent is best understood as defining the
mens rea. Thus, in Burnham, since S was not subjectively
19. 444 N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), discussed at 140.
20. In a footnote, Westen makes the interesting argument that we would have
attitudinal consent, and not merely "expressive" consent, in Burnham if the
victim, in order to avoid her husband's threats, had to actually succeed in having
sex with the stranger rather than merely trying to do so. For in that case, she
would have preferred sex as the best she could do for herself in the circumstances,
and thus would have factually consented attitudinally as well as expressively.
Moreover, Westen argues, the strangers would not have imposed a wrongful harm
on her, since they would have done what she believed best for herself, and they
were not responsible for her predicament (165 n.18). I agree that this would be a
case of attitudinal consent in Westen's terms, but it is less clear that this would
be a case of legally valid consent. Whether it should count as legal consent does
not matter much if (as in the actual example) the strangers lack mens rea. But
suppose a variation of the facts in which they were negligent in not realizing that
she was just going along to avoid her husband's threats. Shouldn't they be liable,
not just for attempted rape, but for rape (assuming that the jurisdiction requires
a mens rea of negligence as to non-consent)? Note that if they are only liable for
attempted rape, that also seems to be true of the husband-an implausible result.
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willing and did not give attitudinal consent, the actus reus
of rape is satisfied; but since she did not express that
unwillingness by the words or conduct the jurisdiction
requires under "expressive" consent, the strangers in that
case lacked the mens rea for rape. Conversely, in Bink,
since the defendant might reasonably have understood S to
have not expressed subjective willingness, though actually,
S was subjectively willing, the defendant cannot be guilty
of the actus reus of rape, and this is indeed what the court
held.21 However, Westen points out that Bink might be
guilty of attempted rape (161-62).
Westen goes on to explain, convincingly, that the
venerable "moral luck" problem applies in this context.
That problem-whether a defendant should suffer lesser
punishment because the legislatively proscribed harm
fortuitously fails to occur, even if he still has the requisite
mens rea as to the harm-arises here only if lack of consent
is understood as a question of actus reus, but not if it is
understood as an issue of mens rea (156-57). In other
words, the question whether Bink should be punished less
because of the fortuity, from his perspective, that his victim
consented (in the sense of attitudinal consent), is answered
21. Nevertheless, Bink could be interpreted differently. The victim's decision
to entrap the defendant by engaging in sex might be interpreted as factual
consent but not legally valid consent, given the very constrained alternatives the
victim faced. (Suppose he reasonably doubted that the jail authorities could
adequately protect him from defendant if he did not cooperate in the entrapment
scheme.) Indeed, suppose a different case in which A rapes S, and S then pretends
to agree to further sex with him, but only in order to keep him in her apartment
for a few more minutes, when she expects her husband to return home and be
able to apprehend A. It surely would be reasonable for a jurisdiction to consider
the second act of intercourse rape, because of the conditions under which the
factual agreement to engage in intercourse was secured.
A more straightforward case than Bink of attitudinal consent but no
"expressive" consent, in which attitudinal consent is much more clearly also
sufficient for legal consent, would be a case in which the victim unconditionally
wants to have sex with A, but conveys this by words or conduct that should be
taken by someone in A's position as nonacquiescence. (Imagine a case of a serious
language barrier. Or consider Westen's example of A unknowingly joining a
swinger's club one of whose members, S, expresses sexual interest in A with
unusual signals of interest that A does not (and has no reason to) recognize. If A
then proceeds to suddenly kiss and fondle S, then S has given attitudinal consent,
but not "expressive" consent (74).)
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affirmatively if one accepts the moral luck principle and if
attitudinal consent eliminates the social harm of rape. But
if only "expressive" consent, not attitudinal consent,
eliminates the social harm of rape, the question is
answered negatively.
Westen's first conclusion is certainly plausible: an
expression must be an expression of something, and
analytic simplicity is served by defining "expressive"
consent precisely in terms of attitudinal consent. But the
second conclusion, understanding attitudinal consent as
vitiating actus reus and "expressive" consent as vitiating
mens rea, is not nearly so obvious. For it depends on a
definition of "expressive" consent that might be too narrow,
and on an understanding of the actus reus of rape that is
controversial, in light of contemporary debates about the
proper scope of rape law.
At the risk of adding unnecessary complexity to
Westen's already intricate model, I suggest that there are
at least three categories of factual consent, not two. I also
believe that it is intelligible for a jurisdiction to conclude
that the social harm of rape occurs when either of two of
these three types of factual consent is missing. Accordingly,
Westen's conclusion that that social harm occurs only when
attitudinal consent is lacking is too narrow-at least, it is
too narrow to explain the social policies that some
jurisdictions purport to favor in modern sexual assault law.
Let me explain.
Westen is undoubtedly correct to expand factual
consent beyond attitudinal consent (S's subjective but
unexpressed willingness or preference), and to focus on S's
communication of consent as an important type of factual
consent. But a paradigm communication in the current
context has two components-an intention to communicate
by S, and an interpretation or understanding of that
communication by A. Westen emphasizes only the second
component. Yet a jurisdiction might have reason to
recognize either or both components as a conception of
factual consent. Thus, I would replace factual "expressive"
consent with the following two categories of factual consent:
2006]
598 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:577
FSEC: Factual subjectively expressed consent (where S
employs words or conduct by which she intends22
to communicate her attitudinal consent)
FOC: Factual observed consent (where an observer-
either A, or A's "interpretive community," or a
reasonable person in A's shoes-understands S's
words and conduct to satisfy attitudinal
consent)23
Sometimes a jurisdiction might want to require (before it will
find legal consent) the outward expression of subjectively
expressed consent, rather than attitudinal consent, in order to
assure that acquiescence reflects a relatively firm, rather
than fleeting or changeable, state of mind.24 The very act of
22. Burnham is a clear case of such an intention.
It might be appropriate to expand this definition to S's employing words or
conduct by which she intends to communicate her attitudinal consent, or that she
expects others to understand as attitudinal consent (even if she does not so intend
them). I don't pursue this complication.
23. Indeed, a comprehensive approach would include a fourth category as well.
The actus reus of rape could be defined either by lack of attitudinal consent or by
lack of subjectively expressed consent. (It is even possible to define it as lack of
observed consent, though this is the least plausible alternative.) And observed
consent could be subdivided into two corresponding categories: where the observer
understands S's words and conduct to satisfy attitudinal consent (Westen's
"expressive" consent fits here), and where he understands them to satisfy
subjectively expressed consent. But I will spare the reader further subcategories.
24. This function is somewhat analogous to the act requirement's function of
ensuring that a defendant's criminal intention is seriously entertained and not
fleeting, or the function of actus reus requirements of attempt in ensuring that a
defendant is seriously committed to a criminal plan. Of course, here the absence
of a "firm" state of mind leads to the conclusion that the victim has not consented,
and thus that the defendant can be criminally punished.
Westen argues that there is no need to build into factual consent a
requirement that the mental state be firm, unequivocal, or stable. If S is
indecisive, or in a paralyzing panic, or if she is vacillating such that she does not
factually consent at the time she submits to intercourse, then a jurisdiction could
decide that she simply lacks factual consent (159). In any event, he points out, a
requirement that A have mens rea with respect to S's lack of factual consent
helps protect against unfair punishment in such circumstances.
Perhaps Westen is correct about the proper understanding of attitudinal
consent, and perhaps in some circumstances even a fleetingly experienced
unwillingness to acquiesce should make a sexual encounter criminal. But I think
the complexities and possible different views of desirable policy here reinforce the
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communicating, which requires some self-consciousness and
some effort to articulate feelings, at least renders it more
likely that the underlying state of mind communicated is
more stable. But a jurisdiction might go one step further and
require observed consent-that an observer (perhaps a
reasonable observer) recognize that S factually consents-
either because lawmakers want to protect defendants they
view as less culpable, or because they believe that the victim
should try to effectively communicate her preferences to the
other. (Observed consent is what Westen calls "expressive"
consent, but I use a different label to emphasize the
perspective of the observer; "expressive" consent is ambiguous
in this regard, for it could refer either to the communicator S
or to the observer.)
To place subjectively expressed consent in context,
compare the way in which a jurisdiction might choose to deal
with a different crime involving a victim's mental state. If it
is a crime, or an aggravated element of a crime, to terrorize
a person, the victim's state of mind is of course directly
relevant: the actus reus is satisfied only if she actually is put
in a state of terror, though the mens rea can be satisfied
(and an attempt conviction obtained) even if she is not put in
such a state, if the defendant intends that effect on the
victim (or perhaps if he believes or should believe that his
conduct will have that effect). Indeed, in the law of sexual
assault, the question whether S has submitted "because of
fear" of violence from A arises frequently, and should receive
a similar analysis: the actus reus requirement of "threat of
force" is satisfied if S was actually in fear, and submitted for
that reason, while the mens rea requirement can receive
separate analysis. (Again, even if S does not actually submit
due to fear, perhaps A should be guilty of attempted rape if
he intended to cause her submission through fear; and
perhaps, in the rare case when the defendant is reasonably
ignorant of the fact that he induced S to submit by fear, he
should be acquitted.)25
value of recognizing subjectively expressed consent as another category of factual
consent.
25. Westen provides a nice analysis of the confused approach of some
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In these two examples, terrorizing and inducing consent
by fear, no one would seriously suggest that the victim must
affirmatively express or communicate her subjective state of
terror or fear in order to have suffered the social harm in
question. In other words, there is no good reason to adopt
the analogue of subjectively expressed consent here. But in
cases where S passively submits to sex with A, many
jurisdictions and many commentators do conclude that the
social harm of sexual assault is not implicated if S could
have communicated non-consent but failed to do so. The
social policy-albeit a controversial one-is that each
participant to sexual conduct has a responsibility to
communicate their preferences to the other, absent some
significant incapacity, and that the criminal law should not
intervene when this responsibility has not been met. This
policy is better captured by the proposed subjectively
expressed consent category than by Westen's attitudinal
consent and "expressive" consent categories.
To see in more detail how my approach differs from
Westen's, consider a case in which S says and means "yes"
or "no" to A's request for a form of sexual intimacy, but A
literally does not hear her (and a reasonable person in his
position also would not have heard her). Under Westen's
approach, the only factual consent questions we ask are
whether S was subjectively willing (attitudinal consent)
and whether a reasonable person would have interpreted
her as having conveyed subjective willingness ("expressive"
consent, which I treat as a subcategory of observed
consent).26
jurisdictions on these issues. Some conclude that a conviction for rape by threat
requires a "reasonable fear" by the victim. But this is ambiguous: it could refer to
the defendant's reasonable belief that the victim submitted out of fear, but it
could also refer to whether the victim's actual fearful reaction was a reaction that
a reasonable person in her situation would have had. As Westen points out, there
is no good reason for the second requirement, so long as the defendant was
actually aware that the victim, however "unreasonably" or surprisingly, was
subjectively fearful and submitted only for that reason (320-21).
26. I believe that Westen's terminology, factual expressive consent, is
unfortunate: although Westen means to restrict it to an actual or hypothetical
observer's understanding of S's state of mind, it more naturally connotes what S
intends to express.
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But suppose a jurisdiction wants to codify the
approach that "only 'yes' means 'yes,"' i.e., that only an
affirmative expression of acquiescence (by words or
conduct) immediately preceding sexual intercourse suffices
for legal consent.2 ' Although controversial, this approach is
one that some jurisdictions and many commentators
support. One reason (among many) for this view is that
only such an affirmative expression of preference genuinely
constitutes sufficient consent. S's passive submission to a
sexual act without affirmatively welcoming or choosing the
act arguably is not an instance of a sufficiently robust type
of agency or autonomy to count as legal consent, just as
passive submission to a medical procedure is clearly not
enough to count as legal consent.28
It is much more difficult to model this approach and all
of its plausible variants on Westen's account than under
my suggested approach.29 Suppose, once again, that the
jurisdiction wants to reinforce a community norm that even
in situations when A is not threatening S with any
disadvantage if she says "no" to his initiatives, "only 'yes'
means 'yes"--i.e., only affirmative words or conduct by
which S expresses acquiescence (only an especially
unambiguous, affirmative instance of subjectively
expressed consent) will count as legal consent. Then it
would make sense to define the actus reus of rape as sexual
intercourse absent affirmative subjectively expressed
27. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation
and the Failure of Law 261-73 (1998).
28. See id. at 270. Of course, there are other reasons for this view, including
the difficulty of distinguishing indecision or psychological paralysis from genuine
willingness to permit the sexual conduct to occur.
29. Westen asserts at one point that no jurisdiction uses what I call the
subjectively expressed consent approach (70). But this seems incorrect: New
Jersey law (as interpreted in MTS, 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992)) appears to employ
this approach, and the same might be true of other states' explicit requirements
of "freely-given" consent. See, e.g., Wisc. Stat. § 940.225(4) ("'Consent,' as used in
this section, means words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give
informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse
or sexual contact."). See also Cal. Penal Code § 261.6 (Deering Supp. 2003)
("[Clonsent shall be defined to mean positive cooperation in act or attitude
pursuant to an exercise of free will.").
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consent. And then the jurisdiction has the option to require
negligence, recklessness, or even knowledge as the
requisite mens rea. (It might plausibly choose knowledge
that S has said "yes" or has by her conduct expressed
affirmative permission in order to offer greater protection
to defendants who are unfamiliar with the novel legal actus
reus requirement. °) But it is difficult to see how Westen
can convey these different mens rea variations within his
model, for he largely neglects the subjectively expressed
consent category, and he defines "expressive" consent too
simply as posing only the question whether A was
reasonable or unreasonable (i.e, negligent) as to whether S
gave attitudinal consent."
Accordingly, his general point, that attitudinal consent
pertains to actus reus while "expressive" consent pertains
to mens rea, is inaccurate. To be sure, a jurisdiction could
decide to organize its sexual offense crimes that way. But it
might also have reason to recognize other variations in
what counts as the social harm of rape (lack of subjectively
expressed consent, not lack of attitudinal consent), and
what counts as adequate mens rea.32 Some jurisdictions
30. In MTS, the court interpreted the New Jersey statute as requiring, for the
actus reus of rape, affirmative permission, while requiring, for the mens rea, only
negligence as to whether such permission had been given. But the requirements
are independent; the second hardly follows from the first, and a mens rea
requirement of recklessness or knowledge is also defensible. 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J.
1992).
31. Westen's careful definition of "expressive" consent and of the relevant
perspective of the observer is a composite, encompassing the beliefs that the
actual defendant has, as well as beliefs that a reasonable person would acquire
(72). But it would be better to employ a definition that permits a jurisdiction to
disaggregate knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, in case it wishes to employ
a mens rea other than negligence.
Westen does acknowledge that "expressive" consent (as he defines it) offers
a less precise measure of an actor's guilty mind than the combination of
attitudinal consent and a mens rea requirement offers. As he notes, the latter but
not the former approach can impose attempt liability on the malicious actor who
has good grounds for believing that the woman acquiesces yet intends that the
intercourse be without her acquiescence (145).
32. I also find problematical Westen's way of conceptualizing the difference
between actus reus and mens rea. In his view, where A has some form of mens
rea but S has given factual and legal consent, A causes a dignitary harm rather
than a material harm (149-52, 161-63).
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believe that the optimal policy (a) gives some, though
limited, protection to potential victims' autonomy interests
by requiring them to say "no," and (b) at the same time
facilitates sex by those who prefer not to have to say, or
very clearly communicate, "yes." Other jurisdictions are
more concerned about protecting victims who find it very
difficult to say "no." These questions should not be decided
or made unduly confusing by stipulative definition.
3
Of course, if the absence of subjectively expressed
consent or of some other type of communication of consent
is taken to negate the social harm of a crime, then the
question whether S satisfied the subjective standards of
attitudinal consent is simply legally irrelevant. Just as
contract law considers the private, subjective beliefs of the
parties to be irrelevant (as Westen acknowledges), a
jurisdiction could take the same view of private beliefs
But the difference between lack of "expressive" consent and lack of
attitudinal consent, or more generally between lack of mens rea and lack of actus
reus, need not be conceptualized in this way. Yes, typically the more egregious A's
mens rea, the more dignitary harm he causes to S. But suppose a case in which A
sexually assaults S, who is unconscious and never regains consciousness. There
still is good reason for punishment here. To be sure, the case could be
conceptualized as involving dignitary harm to the community as a whole. But
that seems just a roundabout way of saying that a person who acts with such
disrespect for others deserves severe condemnation and punishment. The linkage
to "dignitary harm" seems contingent and unnecessary.
In his separate article, Westen goes so far as to treat larceny as imposing
only a "dignitary" harm, because its actus reus is satisfied by a temporary
deprivation of property, which is a derivative form of harm, as compared to the
primary harm of permanent deprivation. Westen, supra note 5, at 346. But unless
we classify as merely "dignitary" every inchoate crime (such as burglary or
possession) or indeed every crime that punishes the causation of a statutorily
defined harm in part because this could lead to further social harms (such as
treason, bribery, or hate crimes), I would think that the social harm of a
temporary deprivation of property should fall on the "material harm" side of the
distinction between externalized harm in the world, on the one hand, and a mere
belief that one is bringing about that harm (or some other culpable mens rea as to
bringing about the harm), on the other.
33. Indeed, even if we confine ourselves to Westen's two categories, attitudinal
consent and "expressive" consent, a jurisdiction should not necessarily assume
that mens rea requirements and "expressive" consent are coextensive. It could
decide, for example, to require recklessness or knowledge as to attitudinal
consent, even though a requirement of "expressive" consent is, on Westen's
account, essentially equivalent to a requirement of negligence with respect to
attitudinal consent.
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about consent to rape or other crimes. 4 For an example
where this view might be plausible, consider one of
Westen's illustrations: Jane expresses voluntary
acquiescence to A but secretly expects and hopes that A
will regard her expression as a joke (163). Certainly in
contexts other than rape, such as physical battery, a legal
rule that public communication defines the wrong is
defensible. Note, too, that once we redefine the social harm
in this way, a mistake of fact about attitudinal consent that
was once legally relevant now becomes, in effect, an
irrelevant mistake of law. In a jurisdiction in which "only
'yes' means 'yes,"' if A makes a reasonable mistake in
believing that S unconditionally desired sex with him, the
mistake is legally irrelevant if S did not affirmatively
express agreement. And if A doesn't realize that absent
affirmatively indicated agreement, he could be guilty of
rape, then that, too, is an irrelevant mistake (about the
scope of the criminal law).
The broader framework that I have suggested also
more easily accommodates additional permutations. For
example, a jurisdiction might employ "only 'yes' means
'yes' for the first sexual encounter between individuals, or
their first act of sexual intercourse, or for any use of
extrinsic force during the sexual act, but it might not
require such affirmative expressions of consent if the
couple has a prior sexual history.
To be sure, Westen might use the reasonable person
(or interpretive community) rubric to capture the idea of
subjectively expressed consent. Perhaps it is just not
reasonable for A to think S has given attitudinal consent
unless he observes that S has tried to express attitudinal
consent by word or conduct; inferring attitudinal consent
from silence is just "unreasonable." But I seriously doubt
that this is in all cases the correct understanding of what a
"reasonable" interpreter would infer. Moreover, this
34. For an example of a jurisdiction that explicitly relies on the contract
analogy in defining consent to rape, see State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn.
1989) ("[Wlhether a complainant has consented to intercourse depends upon her
manifestations of such consent as reasonably construed.").
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approach submerges the critical normative questions
within the murky category of reasonableness. If a state's
social policy, one that it wishes to announce and reinforce,
is the rule of behavior that "only 'yes' means 'yes,"' it is far
more perspicuous to say so directly.
Westen is not without other resources to articulate the
"only 'yes' means 'yes' approach, but his framework
handicaps him. Suppose a case in which S does not satisfy
the criteria of attitudinal consent, does not say anything in
response to A's initiatives, and passively submits to
intercourse. Jurisdictions differ about whether this should
count as a crime of sexual assault. On my approach: (1) a
jurisdiction that wishes to criminalize this conduct (even if
A honestly and reasonably believes that attitudinal consent
is present) would say that legally valid consent to sexual
assault requires subjectively expressed consent, which is
lacking here, and which A will usually know is lacking; but
(2) a jurisdiction that does not wish automatically to
criminalize such conduct would say that, while legal
consent requires only attitudinal consent, in this scenario A
would often have a defense of lack of mens rea as to S's lack
of attitudinal consent. Yet Westen's approach cannot
readily model or explain these results.
Westen does explicitly analyze two topics relevant to
the current discussion-the Antioch College version of
"only 'yes' means 'yes,"' which actually goes so far as to
require a verbal affirmative permission, and the similar
debate over whether "'no' always means 'no."' With respect
to the Antioch policy, Westen points out that under speech
act theory, saying "yes" in response to a request for sex is
an assertive illocutionary act that is a paradigmatic form of
expressive consent (79). But, he observes, this
characterization says little about the normative desirability
of a "yes" requirement, which many rape reformers reject
as too narrow a test of legally valid consent, but which
others find insufficient (79). And in the end, Westen
believes that the Antioch approach is not really a definition
of factual consent at all. Instead, he says, it reflects a
judgment that legally valid consent is not satisfied by
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either attitudinal consent or "expressive" consent, but
instead must take the form of a very specific type of
"expressive" consent, verbal affirmative permission (77).
Although I agree with most of what Westen says here,
I am unpersuaded by his characterization of the Antioch
policy as identifying an instance of attitudinal consent that
fails to satisfy further criteria of legally valid consent. The
Antioch approach is concerned precisely with which kinds
of communications and expressions of acquiescence or
preference suffice for factual consent, which is a
precondition for legal consent. And although, as we will see
in more detail later, there are a number of reasons that
factual consent can fail to qualify as legally valid consent-
reasons of lack of competence, knowledge, or freedom-a
jurisdiction might well endorse the affirmative permission
approach for reasons that do not fall into these three
categories.
Let us turn to what Westen says about a different
bright-line norm, "'no' means 'no."' Westen points out that
this slogan means different things to different people.
Employing speech act theory, he explains that the slogan is
ambiguous. It can be a declaration: by uttering "no," the
woman thereby brings about the state of affairs in which
the man is required to stop or else be guilty of rape. But it
could instead be an illocutionary act: by uttering "no," the
woman is indicating something about her intention-
normally, that she wants the man to stop, but in some
cases, perhaps something else (such as "not yet, but keep
trying") (82). Interestingly enough, Westen observes, the
declarative sense can be satisfied even in cases where the
woman does not subjectively want the man to stop, because
by uttering the words "no" to an explicit or implicit request
35. If some version of subjectively expressed consent were recognized as an
alternative type of factual consent, S would still need to satisfy the additional
conditions of competence and the like in order to validly consent. The Antioch
policy and similar approaches certainly do not imply that a clear "yes" is always
sufficient for legal consent (for example, if this is in response to an explicit threat
of violence, and the demand, "Do you want to be hurt or do you want sex?").
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for sex, the woman actually changes the legal status of the
man's subsequent act, whatever her intentions.
This analysis is parallel to my analysis above of "only
'yes' means 'yes.'" In both situations, the actus reus of rape
or sexual assault can be defined in terms of explicit words
or expressive conduct by S: "yes" grants legal consent (at
least in certain circumstances), and "no" denies it. And in
each case, this legal conclusion can follow without regard to
S's attitudinal consent. This is a perfectly defensible
method of analysis, if one rejects Westen's belief that
attitudinal consent (in his sense) must always be the
cornerstone of legally valid consent. As I have explained,
there is at least as much reason to reject that belief as to
endorse it and then struggle to fit these two approaches
within Westen's other categories of constructive (fictional)
consent or of insufficient competence, knowledge, or
freedom to legally consent.
C. Prescriptive Consent
In his discussion of prescriptive consent, Westen
argues that three additional conditions are needed in order
to transform mere factual consent into legally valid
consent-specific conditions of freedom, knowledge, and
competence. I will review some of the valuable analysis
that he provides here, but will defer until later a discussion
of his most controversial claims about the (in)significance
of force and resistance requirements.
Addressing the "freedom" condition, Westen offers a
useful analysis of different possible conceptions of
"wrongful threats."36 Because factual consent is only a
36. More precisely, Westen draws a distinction between two kinds of (what he
calls) "wrongful force"-(1) wrongful threats, which are conditional and pressure
S to acquiesce in order to avoid the coercer making her situation worse; and (2)
wrongful oppression, which is unconditional and causes S to believe that under
the circumstances, acquiescence is preferable to nonacquiescence. An example of
the latter is where A makes S a captive and terrorizes her over a period of time in
such a way that eventually she prefers having sex with him to the alternatives,
although she does not do so in response to a threat (184). This is an illuminating
conceptual distinction; however, the first category is far more important in
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minimal requirement and does not by itself exclude as
"nonconsensual" even the most extreme threats of violence,
we need some additional principles to distinguish such
threats from relatively innocuous, noncriminal threats such
as a threat to break off a relationship. As Westen points
out, neither a predictive baseline nor a no-worsening
baseline is adequate: an actor might condition sex with S
on a threat not to help save S's child, but we might still
consider the threat illicit (182). Instead, Westen proposes a
normative baseline: a threat is wrongful if it would leave S
"in a worsened position as measured by the worst position
in which the criminal offense at issue allows a person to
leave another as a result of the latter's refusal to acquiesce
to x" (183; italics omitted). Alas, this proposal seems to beg
the question; for what we are looking for is a substantive
account of what that "worst position" is, or should be. (A
jurisdiction could choose a predictive baseline, or a no-
worsening baseline, or a baseline of "the worst position in
which that jurisdiction's laws otherwise permit a person to
leave another" (182, emphasis omitted),37 or something
else.) If Westen's point is that jurisdictions differ in the
approaches they take here, that would be worth
emphasizing; and he might also offer advice about the
policies and principles served by the respective different
approaches.
Westen then distinguishes, and excludes from the
category of "wrongful force," instances of compulsion, where
A overpowers S when S either is not in a position to make
any decision (for example, she is asleep or unconscious) or
when S is unable to prevent A from accomplishing
intercourse (185). In such a case, A brings about
intercourse without any act of will on S's part. Now
Westen's usage here is rather artificial: he concedes that
compulsion is an instance of force "broadly speaking" (185),
but it seems more accurate to say that his exclusion of
compulsion from "force" is using the latter term very
practice.
37. This is Wertheimer's proposal, which Westen rejects (182). See Alan
Wertheimer, Coercion 217-21 (1987).
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narrowly indeed. 8 Also, the term "compulsion" usually
connotes the use of physical force in order to overcome S,
contrary to her desires; but Westen also wishes to use the
term in cases when S invites or desires A's acts of
"compulsion." (A more accurate phrase might be
"overwhelming physical strength."39 ) Nevertheless,
terminology aside, Westen does offer a plausible reason for
the distinction: S could (on exceedingly rare occasions, he
should add!) actually subjectively welcome compulsion, so
even if she does not have power to prevent A's acts, she
might legally consent to them.4 °
Westen's analysis of compulsion is subtle but
important. For it also helps explain why, during acts of
intercourse, when commonly one participant is physically
unable (for brief periods of time) to prevent penetration, we
need not be in the awkward situation of first analyzing the
interaction as presumptively unjustifiable compulsion and
then explaining this away if but only if it is an instance of
advanced consent. (This scenario of acquiescence to
compulsion is even more common in acts of sexual contact
short of intercourse.) For in such cases, the participants
might not have considered and explicitly acquiesced to the
acts in advance, yet it would clearly be incorrect to
conclude that the compulsion makes the act rape, if S
welcomed the compulsion.41
38. In another respect, however, Westen uses "force" extremely broadly, as
any form of pressure on S's choice, as we shall see.
39. Westen, supra note 5, at 350.
40. Here, Westen imagines a (significant!) variation of the famous Morgan
case in which the woman's husband was telling the truth: she really did welcome
the acts of the airmen in surprising her in bed, holding her down, and successfully
having intercourse with her. DPP v. Morgan, [19751 2 W.L.R. 913, discussed at
186. A more common and credible example of his point would be where a woman
agrees with her partner to be passive in a type of rough sexual intercourse such
that she could not prevent intercourse even if she later wanted to.
41. But the question remains: should we distinguish "wrongful" from
legitimate compulsion, a distinction we do draw with threats? Or are compulsion
and threats radically different, as Westen implies? With compulsion, S has no
power to prevent A's acts. With threats, S does have this power, but her choice is
not legally "free" in those instances where the threat is wrongful. So with threats,
when S gives factual consent, this might or might not be legal consent. But with
compulsion, Westen seems to say, if this is one of the unusual cases in which S
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Westen's analysis of the "knowledge" requirement is
also enlightening. Fraud, he points out, undermines legal
consent "by ... misleading S into believing that subjective
acquiesce[ncel to x is more beneficial than it really is"
(188).42 And he provides an excellent analysis of the well-
known case, Boro v. Superior Court.43 In Boro, the
defendant pretended to be a doctor and duped the highly
gullible victim into believing that she was suffering a fatal
disease which could only be cured either by sleeping with
him or by undergoing painful and expensive surgery. The
court reluctantly concluded that the defendant did not
commit rape because the defendant's fraud merely
misrepresented the future benefits of his action. Westen
cogently critiques the state court's analysis of the case
solely in terms of fraud:
In reality, ... the harm Boro inflicted on Ms. R is better
classified as ... sexual intercourse by "force" or "threat."
After all, Boro did not simply mislead Ms. R regarding the
future benefits of having sexual intercourse; rather, he
instilled fear in her by causing her to believe that her
position had conditionally so changed for the worse that she
was induced, illicitly, to acquiesce to sexual intercourse that
she would otherwise have eschewed. (189)
Westen concludes that when fraud induces
acquiescence, the fraud vitiates consent "if S is induced by
A or a third person to acquiesce to x as a result of such false
beliefs regarding A or x ... that preclude a person who
relies upon them from being able to decide whether
engaging in x with A is truly in his or her interests" (189).
Unfortunately, this is more an analytical placeholder than
gives factual consent, this will always be legal consent, too (unless her knowledge
or competence is insufficient).
I believe that Westen is correct here: if S welcomes compulsion in a context
where A does not at the same time threaten a worse alternative, there seems no
basis for describing the compulsion as wrongful.
42. This passage contains one of a significant number of typographical errors
in the book. Presumably these will be corrected in a subsequent printing.
43. 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1985).
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a usable criterion. It does not resolve whether lying, or
misleading statements, or mere omissions, can suffice; nor
whether the requisite false beliefs include not only such
compelling examples as a belief that A does not have AIDS,
but also less compelling ones, such as a belief that A is
unmarried, or that A truly loves S, and the like.
Finally, Westen persuasively argues, against
objections, that competence is a third condition of
prescriptive consent, independent of the other two
conditions (189). Young children, he points out, can be
freed from pressures and provided specific information, but
their acquiescence is still legally insufficient for legal
consent, because "they are too young to be able to assess
their long-term interests"(191); and the same may be true
of adults whose judgment is impaired by intoxicants or
mental disabilities.
D. Prospective and Retrospective Consent
One of the most fascinating chapters in the book
concerns the legal validity of consent that is given not
contemporaneously with x, but either prospectively or
retrospectively. As Westen explains, Anglo-American law
strongly privileges contemporaneous assessments, but
sometimes does recognize noncontemporaneous assessments,
though it does so much more frequently for prospective than
for retrospective consent (248).
With respect to prospective consent, Westen draws an
important distinction between cases in which S will later
be incapable of consent (e.g., where S executes a living will,
or where S consents to surgery during which S will be
unconscious) and cases in which S will later be capable of
consent.44 The latter category includes the classic story of
44. Westen says that that the rationale for allowing prospective consent when
S will later be incapable of consent is that this will enhance S's overall well-being
(250). This explanation seems too crude. Suppose S decides in a living will not to
permit extraordinary efforts to keep him alive. His rationale might be to save his
family expense or emotional trauma; to be legitimate, these reasons need not be
understood as contributing to S's overall well-being.
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Odysseus and the Sirens: Odysseus instructs his crew to tie
him to the mast and to ignore his later pleas to be untied,
so that he can hear the Sirens but not succumb to their
deadly entreaties. It also includes cases such as a timid
skydiver prospectively requesting to be pushed out the door
over the objection he knows he will raise at the time. In
this category of cases, Westen explains, the actor's
prospective consent, in order to be valid, must be
irrevocable. Moreover, this category includes both
reciprocal agreements (such as plea bargains and
commercial contracts) and unilateral decisions to give up
rights in order to protect one's own interests. Westen points
out that jurisdictions are legitimately more reluctant to
permit irrevocable prospective consent when the
commitment is nonreciprocal rather than reciprocal (252)."5
The proper analysis of retrospective consent, Westen
observes, is especially difficult to discern. Consider three of
Westen's examples. First, suppose S1 and Al are lovers.
One night, S1 awakes to discover that Al is (without any
prior agreement) having sexual intercourse with her.
Suppose she immediately embraces him, saying "This is
nice-we should do it this way again" (254). Second,
Westen recalls the famous scene from Gone with the Wind,
in which Rhett Buttler seizes his wife Scarlett O'Hara
during an argument and carries her struggling up to the
bedroom. In the morning, she is full of love for Rhett.
Westen points out that without regard to whether the
sexual intercourse that we can assume occurred was
consensual, Scarlett clearly did not factually consent at the
time to the physical assault of being carried up the stairs.
Third (and here Westen addresses an example from Joel
Feinberg), suppose S3 is violently attacked by A3, who is
45. See 252-53:
Significantly, jurisdictions tend to [permit irrevocable nonreciprocal
commitments] only with respect to subjects who reasonably believe
beforehand that, though they may retain some competence to assess their
own interests by the time of the event, their competence at that time will
be substantially diminished, whether because of fear .... psychological
pressure..., or other perceptual impairment ....
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then a stranger. She presses rape charges. But she
gradually falls in love with him, drops charges, and
concludes that if she had known him as well then as she
knows him now, she would have consented (255). We might
be inclined to deny that a harm has been done to S1, to
Scarlett (with respect to being carried, while struggling, up
the stairs), or (most controversially) to S3. Such cases,
Westen explains, demonstrate the paradoxical quality of
retrospective consent.
In the third example, Westen persuasively argues, the
retrospective feelings of S3 do not render the initial act
harmless; rather, although S3 now forgives A3, she may
still feel she was initially harmed. Perhaps she would have
acquiesced to what he did given what she now knows, but
this doesn't mean she did acquiesce (256). On the other
hand, Westen believes that the first two examples do
involve a form of retrospective consent that vitiates the
harm to the victim. In the case of Scarlett:
Scarlett appears not to feel assaulted at all. She seems to
feel that Rhett knew better than she did what she wanted
for herself. Like other people who are forced into situations
they later come to embrace, Scarlett seems pleased in
retrospect that Rhett disregarded her opposition, pleased
that Rhett did something that she now embraces as a
furthering of her interests, though she failed to realize it at
the time. (256)
This is a controversial analysis. It is defensible; as
Westen says, Scarlett can be analogized to a religious cult
member who is later grateful that his parents
deprogrammed him because they knew what was in his
interests better than he did (256). But we should also bear
in mind the concrete social context of this particular change
of heart. Some will plausibly object that the retrospective
acquiescence of a woman in Scarlett's situation should not
be treated as legal consent because she cannot reliably
judge what is in her own best interest, given the violent
and misogynistic pressures she continues to face.
(However, Westen's model can accommodate this
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objection-for example, by declaring that in some instances
of retrospective consent, S lacks sufficient competence, or
even, and more radically, by presuming lack of competence
in all such instances.)
Still, retrospective consent does pose a difficulty that
contemporaneous and even prospective consent do not: with
retrospective consent, there is a period of time (from the
time of x to the time of the retrospective consent) during
which S suffers wrongful harm (257). Yet this difficulty
dissolves, according to Westen, once S gives retrospective
consent. For at this point, he says,
the conduct is something that S chooses for herself and,
hence, something that not only is no longer a wrongful harm
to S but that is no wrongful harm ... at all. Thus, when
Scarlett decides after the fact that she wants Rhett to have
done to her what he did to her, Rhett's actions not only
cease to be a wrong to Scarlett, but cease to have been a
wrong to her. (257)
I'm not sure the problem can be dissolved so easily,
however. Understanding consent in this tenseless sense, as
"what S wants A to have done to her," simply papers over
the problem. S can now be glad that A did something that
she earlier opposed, but I don't think she can "want" or
"choose" something that she cannot influence, i.e., A's past
conduct. And this is not merely a linguistic point. Whether
S's later wishes and attitudes should always have priority
over her earlier ones in assessing her best interests or in
protecting her autonomy is an open question. At the very
least, ceteris paribus conditions need to be observed;
obviously a later preference that is less knowledgeable,
competent, or free than the earlier one might be ignored.
But the problem is deeper, for it seems to implicate
questions of personal identity over time. Thus, suppose the
"prior" person knows that she is likely later to embrace a
person who violently attacks her in a particular way
(perhaps based on an earlier experience), and is likely to
view the attack as not harmful at all; and suppose she
hates this about herself. If this happens again, and she
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does come to embrace the person, does her retrospective
consent serve her overall interests? Wouldn't we want to
permit her to precommit not to let this situation happen
again in the future? But wouldn't such a precommitment
plausibly serve her long-term interests and her autonomy?
A similar problem arises with Westen's analysis of the
objection that if we recognize retrospective consent, we
must recognize retrospective non-consent (where S
acquiesced at the time of x but at some later time rejects x,
such that she does not factually consent at the later time4").
Westen points out that mens rea requirements protect A
here, but he concedes that from S's perspective,
retrospective non-consent "causes her to have suffered all
along the primary harm that the offense of non-consent
seeks to prevent" (260). Once again, however, it is fair to
ask why the later views of S necessarily control what was
in S's interests, and, indeed, to ask what it means to speak
of "'S's interests" simpliciter, over and above S's interests at
time one or at time two. And the answer, presumably, will
depend on the time frames, and on the reasons why the
later judgment might better represent S's long-term
interests. S's reflection for a few days is less likely to lead
to better judgment than her reflection over a few years.
And the judgment of a fifty-year-old might take priority
over that of his twenty-year-old predecessor, but the
judgment of a ninety-year-old might not deserve priority
over that of his fifty-year-old counterpart.
Westen points out that jurisdictions almost always
decline to give effect to retrospective consent, for a number
of plausible reasons (257). 47 But perhaps the substantive
46. I confess to some puzzlement with Westen's analysis here, given his
definition of factual consent. If at a later time S views x favorably, while at the
time she did not factually consent to it, how can the later view count as actual
factual consent, since S does not, at this later point in time, have an option to
acquiesce to x, a past event? This seems instead to be an instance of hypothetical
consent, where S is answering the counterfactual question, "Would I have
acquiesced to x at the time it occurred, if I then had had the feelings I now have
about A?"
47. Westen thoughtfully identifies three reasons. First, A will typically still
satisfy the mens rea requirement, even when S retrospectively consents. (But,
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problems I have mentioned are, or at least should be,
additional reasons for pause. (Westen also acknowledges
that jurisdictions have good reason to insist that
retrospective consent be a settled state of mind (262); but
this acknowledgement is in tension with his rejection of a
similar requirement for contemporaneous consent, as I
discuss above.)
E. Constructive Consent
As noted above, Westen identifies three categories of
consent that he considers "fictional," in the sense that they
impute legally valid consent to S even though she fails to
satisfy the standards of prescriptive consent: constructive
consent, "informed" consent, and hypothetical consent.
"Like all legal fictions," Westen claims, "fictions of
prescriptive consent can be replaced with functionally
equivalent rules that make no reference to consent" (272). I
agree with Westen that these three categories differ
significantly from standard prescriptive consent, but I
believe that he fails to appreciate their similarities to
prescriptive consent and why, in most instances, they all
still deserve the name "consent," and indeed could not be
adequately understood without reference to consent, at
least in the broad sense of the term. In this and the next
two sections, I will try to defend this objection.48
Westen points out, on rare occasions A might know or reasonably believe that S
will subsequently retrospectively consent, so in these cases, he should not be
guilty; in the other cases, however, he should be guilty only of attempt, since
retrospective consent eliminates the actus reus element of nonconsensual harm.)
Second, it is often difficult to distinguish true retrospective consent from S's
desire not to prosecute, or S's decision to forgive. And third, retrospective consent
is especially arbitrary because it could in principle occur at any time-the day
after, weeks later, even years later-and could, whenever S changes her mind
about whether she has experienced harm, repeatedly transform vitiated harm
into legally recognized harm and back again.
48. Westen does acknowledge that the fictions serve a function: the three
types possess common features, and "further some of the same values of personal
agency that underlie acts of prescriptive consent" (272). Still, he underemphasizes
or loses sight of this point in his later analysis, as we shall see.
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Let us begin with constructive consent-a rule of law
that, according to Westen, does not really depend on
consent at all, yet is framed in terms of consent.
(Sometimes, he points out, the overbroad term "implied
consent" is used for this idea. 9) One of Westen's example is
wonderfully colorful: the "Fastidious Football Fan" likes to
watch games but hates any physical contact with other
fans, and publicly so states while in the stands.
Nevertheless, the law will deem him to consent to such
contacts (322); indeed, remarkably, Westen discovers an
explicit Delaware criminal statute that so provides." As
another example, a jurisdiction that requires drivers
suspected of drunk driving to give blood alcohol tests might
justify this as based on the driver's "implied consent" or
"constructive consent" to the test (277). Even if it were
clear that a particular driver objected to this policy, the
policy might be upheld based on this "fictional" rationale.
Westen correctly asserts that applying a consensual
rationale in these circumstances stretches that rationale
beyond the rationale for prescriptive consent, and surely
cannot depend on the mere fact that the driver engaged in
some type of voluntary act. But he also acknowledges that
"the principle that underlies rules regarding compulsory
blood-alcohol testing shares a family resemblance to the
principle that underlies defenses of prescriptive consent"
(278-79). For the driver "voluntarily participated in a social
practice [of driving] in the expectation of benefiting from it
... the benefits of which depend upon the willingness of
participants to make certain personal sacrifices," including
49. Westen helpfully observes that "implied consent" can mean either
"imputed (or constructive) consent" or consent implied in fact. (This ambiguity
causes confusion in tort law, as well.) The latter type of consent simply refers to a
subset of prescriptive expressive consent, where S employs words or language
that, as conventionally understood, indirectly imply acquiescence-for example, a
patient says "start the anesthesia," implying that he is willing to begin the
procedure of having his tooth pulled (274).
50. "Any person who enters the presence of other people consents to the
normal physical contacts incident to such presence." Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 451
(1999), discussed at 322.
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obeying traffic rules and accepting blood-alcohol tests when
drunk driving is suspected (278).
Still, Westen treats prescriptive consent to an act x of
sexual intercourse as a more fundamental and more
genuine form of consent than constructive consent to a
social activity. In the latter case, although S consents to the
package, he does not consent to each of its elements; he
might prefer to be able to drive without being subject to
drunk-driving tests, or (in the case of the Fastidious Fan)
to watch sporting events without any risk of physical
contact from fellow fans.
But I think the contrast is overstated. After all, factual
consent to x, which is a precondition of actual (rather than
imputed) prescriptive consent, itself includes conditional
preference; and yet conditional preference, like constructive
consent, involves S's consenting to a package but not to
each of the package's elements. That is, when S
conditionally prefers x, a state of affairs including sex with
A, over y, a state of affairs excluding sex with A but
including some detriment that S would prefer to avoid, she
might consent to x quite reluctantly, simply to avoid that
detriment. (Suppose S consents to sex only to avoid A
breaking off the relationship.)
Moreover, in a surprisingly wide range of cases, sexual
contacts are better understood as instances of constructive
consent and not as instances of the narrower idea of
prescriptive consent. If S and A enthusiastically kiss at
time T1, and A unilaterally kisses S at time T2, only
moments later, this will be treated as constructive consent,
even if S then subjectively objects; but it will not be treated
as constructive consent if T2 occurs after they have broken
up, or if it occurs a year later (A and S having never
developed a relationship), and so forth. By the same token,
if A unilaterally follows the kiss at T1 with a slightly more
intimate gesture moments later, that, too, will most likely
fall within constructive consent;5' but the same is not true
51. But this might not be true in a jurisdiction or institution strictly applying
the "only 'yes' means 'yes' approach to any "escalation" of sexual intimacy (e.g.,
the rules that Antioch college applies).
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if A unilaterally follows the kiss with an aggressive act of
sexual penetration. Complex social conventions are very
important here in determining what forms of sexual
contact are considered acceptable instances of constructive
consent, even if they are not instances of factual consent.
And finally, I think we tend to assume too readily that
what S consents to is precisely x (say, the act of sexual
intercourse). Quite often, what S is really consenting to is a
package including x, but not to x itself. Of course, all cases
of conditional preference involve consent only to a package.
But even some cases of unconditional preference might best
be understood, not as consent precisely to x, but as consent
to what x will facilitate, or consent to a physical act very
similar to x. Thus, if S sleeps with A because she thinks
this will help maintain a relationship (but without any
threat by A to cut off the relationship if she does not), while
regretting that she has to have sex on this occasion, it
seems that she is consenting to the package including x,
but not unconditionally consenting to x itself. Or, if she
agrees to sex with a longtime partner, believing that this
will involve her being more active and aggressive than A
(which is their usual pattern), but on this occasion A
surprises her by taking a more active role, we might
conclude that she didn't expect or consent to precisely that
physical interaction, though after the fact, she has no
complaint. Again, in order to characterize this as an
instance of legal consent, we might need to rely on
constructive consent (or at least retrospective consent).52
Whether we view a particular instance of constructive
consent as essentially dissimilar from prescriptive consent,
or instead as having a close family resemblance, does
matter. Consider a doctrine often conceptualized as
"implied" or constructive consent: the traditional marital
exemption from rape, which deemed a married woman to
consent to acts of violence by her husband, even if she did
not satisfy the criteria for consent that would have applied
52. Westen does recognize some difficulties in determining the requisite
specificity of "x" (see 195-201), but I believe that these problems are more
pervasive than he suggests.
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had she not been married to him. The exemption, Westen
points out, still survives in some form in many jurisdictions
(275). Westen claims that a jurisdiction can frame the
marital exemption in terms of actus reus without reference
to consent, by simply excluding married women from
eligible victims; or it can invoke a fiction of prescriptive
consent (275-76). But I believe that the choice of frame is
significant: by invoking the "fiction" of consent, and
explicitly deeming the married woman to consent, thejurisdiction is asserting two things: first, that her situation
is normatively equivalent to that of a woman who actually
consents (thus, the imputation) insofar as both count as
legal consent; and second, that the reason for this
normative equivalence is a family resemblance between the
cases, i.e., a set of justifying principles that are at least
broadly similar and that fall within some plausible, generic
conception of consent.
To be sure, Westen is entirely correct in pointing out
that the marital exemption does not rely on actual proof
that the woman factually (prospectively) consents, in either
the attitudinal or expressive sense (323). Accordingly, he is
also correct that one cannot persuasively reject the marital
exemption merely on the ground that most married woman
do not actually factually consent in either sense to acts of
violence that would otherwise be rape. But I think he
misses part of the traditional rationale for the exemption,
which presumably was to consider a woman's decision to
marry as a voluntary waiver of a wide array of rights she
would otherwise have, in deference to her husband's
interests. Of course, this is not a rationale that we consider
legitimate today. But it is indeed a type of consensual
rationale, and this helps explain why treating the marital
exemption as an aspect of (rather than a completely
arbitrary "fiction" of) consent once seemed sensible.
Westen also notes a fallacious argument that some
courts employ to reject the marital exemption-the
argument that one can discredit the doctrine as a valid
form of legal consent simply by showing that it is a fiction
of prescriptive consent. Rather, Westen explains, courts
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must show that this is an unacceptable fiction, unlike, say,
the Delaware statute that treats a person as consenting to
the minor physical contacts incident to his entering the
presence of others (325). This is an important point.
Instances of constructive consent are much more prevalent
than is generally realized, as Westen's and my own
examples show. But the problem has received too little
attention and analysis. Accordingly, courts tend to rely on
ad hoc intuitions more than principle in distinguishing the
situations in which criminal liability will and will not be
excluded. (A very similar problem arises in tort law as well;
instead of articulating criteria of assumption of risk, courts
today often relegate the problem to the obscure multifactor
inquiry that the "limited duty of care" category requires.5 3)
My endorsement of the vague concept of "family
resemblance" (a concept that Westen also acknowledges)
merely points in the direction of a more promising and
more principled analysis.
F. "Informed" Consent (Assumption of Risk)
Westen's second category of imputed consent is what
he calls "informed consent." Here, he is discussing what
courts in tort cases usually denominate assumption of
risk.5 4 These are cases in which S knowingly accepts a risk
of x but does not factually or legally consent to x itself
(280). Thus, suppose x is a harmful side-effect of surgery. If
53. See Simons, supra note 11, at 498-503.
54. In tort law, "informed consent" is more often used to describe the doctrine,
whether analyzed as battery or negligence, imposing tort liability for performing
a medical procedure p without obtaining the patient's adequate consent to p, in
the sense that the medical practitioner does not sufficiently inform the patient of
p's nature and risks. By contrast, Westen uses the phrase in a very special sense.
Westen is instead considering whether S consents to the harm x resulting from p
in either of two situations: (a) where S agrees to the medical procedure (or
physical contact) p, and would agree to p even if S realized that the risk of harm x
resulting from p was a certainty; (b) where S agrees to p, but would not agree to p
if S realized that the resulting risk of x was a certainty (282). In Westen's view,
(a) is a straightforward case of prescriptive consent to x, while (b) cannot be so
analyzed. Rather, if (b) does not result in criminal liability, it is because S has
given "informed consent" to x (or, I would say, has validly assumed the risk of x).
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S agrees to surgery, and would agree to surgery even if he
knew for certain that x would occur, then he prescriptively
consents to x. In effect, Westen treats this as a conditional
preference case: although S would surely prefer to obtain
the benefits of the surgery without the side effect, he is
willing to suffer the side effect to obtain the benefit, just as
S might be willing to have sex with A in order to keep a
relationship intact but might most prefer not to be faced
with the choice. By contrast, if S agrees to surgery but is
only willing to accept a small risk of x, not a certainty, in
order to secure the benefits of the surgery, then S does not
prescriptively consent to x. If his agreement is nevertheless
deemed to be legally sufficient consent, it must be an
instance of a different category of consent than prescriptive
consent.
Moreover, Westen continues, this different category, of
"informed" consent, demands a different analysis: S validly
consents to a risk of x only if he has sufficient knowledge of
the risk, and only if he is justified in taking the risk (283).
It is not socially justifiable to engage in street fighting, so a
brawler has no valid "informed consent" defense that the
other fighter agreed to the fight and knew of the risks of
serious injury; but it can be justifiable to engage in
competitive boxing, so a boxer indeed has a valid defense
that the other boxer knew of the risks of harm. The
justification, according to Westen, depends on a balancing
of the social benefits of the activity with the activity's risks
of harm. Westen concludes:
Ultimately, of course, rules of informed consent are legal
fictions. The fiction is that because persons prescriptively
acquiesce to risks of x, they also prescriptively acquiesce to x
itself. (283)
Westen is correct to point out that the prescriptive
consent and "informed consent" categories are distinct, and
demand distinct analysis. But I believe that he understates
the commonality between the two concepts, and
exaggerates by calling assumption of risk (or "informed
consent") a "fiction" of prescriptive consent.
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Let me begin with three preliminary observations.
First, notice an intriguing and surprising aspect of
Westen's analysis here: prescriptive consent, it turns out, is
a much broader concept than his initial definition might
suggest. And one consequence of this broad definition of
prescriptive consent is that "informed" consent need not be
invoked as frequently as one might have imagined.
Specifically, Westen indicates that prescriptive consent
to x does not require that S hope for or even expect x to
occur. Rather, it suffices that S would have preferred to
engage in the relevant act had S believed that x was
certain to occur (even if in fact, when she decided in favor
of the act, she believed the probability of x to be much less
than a certainty). For example, if S would prefer even the
certainty of suffering a broken finger to not playing a game
of high school football, then we need not rely on "informed"
consent to preclude the criminal liability of another player,
for S does give prescriptive consent (even if S believed and
hoped that the injury would not occur) (281).
This is a subtle and significant point. Still, even this
broader conception of prescriptive consent will very often
not be instantiated in surgical situations, or even in contact
sports. If x is a serious and permanent injury, of course, S
would almost never prefer x (nor any package of which x
was a part). And even if x is merely a physical contact or
minor injury, often S would not prefer x, if the preference
set is defined in a temporally limited way, as what S would
choose on that single occasion.55
In the second place, notice that the sports and medical
procedure fact patterns that Westen is addressing under
"informed" consent are quite different from most of the
sexual assault scenarios in which the issue of consent
55. Notice how sensitive the prescriptive consent characterization is to the
time dimension. If we ask, "Would you play a game of football knowing that an
unusually hard hit will happen?," the answer might be no; if we ask, "Would you
play a season of football, knowing that an unusually hard hit will occur at some
point during the season?," it might be yes. Indeed, if we ask, "Would you play
basketball for ten seconds, knowing that you will get knocked hard to the
ground?," the answer might be no; but if we ask, "Would you play a game knowing
that this will occur once during the game?," the answer might be yes.
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arises: S typically wants the benefits of the game, or the
procedure, and regrets that any risk of harm exists, while
both participants in sexual relations often unconditionally
desire sex. Nevertheless, some scenarios in the sexual
context are more analogous: when A places S in a
threatening or merely uncomfortable choice situation, S
might prefer to avoid sex yet choose it in order to avoid a
greater burden or obtain a benefit (such as continuation of
the relationship). Still, these last scenarios will not often
involve S acquiescing to a mere risk that (undesired) sex
will occur;56  after all, if S expresses agreement, it is
normally within A's power to complete the sexual act with
acquiescing S. Thus, assumption of a mere risk of x will
rarely be at issue when x is sexual intercourse or sexual
assault.57
56. A very different set of issues arises when it is claimed that S, by dressing
provocatively, or walking alone in a city at night, or inviting a man to her room,
or agreeing to an act of prostitution, is assuming the risk of rape by A. For here,
S's prior conduct does not reflect or express any willingness that rape or even a
risk of rape occur. Put differently, A's conduct remains a wrong to her, even if she
realizes that her choices increase the risk of rape. Indeed, I believe that A's
conduct would be a wrong to her, and her decision to engage in the "risky"
conduct would not amount to a legal defense of consent, even if her mental state
and conduct would satisfy the standards of prescriptive consent (i.e., even if she
still would have walked alone at night or invited the man to her room had she
believed it virtually certain that she would thereby suffer a sexual assault). We
can account for these conclusions by saying that she is clearly entitled to freedom
of action in these situations, so even if she satisfies the criteria of factual consent,
she does not satisfy the condition of freedom required for legal consent. (In tort
law, courts recognize a "plaintiff no-duty" rule: the victim has no duty not to walk
alone at night, even if this conduct increases the risk of harm; accordingly, the
victim's conduct is ignored in any comparative fault judgment. See Ellen M.
Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 Colum.
L. Rev. 1413 (1999).)
57. Here are some rare examples:
(1) S is uninterested in sex tonight, and verbally agrees to sex only because
her partner A insists, and only because she believes that A will very probably lose
interest due to fatigue. Thus, she has acquiesced in only a small risk that A will
initiate sex.
(2) A threatens S with serious violence; S contemplates resisting, but
decides to acquiesce only because she thinks a passerby will very likely arrive in
time to prevent A from engaging in intercourse. Thus, she knowingly takes a
small risk that A will commit a rape.
But it is very doubtful that the legal validity of S's consent in these cases
should turn on whether she prescriptively consents to sex (i.e., she believes sex is
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Third, note that comparing consent to sexual assault
with consent to risks of harm in medical procedures and in
recreational or sporting activities to some extent compares
apples and oranges. The criminal law defense of consent to
rape or sexual assault focuses on whether S has acquiesced
to the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact, and not
whether she has consented to the emotional or physical
harms (or the risks of such harms) that might result from
that contact. But the defense of consent to assault or
battery focuses on whether S has acquiesced to the harm
resulting from a medical procedure or from a physical
contact (or to the risk of such harm); for it is often not
disputed that S acquiesced to the procedure or the contact
itself, and in any event the crime of assault typically
prohibits, not merely causing a nonconsensual physical
contact, but bringing about a specified physical injury.
These distinct legal definitions of the prohibited actus reus
help explain why the issue of assumption of risk arises
much less often in sexual assault prosecutions.
(Nevertheless, lack of awareness of risk can become legally
relevant even in a sexual assault case if the jurisdiction
finds acquiescence to sex legally inadequate because S
lacks sufficient knowledge of the resulting risks from sex-
for example, when A has concealed or lied about his HIV-
positive condition.)
Nevertheless, although the characteristic factual
contexts of assumption of risk and prescriptive consent
differ, the underlying rationales for precluding criminal
liability in the two categories are quite similar, and much
more similar than Westen suggests. In each, minimal
conditions of competence, freedom, and knowledge are
required. And to a significant extent, the differences in
certain to occur, or she would consent had she so believed) or only assumes the
risk of x (she believes sex is much less probable). In the first scenario, S would
likely have legally consented regardless of whether she gave prescriptive consent
or instead only assumed the risk; and in the second scenario, S would
undoubtedly not have given legal consent regardless of the type of case. It is
difficult to conceive of a sexual assault case in which prescriptive consent would
not be recognized but (on otherwise similar facts) assumption of risk would be
recognized.
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criteria are only questions of degree, merely reflecting the
differences in the probability of the harm that S is willing
to accept. For reasons of space, I will merely sketch out this
argument.
In a case of assumption of risk, although S would not
consent to a certainty of x under the circumstances, he does
consent to some specified level of risk (say 5%) of x under
the circumstances; and we could easily define the requisite
criteria of assumption of risk analogously to the criteria of
prescriptive consent. Thus, we can say:
(1) S must unconditionally or conditionally prefer a 5%
risk of x, or must "indifferently" leave that choice of risk
to A;
(2) perhaps the law should consider whether S has
expressed that preference (see discussion of subjectively
expressed consent, above), or should consider how a
reasonable observer would understand the preference;
and
(3) the preference must satisfy specified criteria of
competence, knowledge, and freedom.
Of course, insofar as S is only willing to take this smaller
risk, it is much more likely that the risk will be considered
justifiable and thus that a knowing acceptance of the risk
will constitute legal consent. Agreeing to a 5% chance of
serious permanent injury in a wrestling match might be
justifiable and qualify as legal consent, while agreeing to a
100% probability might not and might not so qualify.58 But
the nature of the analysis is not fundamentally different in
the two contexts.
58. When Westen speaks of "justifiability" here, presumably he is indicating
that the choice fails to satisfy either the "freedom" or "competence" criterion, i.e.,
if the state determines that the risk is "unjustifiable," in effect it is concluding
that S's acceptance of such a risk is not sufficiently "free" (given the constraints
he faces) or is not sufficiently "competent" (given the very serious setback to his
welfare). Alternatively, perhaps Westen is addressing pure paternalistic
justifications, and would treat them outside his basic framework, as follows: even
if S's choice satisfies all the usual criteria of competence, knowledge, and freedom,
the state sometimes has an overriding interest in deciding what is best for S. On
either view, however, justifiability can be understood similarly when S consents
to x and when S consents to a risk of x.
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The rationales for permitting relatively low-level risk
taking include respect for autonomy and freedom of choice,
notwithstanding predictable and significant risks to the
welfare of the participants. In other words, with both high-
level and low-level risks, a critical question in judging
whether it is permissible for an actor to pose the risk, and
whether another actor's knowing acceptance of the risk
counts as legal consent, is whether the state has a
sufficient interest in overriding the actors' preferences.
What are the appropriate scope and limits of state
paternalism?
Accordingly, insofar as Westen might be suggesting
that a utilitarian cost-benefit judgment is required to
determine the permissible range of self-endangering
conduct, the suggestion is both descriptively inaccurate and
normatively incomplete if not erroneous. Or, to use
Westen's terminology, the concept of a risk's "social
benefits" is complex; it can and should include
considerations of autonomy. Prescriptive consent itself
need not depend on utilitarian analysis: to a considerable
extent, the law permits individuals to make autonomous
choices that arguably do not serve their own best interests,
or the best interests of society, and thus do not further
utility (however understood). For example, actors might
choose to engage in very "rough" sex that they will later
regret, or to have sex in order to prolong a psychological
unhealthy relationship, or to undergo cosmetic surgery that
they realize will cause very painful and prolonged side-
effects, or to participate in boxing or wrestling. For similar
reasons, the legal validity of assumption of risk does not
depend on a judgment that the choice is "reasonable" or
"justifiable" in the sense of promoting social utility. 9
59. For further discussion of this theme, see Simons, supra note 11, at 505.
Westen discusses my own account of assumption of risk in a footnote (299-
300 n.43). On that account, S assumes a risk in tort law if and only if S prefers
the risky alternative that A provided to the less risky alternative that A tortiously
failed to provide (and that most potential victims would prefer). So if passenger S
encourages driver A to speed, S would be precluded from tort recovery on my
"risk-preference" account, while passenger T who did not have or express such a
preference would be entitled to recover. Westen questions whether this account
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Finally, recall Westen's claim that ultimately
"informed" consent rests on a legal fiction that because S
consents to the risk of x, she gives prescriptive consent to x
itself. Here I must disagree. Assumption of risk or
"informed" consent is not a fiction at all. For no thoughtful
observer believes that by factually or legally consenting to
a risk of x, one necessarily factually or legally consents to x
itself. Rather, the decision to treat both as legally valid
forms of consent is an obvious case of the law having (good
or bad) reasons for treating one form of consent the same
for purposes of criminal liability as another.
Consider Westen's helpful definition of "fiction,"
provided in another section of the book:
should apply to criminal law, and indeed seems to question the validity of the
account in any context: he asserts that the risks that A offers to S are either
unjustifiable or justifiable, so S's personal risk preference should be irrelevant.
But I believe that intermediate categories exist, where the activity offered
by A is neither justified for all who encounter it, nor unjustified for all who
encounter it. If the activity is skating on a very rough ice skating surface, perhaps
this is wrongful to offer to most skaters, but not to those skaters who fully prefer
this because it provides an extra challenge or because they have unusual skill.
Put differently, traditional assumption of risk could be recharacterized as a
selective no-duty rule: in the above example, A owes a duty of care to T but not to
S. See Simons, supra note 11, at 500.
On the other hand, it might also be true, as Westen suggests, that the
criteria for barring tort recovery on the basis of assumption of risk properly differ
from the criteria for precluding criminal liability on that basis. Perhaps criminal
law should ordinarily look at assumption of risk wholesale, not retail, treating A's
actions as unjustifiable or justifiable, period, without regard to S's preferences. In
my example, if S encourages A to speed, S can't recover in tort in states that take
traditional assumption of risk seriously. But in criminal law, perhaps we should
just determine whether A is criminally negligent or reckless in subjecting S to
this risk, whether or not S agrees to it in some sense; for in criminal law, we are
concerned with A's responsibility to the public, while in tort, we are also or
instead concerned with S's right to obtain relief from A. (Even if, on the facts, A
endangered only S, criminal law can legitimately be concerned with punishing A.)
Indeed, precisely because traditional tort assumption of risk often involves A
posing unjustifiable risks to some (but not to others who consent to the risk), A's
conduct is often appropriately subject to criminal regulation, even if those others
are not legally entitled to tort damages if injured.
Another illustration of the difference between tort and criminal law
approaches to these issues is the treatment of injuries from illegal fights. Some
states provide that even participants in illegal fights who are subject to criminal
prosecution are not subject to tort liability, because of the choice of the victim to
participate.
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A fiction is a misrepresentation, a statement of something
that, on its own premises, is necessarily false. In expressing
a legal fiction, a speaker consciously or unconsciously refers
to the absence of a certain fact as the occurrence of that very
fact. (292)
In this sense, assumption of risk is hardly a fiction. It is a
straightforward idea, easily understood. And its definition
and analysis can be perfectly parallel to the definition and
analysis of prescriptive consent.6 °
G. Hypothetical Consent
Westen describes hypothetical consent as a category of
imputed consent in which "S would have prescriptively
consented to x or to a risk of x ifS had had the opportunity,
which S did not" (284). He points out that the idea is used,
though somewhat differently, both in moral and political
theory, and in criminal law. In political theory, consent "is
at most a conceptual device for formulating new criminal
offenses, not an interpretive device for giving meaning to
the term 'consent' under existing offenses" (285). And
Westen nicely summarizes the precise assumptions of
criminal law's version of the concept as applied to a subject
who might have once been competent but at the time of x is
not.e"
Westen explains that medical treatment of
unconscious or incompetent patients is often justified by
this type of hypothetical consent, which (unfortunately) is
frequently identified by the unhelpful label "implied
consent." The difficult questions here are when an
60. Westen does acknowledge that both assumption of risk and prescriptive
consent rules enhance S's autonomy by immunizing A from criminal liability
(284). This recognition is hard to reconcile with his assertion that assumption of
risk is a fiction.
61. The assumptions include: considering everything known about S including
her distinct values and idiosyncrasies; imagining that for a brief moment, S
regains her competence (or gains new competence) and decides how she wishes to
be treated when her incompetence reoccurs; and supposing that S has the benefit
of the information about her condition that those responsible for her welfare now
have (285).
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advanced directive not to treat will negate hypothetical
consent, and what type of presumptions should be
employed, e.g., in favor of life-saving treatment.
Hypothetical consent is, of course, distinct from actual
consent. As Ronald Dworkin observed in the context of
political justification, "[A] counterfactual consent is not
some pale form of consent. It is no consent at all."62 And one
might therefore expect Westen to emphasize the fictional
and misleading nature of hypothetical consent.
Interestingly enough, he does not. In response to others'
objection that hypothetical consent is a dangerous legal
fiction, Westen argues that it is indeed a fiction, but it need
not be a dangerous or misleading one. Westen
acknowledges that determining hypothetical consent
requires a counterfactual inquiry that is sometimes
difficult to answer. Nevertheless, "a counterfactual
statement is not a fiction because it is not invariably false,
and it does not refer to a thing by anything other than
what it is, namely, a counterfactual" (292). What is fictional
about hypothetical consent, Westen continues, is that it
invokes counterfactual facts that plausibly are true of S
(that she would have consented) in order to attribute to S
facts that could not possibly be true (that S actually did
give prescriptive consent) (293). But this is not a dangerous
fiction, Westen believes, insofar as it is not misleading. And
there is indeed widespread recognition that incompetent
and unconscious persons do not actually choose medical
treatment for themselves.
I largely agree with Westen's analysis here, but I
would give greater emphasis to the value of at least certain
legal fictions. One of the reasons that this particular fiction
is not misleading is that it is an appropriate, persuasive
analogy. To be sure, even a completely arbitrary fiction
need not be misleading. If we decided to call A's justifiable
self-defense against S an instance of S's "consent to
defensive force," and if everyone understood that the new
label was merely that, then the fiction would not be
62. R.M. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 278 (1985).
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misleading. But it would also be pointless. And the legal
fictions of consent that Westen identifies do have a point: to
identify different types of consensual behavior that deserve
equivalent legal treatment.
Westen does recognize that fictions of Y can be
beneficial in the way I have suggested, by revealing the
underlying values that Y and the fiction of Y have in
common. He indicates that the fiction of hypothetical
consent is valuable because it "convey[s] what the decision
regarding [an incompetent patient] shares with decisions
regarding competent patients on life support, namely, that
both are entitled to be treated as much as possible as
agents of their own well-being" (293). Westen's
acknowledgement has wider significance: in most of the
imputed consent contexts that he addresses, the argument
against criminal liability rests on similar values of
respecting S's autonomy and agency, and protecting A from
criminal sanction when his actions demonstrate such
respect.63
III. THE CONTROVERSIAL CLAIMS
Perhaps the most striking and provocative claims in
the book are these (related) assertions:
(1) A force requirement is largely coextensive with a
simple non-consent requirement. Accordingly, force is
essentially a gratuitous concept, and the controversy
63. In his conclusion to the imputed consent chapter, Westen wonders why
states do not use direct legislative language, rather than fictions of consent, to
address constructive, informed, and hypothetical consent; and he offers a
proposed statute that would embody this direct approach. In his view, the direct
approach would lead to a narrower definition of non-consent than the current
approach, under which courts often create fictions of non-consent to encompass
these categories, in the absence of explicit statutory provisions (296).
Although I am not so sure that Westen's approach would necessarily
provide a narrower definition of non-consent, it would indeed be an improvement
in clarity and fair notice. In this regard, it would be similar to what we see in
modern sexual assault statutes, which carefully distinguish which types of
incompetence, threat, and coercion vitiate consent, and which are therefore an
improvement over older, more opaque statutes that courts sometimes treated,
through interpretation, as reaching very similar results.
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over whether to eliminate the force requirement is based
on a fundamental conceptual confusion.
(2) Resistance requirements are themselves merely
logical corollaries of wrongful force and non-consent
requirements, and therefore are not problematic; at
least, they are no more problematic than the force and
non-consent requirements to which they correspond. But
for this reason, explicit resistance requirements are also
gratuitous, since they are no more than a logical
implication of wrongful force requirements.
Although there is a germ of truth to both claims, the claims
are also misleading, for they fail to capture what is
distinctive about contemporary objections to force and
resistance requirements, as we shall see.
A. Force
As noted above, Westen employs the term "wrongful
force" to encompass all wrongful threats that illegitimately
pressure S to acquiesce in x. This is a very broad
understanding of the term, for it encompasses such varied
examples as a high school principal's conditioning a
student's graduation on submitting to sex, or (in ajurisdiction that forbids this) a boyfriend using mere
emotional pressure to induce consent.s4 It is much wider
than what was undoubtedly the original meaning of the
term in traditional rape statutes, namely, an immediate
threat of significant physical violence.
It might be defensible to employ the term in a very
specialized sense, and some jurisdictions do use the term
surprisingly broadly,65 though it certainly, seems that the
term "wrongful threat" would be more accurate.6 But the
64. See Commonwealth v. Meadows, 553 A.2d 1006, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989), discussed in Schulhofer, supra note 27, at 91-93, 121-24.
65. See 31 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3101 (2006) (defining forcible compulsion as
"[c]ompulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological
force, either express or implied").
66. Insofar as Westen also means to encompass the rare instance of what he
calls "wrongful oppression," see supra note 36, that term could be used, when
appropriate.
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more important difficulty is with how Westen evaluates the
legal relevance of wrongful "force," as he broadly construes
the term.
Westen points out that the analysis of wrongful "force"
to acquiesce can sometimes seem paradoxical. What if S
subjectively consents to be pressured to subjectively
acquiesce to x? (202). The answer, Westen persuasively
argues, depends on the jurisdiction's particular version of
legal paternalism. All jurisdictions, he notes,
unconditionally prohibit some pressures on acquiescence no
matter how much S welcomes them (e.g., pressuring a
masochist into the choice of sex and being murdered or
seriously maimed); while all only conditionally prohibit
other types of pressures, i.e., they prohibit certain
pressures only if S does not welcome them (e.g., a college
wrestler legitimately employing physical force in order to
induce the other wrestler into a physically vulnerable
position).
But Westen's further analysis of the force requirement
is more questionable. The debate over whether women are
better protected by laws against force or against non-
consent, he says, "rests on false conceptual premises" (208),
for either "force" or "non-consent" can easily incorporate the
jurisdiction's view of when pressures on subjective
acquiescence are wrongful.67 At the same time, he decries
as confused the popular belief that controversial questions
about force requirements can be eliminated by instead
making it a crime to act without S's consent (232).68 Westen
67. Westen mentions two exceptional cases, where he concedes that "non-
consent" must be used in lieu of (or at least as part of the definition of) "force":
(1) Where A uses compulsion to achieve intercourse against S's wishes or
acquiescence (for here, since compulsion that S factually consents to is not
unlawful (e.g., a disabled S), we must use the language of non-consent to
identify when compulsion is indeed unlawful); and
(2) Where A employs a threat, but the threat is only conditionally criminal
(e.g., the state permits a threat of moderate pain such as a spanking if but
only ifS prescriptively consents to it) (210).
68. In his introduction, Westen refers to the debate over the best way to
reform rape law between Susan Estrich (arguing for a revitalized conception of
consent) and Catherine MacKinnon (arguing for prohibitions on force and
rejecting the use of the concept of consent). Here, too, he objects that the
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asserts that this belief is incorrect because when S has
been pressured into sex, questions of force are not
independent of legally valid consent; they are constitutive
of legal consent (232). Even without an explicit force
requirement, in other words, a jurisdiction would have to
determine, as part of its non-consent requirement, what
pressures to acquiesce are illegitimate.
Westen is correct to underscore that in many cases,
force and non-consent are closely related, or even
interchangeable. But he overstates the relationship. In the
first place, as an historical matter, the movement in many
jurisdictions from a "force" requirement to a less
demanding "non-consent" requirement has actually meant
a substantive change from requiring that the pressure on S
take the form of a violent threat to requiring much less
(e.g., the "'no' means 'no'" approach, or counting as
wrongful various types of nonviolent threats such as
retaliatory or coercive deprivation of legal rights or loss of
certain important benefits). Of course, Westen wants to use
"force" to encompass pressures other than violence, but to
that extent, he misrepresents what at least some advocates
mean to accomplish by replacing a "force" requirement with
a broader "non-consent" requirement.
Second, Westen's approach cannot really explain the
modern approaches that count A's actions as sexual assault
when he does not pressure S with any type of threat yet
proceeds to engage in intercourse despite S's non-
acquiescence. In both the "'No' means 'no' and "Only 'yes'
means 'yes' approaches, A need not make any explicit
threat or impose any explicit type of pressure; the very
point of these approaches is to recognize the woman's right
to decide and to forbid A's action if she affirmatively
indicates non-acquiescence, or if she has not affirmatively
indicated acquiescence.
Westen does have a reply, but I think it is an
unpersuasive instance of definitional fiat. If a jurisdiction
difference between the approaches is rhetorical, not substantive, and that it is
'normative confusion" to think otherwise (3).
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treats "no" as "no" even in the absence of any other kind of
force or pressure (such as a threat of violence, or of another
detriment or of loss of a benefit), then, according to Westen,
the jurisdiction is treating a man who continues to proceed
with intercourse despite verbal objection as using "force" in
the sense of "illegitimate pressure." For he is required to
stop when she says "no"; so by continuing, he is necessarily
improperly pressuring S. 69 (And the "Only 'yes' means 'yes'
approach would be analyzed similarly.)
But stretching the meaning of "force" this far is quite
misleading. Even the broadest sense of "force" requires a
"threat": A must put S to a choice of x or something else
(call it "y") and S must submit to x in order to avoid y. Yet
this often is not an apt description of the situation and of
S's state of mind when she says "no" but A persists until he
has had intercourse. What S wants is simply not-x, i.e., not
having intercourse. To say that she has chosen to acquiesce
to x in order to avoid the threat of y misrepresents the
phenomenology of her state of mind concerning her
submission. She need not feel that she will be made worse
off if she does not submit, in order to feel violated by his
persisting. To be sure, if S persistently and sincerely says
"no" while A keeps proceeding, it is possible that she is
submitting because of an implicit threat of something
else-of violence, or of some other illegitimate burden. But
she also might simply be unwilling to have sex. In short, a
jurisdiction that wishes to criminalize A's conduct here
should be entitled to do so even if A's conduct cannot
plausibly be characterized as imposing a threat.
70
69. In his words:
Some jurisdictions regard the pressures that actors bring to bear upon
women to induce them to submit to sexual intercourse despite their saying
"no" as wrongful pressures. Others do not. In jurisdictions that do, actors
are guilty of sexual intercourse by force and without consent. In
jurisdictions that do not, actors are guilty neither of using force nor of
having sexual intercourse without consent. (344)
70. Nor can Westen escape this objection by characterizing the physical
conduct intrinsic to the act of intercourse itself (such as penetration) as wrongful
"force," for as Westen persuasively argues: "The wrongful force with which the
law of rape is concerned, including wrongful force in the form of physical contact,
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Interestingly enough, at the very end of the book,
Westen objects to the use of "force" to describe instances of
non-consent that are due, not to the actor's lack of
sufficient freedom to warrant treating factual consent as
legal consent, but to the actor's lack of sufficient
competence or knowledge: "It would be simpler and more
perspicuous to start and finish with legal consent as the
controlling standard" (346). Indeed it would. But it would
also be more perspicuous to treat the situation I have
described, of a passive victim who submits to sex despite
her opposition, as nonconsensual simply because legal
consent requires the actor to treat a "no" (or even lack of a
"yes") seriously, on pain of criminal liability, and not
because her submission legitimately qualifies as induced by
wrongful "force."
Now Westen has another possible reply: in this
scenario, S has not given factual consent, so a jurisdiction
can easily decide that legal consent is also lacking. But I do
not believe that this response is available to him, given his
view of factual consent. In this situation, jurisdictions that
believe "'no' always means 'no,"' or "only 'yes' means 'yes',"
want to treat A's conduct as sexual assault or rape even ifS
knows that she might have an effective alternative to
submitting to sex with A-for example, pushing him away,
or screaming at him, or simply walking out the door. And
yet, on Westen's view, her conditional preference for
submission over these alternatives means that she
factually consents to sex. (I will say more about this below.)
And, finally, since (as I have argued) her preference cannot
plausibly be viewed as induced by a wrongful threat, the
conclusion must be that she has given both factual and
legal consent. (The only other arguments available to
Westen here that might preclude considering S's factual
consent to be legal consent-that S lacks "competence" to
consists of wrongful pressure to acquiesce to the physical contact of sexual
intercourse, not the physical act of sexual intercourse itself' (229). But cf. In re
M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (controversially holding that the statutory
"force" requirement is satisfied by the physical contact intrinsic to the act of
intercourse itself).
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consent, or that she is the subject of "compulsion"-are
dubious on their face.71 )
Still, perhaps Westen's model could account for a
jurisdiction's choice to impose criminal liability in this
scenario if he did not characterize as factual consent a
decision to submit to sex rather than take advantage of
opportunities to avoid sex. The latter characterization, of
course, directly relates to how a resistance requirement
should be understood, and when, if ever, it is normatively
acceptable. Accordingly, I turn to Westen's controversial
analysis of that doctrine.
B. Resistance
Westen frames the resistance question carefully and
elegantly. When A wrongfully threatens S, he presents her
with three options:
(1) to submit to an act of sexual intercourse that she abhors,
(2) to refuse to submit and suffer the very harm, e.g., a
brutal beating, with which she is wrongfully threatened, or
(3) to resort to evasions by which she can successfully avoid
both the burden of unwanted sexual intercourse and the
burden of any of the threatened harms from which the
statute seeks to protect her. (210)
In Westen's view, the resistance requirement in (3) is
simply a logical corollary of the wrongful threat
requirement in (2), in the following sense. Suppose the
jurisdiction says that A's threat is wrongful (for the
purposes of its rape statute) if and only if it is a threat of
71. "Compulsion" doesn't work because Westen defines it narrowly as physical
force that S is unable to prevent. In the passive victim scenario, this need not be
the case.
But can Westen rely on a "soft" compulsion argument? Perhaps he can
argue that legal consent is also lacking if S, while retaining some ability to
prevent A from securing x, has less capacity to prevent x than the law entitles her
to have. But this reformulation of the "compulsion" element seems arbitrary. The
policy arguments in favor of "'No' means 'no'" or "Only 'yes' means 'yes" need not
rely on A overwhelming S's will, yet that is what any "compulsion" approach
presupposes.
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serious bodily injury or death. If S responds to a threat of
death (2) by choosing to submit (1), when she could have
chosen an evasion or form of resistance (3), what is critical
is what harm she (believes that she) would have suffered if
she had chosen resistance. If by resisting (3) she would
have been met with serious bodily harm, then there is no
duty to resist, for imposing such a duty would require her
to suffer the very harm from which the rape statute
protects her. But if by resisting she would only have
suffered moderate or lesser bodily injury, then she has
declined to choose an option that would have permitted her
to avoid both unwanted sex (1) and the enumerated harm
(2) from which the statute sought to protect her. Of course,
one might object that a statute such as this imposes too
onerous a duty to resist. But, according to Westen, this
really amounts to an objection that the statute should not
impose such a narrow definition of wrongful threat. So if a
jurisdiction does not want to require a duty to resist if this
would lead to even moderate injury, then the jurisdiction
should also require, as its criterion of wrongful threat, that
A not put S to the choice of intercourse and even moderate
injury.
This argument has superficial appeal. If true, it would
also dramatically change the way we view and argue about
resistance requirements.12 It would mean that "utmost-
resistance" requirements are just as acceptable (or
unacceptable) as the wrongful threat requirements that the
jurisdiction imposes (212-14). It would also mean that "no-
duty-to-resist" rules are just as defensible as the
corresponding wrongful threat requirements (214-17). And
it would demonstrate, on the one hand, that resistance
requirements in a sense are gratuitous, for they need not be
72. Westen is also deliberately provocative in his description of the actual
operation of the traditional "utmost-resistance" rule. He states that the rule did
not really require utmost resistance: it only applied to those with capacity to
resist, who did not think countermeasures futile, and who could use
countermeasures without risking death or great bodily injury (212). Whether this
is an accurate account of the doctrine, I leave to others who have studied the
history more carefully.
638
BOOK REVIEW
specified independently of definitions of what count as
wrongful threats; and on the other hand, that resistance
requirements in a sense are inevitable, because any
plausible definition of wrongful threat will only protect S
against certain types of harm, and thus will in effect
require a woman to "resist" if in doing so she can avoid that
type of harm. For example, suppose it is a wrongful threat
to induce acquiescence by any threat of physical harm, but
not by a threat to take an inexpensive piece of property. If
A wrongfully threatens to slap S if she does not have sex,
and if she knows she could easily walk out the door to
safety but also realizes that this would cause A never to
return S's inexpensive ring, her submitting to sex instead
would satisfy legal consent.
But the logical corollary argument is inadequate and
in an important respect fallacious. Let me explain why,
with the following four points.73
1. An initial issue is terminological: what should count
as resistance? Should it include anything that S could do or
say to prevent x (running away, screaming, pressing a car
alarm, merely saying "no"), or only S's efforts, by physical
confrontation, to prevent x (pushing A away, fighting
back)? Westen defines resistance in the first, extremely
broad way. This is problematic for some of the same
reasons that defining "force" extremely broadly is
problematic. Among other things, it means that his
criticism of others' views of resistance is sometimes
misplaced; while his criticism is apt if they are employing
the broad view (and indeed, the phrase "verbal resistance"
73. I am also unpersuaded by Westen's criticism of the argument that
resistance can at least give notice of non-consent to A (217-19). Even if one
accepts his "corollary" view (that resistance risking harm up to a certain
magnitude is required if a threat of harm of that corresponding magnitude is
required), the notice argument has at least some weight. It is sometimes difficult
for A to know why S submitted, or whether she honestly felt threatened by A; if
she resists, these things are easier to know. The law would not be "contradicting
itself' (cf. 218) in wanting especially clear proof of threats, or of S's honest belief
that she has been threatened, or of A's realization that S so believes, though of
course there are also very strong reasons not to elevate this slight evidentiary
benefit to a legal requirement.
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is sometimes employed in the rape debate), it is not apt if,
as is sometimes the case, they are employing the narrower
view.74 Good pragmatic reasons also support the narrower
interpretation. Whether a woman must say "no" or else be
deemed to have factually consented is an important and
controversial question. Because it is controversial, while
the lack of a stringent duty to resist physically is not, it
would make sense to restrict the term "resistance" to
physical steps taken by the victim to ward off the man's
advances.
2. The second point is this. The logical corollary
argument is simply false: it reflects an understanding of
the duty to resist that a jurisdiction might have very good
reason to reject, and it fails to capture features of a duty to
resist that a jurisdiction might have very good reason to
find problematic. Specifically, a jurisdiction might not
consider legally equivalent the situation in which S
"resists" (in the broad sense) and thereby expects to suffer
harm Y, and the situation in which S submits to sex in
order to avoid the wrongful threat of a harm Z that is
claimed to be equivalent to Y. One reason it might not
consider the situations legally equivalent is because a
meaningful comparison of harms Y and Z is often quite
difficult. For Westen's very broad definitions of force and
resistance create a serious incommensurability problem.
Suppose it is wrongful force for A to threaten to give S a
lower grade than she deserves, or to deny her graduation
from high school, if she will not have sex with him. And
suppose S knows she could "resist" and prevent sex by
reporting A to the school board, or by slapping A as he
initiates sexual activity. I have no idea whether the state's
imposition of a duty on A not to obtain sex by wrongful
"force" threatening these kinds of harms (lower grade,
nongraduation) has as its corollary that S must take these
preventive actions despite the harms S will thereby suffer
(the burdens of having to report A, or of having to
74. A number of states refer to duties, or absence of duties, to "physically"
resist. See 214-17.
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physically strike A). Which harms are greater? Perhaps the
rough idea is that S is required to employ forms of
resistance that are less burdensome for her to undertake
than the burden that she would suffer if A were to make
good his wrongful threat; but the legislative definition of
wrongful threats hardly clarifies what counts as a lesser
burden.75
There is a second, more fundamental reason why a
jurisdiction might choose not to impose on S a duty to resist
if this would entail her suffering harm Y1, even in cases
where Y1 can more easily be compared with the harm Y2
that A is forbidden from threatening to impose in order to
induce her acquiescence. (Suppose a case in which Y2 is
physical harm or violence threatened by A, and Y1 is
physical harm or violence that S expects to suffer if she
physically resists.) The reason is this: imposing a duty to
resist, insofar as it demands affirmative action by S at a
moment when she is under imminent violent threat, is
requiring something quite extraordinary of a crime victim.
Even a jurisdiction that requires a threat of a relatively
high degree of violence in order for A's threat to be
wrongful might also understandably choose not to require
any affirmative conduct by S to resist the threat, or at
least, no affirmative conduct by which she might expect to
suffer any injury. (Presumably this is one of the reasons
why rape reformers have tried to abolish the resistance
requirement. 6 )
75. Or consider the facts of the famous case of State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720
(Md. 1981). In Rusk, a jury might have concluded that the victim was implicitly
threatened with physical harm when Rusk grabbed her car keys and insisted on
her coming up to his apartment. But Pat did have another option: to run away
into the unfamiliar neighborhood at night. If she believed that fleeing would
expose her to an equivalent risk of harm from an unknown stranger, does that
count as legally equivalent to the threat of harm from Rusk? Alternatively,
suppose she conceded that the risk of physical harm from fleeing was much less
than the risk of such harm from staying with Rusk; rather, the main risk from
fleeing was simply that she would be lost, fearful and disoriented in an unfamiliar
place at night, and would have great difficulty getting home. Is this a lesser,
equivalent, or greater burden than what she expects to suffer if she does not flee
(and does not submit to sex)?
76. Another reason, to be sure, is undoubtedly a desire to reduce the requisite
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Thus, suppose a jurisdiction provides that wrongful
force means threats of physical injury. The jurisdiction
might at the same time plausibly conclude that S need not
engage in any form of physical resistance, even if she could
avoid any physical injury to herself by shoving A and
running away, or by stabbing A with a knife. Even a
jurisdiction that limits "wrongful force" to threats of serious
physical injury or death might conclude that requiring S to
resist if she knows she could do so by suffering "only" less-
than-serious injury would place too great an obligation on a
victim-"too great" in terms of what can realistically be
expected in such a stressful and extraordinary
circumstance, and in terms of what can legitimately be
expected of a person in order to avoid an otherwise coercive
choice. (Indeed, in cases where she can protect herself only
by causing serious injury to A, but where she does not
expect to suffer any harm if she chooses to harm A, it would
certainly be understandable if a jurisdiction decided both
(1) to permit S to be merciful rather than stand on her
right to self-defense, and also (2) not to treat the merciful
choice as precluding a rape conviction.) Or, at the other end
of the spectrum, suppose a jurisdiction defines wrongful
force as any threat of aggressive physical contact. And
suppose the following case: A threatens to push S onto a
bed if she does not submit; S believes that slapping the
man hard on the face is the only sure way to stop him; but
she is also sure (given what she knows about his fearful
response to such an act) that he will not then retaliate with
violence. Why should she be required to resort to even a
mild form of violence?
level of violence that A must threaten in order for his threat to be wrongful, or a
desire to eliminate a threat requirement from rape law altogether. To this extent,
Westen's "corollary" approach is a valuable reminder of the possible (but not
necessary) relationship between force and resistance requirements. Still, even a
jurisdiction that abolishes the threat requirement might want to impose
aggravated punishment on sexual assault accomplished by threat of serious
violence, and it still should be an open question and not merely a question of
logical relevance whether a duty to resist should also be required for conviction of
the aggravated crime, even if S knows that by resisting she risks only less-than-
serious violence.
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In this and other cases, a jurisdiction might have good
reasons for rejecting any duty to resist. And it might
conclude that the evil of having to resist and thereby suffer
(or even inflict) a particular harm is a qualitatively distinct
type of harm or wrong from the evil of directly suffering an
otherwise similar harm from A as a result of A making
good his threat.77
An analogy is a robbery victim who could resist and
thereby expect minor force (less than what the robber is
threatening) in order to avert the harm. We obviously
would not view the victim as consenting to the robbery,
even in a minimal, factual sense, simply because he had
this opportunity and failed to choose it; nor would a duty to
resist in this way logically follow from a statutory
requirement that the robbery be accompanied by a threat of
greater-than-minor force.
Accordingly, even if we understand resistance broadly,
as encompassing acts other than physical resistance
against A's advances, the factual consent choice set should
not be understood to encompass S's option of taking
affirmative action to resist A. And this exclusion of
resistance from the conditional preference choice set is
consistent with Westen's general treatment of factual
consent: just as he sensibly builds some minimal standards
of competence and knowledge into factual consent, so he
should build in some minimal constraints on the choice set
77. Indeed, the failure of the "logical corollary" argument also means that, in
theory, a jurisdiction could choose the converse approach from the one we have
been considering: a jurisdiction might decide to impose a more stringent duty to
resist than the corresponding definition of wrongful threat entails. In cases of
physical violence, to be sure, this is exceedingly unlikely. If aggravated rape
requires A to threaten S with moderate or serious physical injury, it is difficult to
see how the jurisdiction could plausibly justify requiring S to resist if this would
cause her to risk moderate physical injury or worse. Still, such a jurisdiction
would not be literally "contradicting itself," as Westen argues (219). For imagine a
much weaker threat requirement: criminalizing the threat of any unwanted
emotional harm, including the threat of social embarrassment. And suppose the
state also requires S to actively resist by loudly proclaiming "no" even in a
situation (such as proximity to the public) where this will cause S significant
embarrassment, in order to ensure that A has notice of nonacquiescence or that
the proof of S's nonacquiescence is clear. This might still be bad policy, but it
would not be self-contradictory.
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(at least, insofar as many jurisdictions would indeed
recognize such constraints).
It is especially important to exclude S's option of
affirmative action from the choice set when A's conduct
involves threats other than violence, or involves persistence
in the face of a clear "no." Otherwise, one is compelled to
draw the awkward and implausible conclusion that when S
persistently and vehemently says "no" to A's advances but
ultimately submits, she has factually consented simply
because she could have chosen another option that would
be effective (such as striking A or screaming). Westen
indeed draws that conclusion:
If [S] ... appears to realize that saying "no" will not change
her partner's mind and to be consciously refraining from
resorting to more emphatic forms of resistance at her
disposal that might succeed, she ... factually "consents" to
sexual intercourse in mind as well as in expression, because
she subjectively prefers sexual intercourse to the
alternatives to which she believes she could resort, and she
makes her preference manifest. (87)78
3. At the same time, if a jurisdiction decides as a
matter of policy to impose a duty to resist, it can easily do
so, by explicitly incorporating such a duty within the
definition of legal consent. For example: "S shall be deemed
78. To be sure, Westen's approach can still criminalize A's conduct in this
scenario, but I believe that he must frame this as an instance of factual consent
failing to satisfy either the jurisdiction's requirement of sufficient competence, or
its requirement of sufficient freedom, for legal consent. Or we would need a
separate exception to the effect that certain forms of resistance are not required,
even if the overall factual consentlegal consent framework would otherwise treat
the case as one of legal consent. Either solution seems ad hoc. Would it not be
more perspicuous to exclude physical resistance in the first instance from the
choice set for factual consent?
Westen does ameliorate the difficulty with his "logical corollary" approach
to resistance in one important respect. He would say that S does not factually
consent if in the face of a threat, and aware of an option to resist, she simply
panics or is in an emotionally frozen state of mind; for she has not actually made
a decision not to resist (219). Still, if she does actually decide that it is better, all
things considered, not to resist, she will indeed be understood to have given
factual consent.
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to legally consent if she acquiesces to x, even in response to
a wrongful threat, if she also (1) knows she could have
prevented x by employing minor force or by employing
verbal resistance and (2) knows that these methods are
likely to be effective." And if the legislature means to adopt
a duty to resist that is precisely coextensive with the
definition of wrongful force, then it can so define element
(1).1 9 Among other things, this approach would have the
benefit of highlighting the legislative decision to impose
this special affirmative duty on a rape victim, rather than
concealing the duty by articulating a general definition of
wrongful force or threat and then simply assuming that the
victim's duty to resist directly follows from that definition.
4. I have been considering cases in which A threatens
S with physical violence, and S has some ability to resist or
prevent such violence. But another important category of
cases involves A actually using physical force to overpower
S. In some cases, which Westen denominates "compulsion,"
A overpowers S completely. But how should we analyze
cases in which A tries to overpower S, yet S knows that she
has, or might have, the ability to avoid the harm? In this
scenario, too, Westen's analysis is deficient. For in these
cases, Westen must (and does) say that A factually
consents to the harm, because she evidently prefers to
submit to sex than to resist (229). And once again, in order
to make sense of a jurisdiction's decision to criminalize
such conduct, he must employ an ad hoc solution, such as
characterizing S as lacking sufficient "competence" or
"freedom."
79. Thus, if the legislature defines wrongful force for purposes of rape as a
threat of serious bodily injury or death, then it could define (1) as any preventive
means that do not expose the victim to a significant risk of serious bodily injury
or death.
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CONCLUSION
In concluding, I offer four suggestions or observations.
1. First, the book would have benefited from a more
definitive set of conclusions, and a more detailed analysis of
the criteria by which factual consent becomes legal consent.
As I concluded reading the book's complex and
intricate arguments, I came away feeling that the critical
focus was a bit too relentless. Not that it is easy to criticize;
actually, Westen shows how difficult it is to articulate
precisely what is wrong with the statutory provisions and
academic arguments that he so thoughtfully and
persuasively dissects. But it would have been immensely
helpful if he had offered the reader a more specific model of
how the problems of consent and sexual relationships
should be analyzed. Perhaps in the future Westen could
suggest model statutory language to address the most
important issues that he analyzes here.80 As suggested
earlier, he might propose greater uniformity of usage, such
as eliminating "consent" from "factual consent" and calling
this "acquiescence" or something else instead."1 Or, at least,
he might suggest that legislators and courts explicitly use
both the terms "factually consents" and "legally consents." 2
Moreover, it would have been useful to spell out and
analyze more fully some of the policies and principles that
jurisdictions invoke in deciding which instances of factual
consent qualify as legally valid consent. For example,
Westen recognizes that legally valid consent requires, not
just that S prefers x to the available alternatives, but that
her choice of x is sufficiently "free." Saying "yes" to a
stranger with a gun in order to avoid serious injury is
hardly the same as saying "yes" to a partner in order to
avoid his disappointment. But Westen says relatively little
80. Westen does offer a model statutory provision to simplify the treatment of
imputed consent. See supra note 63.
81. Westen recognizes the option but does not pursue it (52).
82. Thus, Westen criticizes a Kansas rape statute for sometimes using the
term "consent" factually and other times legally (339); but the statute's meaning
would presumably be beyond doubt if it used the terms "factual" and "legal."
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about how jurisdictions should analyze the difference or
how they should identify the line between criminal and
noncriminal behavior.8 3
To be sure, Westen is interested in providing a
conceptual framework that jurisdictions with widely
varying normative views would find useful. Still, it would
have been beneficial to clarify why, for example, he endows
"factual consent" with such minimal content and leaves so
much of the controversial work to the freedom, knowledge,
and competence conditions that convert factual into legal
consent. It would also be helpful to understand why some
issues of competence and knowledge are treated as part of
factual consent, while others are part of legal consent.8
(Perhaps this is an effort to reflect the ordinary meaning of
"acquiescing" or "agreeing" to x, but I suspect it also derives
from Westen's desire to invest factual consent with only a
modicum of normative content.)
It would have been especially helpful if Westen had
taken some of the most significant normative controversies
about the proper scope of sexual assault law and explicitly
stated how they should be framed. For example, although
he addresses aspects of the "'No' means 'no' and "Only 'yes'
83. For example, consider this opaque statement: "[Legal consent] does
require a certain measure of freedom, namely, whatever freedom to reject sexual
intercourse the society believes a woman must possess if her choice of sexual
intercourse is to satisfy her legitimate interests.. ." (48).
84. Recall that some minimum conditions of competence and knowledge are
part of factual consent. But why not build all such conditions in at the stage of
legal consent, as he does with the condition of freedom? Alternatively, we could
proceed in three rather than two steps:
1. Define factual consent very narrowly, excluding all conditions of
competence, knowledge, and freedom.
2. Add all conditions of competence and knowledge required for legal consent.
3. Then add all conditions of freedom required for legal consent.
This approach would avoid the awkwardness of building an extremely minimal
competence requirement into factual consent (so that, under Westen's analysis,
even a three-year-old can factually consent) (see supra note 16). It would also
render irrelevant the ultimately pointless distinction between fraud in the factum
and in the inducement, which Westen rightly criticizes (197-99). We would not
need to identify what type of "knowledge of x" is required for factual consent, and
could instead focus on the genuine and ultimate issue, namely, what kinds of
knowledge about x and the surrounding circumstances (including the risks and
benefits of x) should be considered legally adequate for consent.
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means 'yes"' approaches numerous times in the book, his
analysis focuses on specific mistakes and fallacious
arguments that legislators and commentators make in
analyzing them, and not on how they should be
conceptualized.
Westen skirts many of the hard questions by simply
treating them as among the difficult normative questions
that the jurisdiction must decide in converting factual
consent into legal consent. Of course, in light of the
conceptual nature of his project, it is hardly an objection
that Westen declines to take a position on many of the most
difficult normative questions here. But there is much more
that could be said, of a conceptual nature, about the best
way to understand the translation of factual consent into
legal consent.
Perhaps Westen's hesitation stems from his belief that
legal consent is "contestable" in ways that factual consent
is not (330).15 But the contrast seems overstated. He has
shown that jurisdictions and commentators employ a great
diversity of approaches to both factual consent and to legal
consent. And if "contestable" means "cannot be rationally
analyzed," that seems an inapt description of both factual
consent and legal consent. Westen does articulate the
range of considerations that are typically found relevant to
legal consent.8 6 I hope that he, or other scholars, will in the
future subject these to more sustained analysis.
85. Westen further claims that factual consent is constant and invariable,
while legal consent adds variable elements (327). He seems to believe that
"factual consent to x" means the same thing regardless of which x we are talking
about; and regardless of the jurisdiction (328). But this, too, seems overstated.
Westen acknowledges a variety of approaches to whether "indifference" counts as
a form of factual consent, and about the requisite knowledge condition implicit in
factual consent. And presumably a state's normative views about the proper scope
of criminal liability could affect its definitions both of factual consent and of legal
consent.
More generally, Westen seems to believe that the normative questions
surrounding consent are less subject to analysis than are the conceptual
questions (108). Yet again, the contrast seems overdrawn. After all, even the
conceptual questions that arise in defining criteria of factual consent are
questions we ask in order to improve the ultimate legal and normative analysis.
86. Westen mentions vulnerability to exploitation, the harm that A will cause
S, the value of permitting self-regarding decisions, the social consequences and
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2. The possibility of an ideal or model statutory
approach raises a deeper question about Westen's project.
There is some tension in the book between (1) providing a
descriptive account of how ordinary people, and current
sexual assault statutes, use various concepts related to
consent (such as force, resistance, threat, compulsion,
freedom, knowledge, and choice) and (2) providing a more
idealized conceptualization of the normative phenomenon
of consent to sexual relations, using terms entirely as terms
of art, if necessary. We can see this tension in the basic
progressive structure of factual and legal consent:
1. No factual consent.
2. Factual consent but not legal consent.
3. Legal consent = factual consent under adequate
conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom.
At times, Westen seems to suggest that the case for
finding legally valid consent becomes progressively
stronger as we move from step one to step two to step three
(which fills in all the necessary conditions for
"decriminalizing" what would otherwise be sexual
assault).87 At times, in other words, factual consent appears
to have some presumptive normative weight, relative to
cases in which factual consent is absent. But this claim is
too strong. To be sure, cases in which a conscious victim is
physically overpowered and cannot prevent that outcome
might ordinarily be considered a more serious infringement
of a woman's autonomy than cases in which she can make
some choice, no matter how constrained. But in many
instances of (1), where A acts without any factual consent,
A is much less culpable or commits a much lesser wrong
than in many instances of (2), where A does act with
effectiveness of criminalization, alternative ways to regulate A's conduct, and the
seriousness of the criminal penalty (121).
87. See, e.g., 52 (Canada's usage of factual consent is "a healthy reminder of
the normative significance of factual atttitudinal 'consent'"); 49 (contrasting a
case in which a victim is overpowered despite her resistance with a case in which
a victim is forced to acquiesce).
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factual consent. Intercourse secured by threat of death with
a woman who reluctantly gives factual consent can
certainly be understood as a worse wrong than intercourse
with a sleeping woman.
It appears, then, that Westen's framework is not a
series of increasingly weighty normative presumptions of
valid consent so much as a pragmatic instrument for
clarifying concepts and reorganizing the structure of
analysis. And throughout the book, Westen offers
numerous examples of ways in which his general
framework, and its particular subcategories, would indeed
avoid serious confusion. Still, there remains some tension
between the descriptive enterprise of identifying the
ordinary language or legislatively intended meaning of
terms such as consent, force, compulsion, and resistance,
and the more prescriptive and idealized enterprise of
developing concepts that perfectly suit a range of
normative objectives.
3. In this review, I have suggested a number of specific
problems with Westen's analysis, most importantly the
following:
* The terminology of factual "consent" creates
significant confusion, which Westen understates.
" The category of factual consent in which S is
"indifferent" to whether x occurs is somewhat
problematic, and involves only a weak sense of
choice.
* Indecision might legitimately count as a fourth
category of factual consent.
* The choice set over which factual consent ranges
should not include options of affirmative action that
the victim S could choose. Otherwise, we will be
presupposing a controversially stringent duty to
resist.
* The category of factual "expressive" consent should
be divided into two separate categories, factual
subjectively expressed consent and factual observed
consent.
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* The "expressive" consent category is too crude,
because it does not permit a jurisdiction to choose a
mens rea other than negligence with respect to S's
attitudinal consent.
* More generally, although a jurisdiction might indeed
wish to characterize "expressive" consent as
pertaining to mens rea, it also might have reason to
characterize "expressive" consent (or some variant of
"expressive" consent) as constitutive of the actus
reus.
" Westen's framework cannot readily explain two
significant contemporary approaches to non-
consent-the "'No' means 'no' and the "Only 'yes'
means 'yes' approaches-because it cannot easily
articulate and model a jurisdiction's decision to treat
a "no" or the lack of a "yes" as insufficient for legal
consent.
* The claim that retrospective consent essentially
dissolves the harm of sexual assault is unpersuasive.
For it is an open and normatively contestable
question whether we should always give priority to
what S today views as having been in her best
interests over what she viewed as in her interests in
the past.
* The so-called "fictions" of constructive, informed, and
hypothetical consent often do not deserve the label.
For although these categories do not involve persons
who consented to x in Westen's prescriptive sense,
they frequently involve scenarios in which S does
consent in a significant sense, either to a social
activity that includes x, or to the risk of x; or they
involve a subject who would have consented but did
not have the capacity to do so. These forms of consent
at the very least bear a family resemblance to
Westen's core category of prescriptive consent.
* Constructive consent to x involves S agreeing to a
package in which x is only one component; but
prescriptive consent also often involves merely
agreeing to a package in a similar sense.
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* Informed consent to a risk of x can be defined in
precisely parallel fashion to prescriptive consent to x
itself (incorporating the same criteria of factual and
legal consent, suitably modified).
* Westen's definitions of force and resistance, while
elegant, are procrustean: he presupposes that "force"
is just a term of art for all unlawful pressures that
induce S's acquiescence, and that "resistance" is
essentially a term of art for any option available to S
by which she could avoid both x and A's threat. These
very broad definitions are disconnected from the
history of the law of sexual assault and from the
normative controversies that these terms continue to
provoke.
* The argument that a jurisdiction's wrongful force
requirement entails, as a logical corollary, a duty to
resist is fallacious. A jurisdiction might have good
reason to prohibit wrongful threats only of a certain
type or degree of harm, but also good reason not to
impose an affirmative duty on a victim of an
immediate violent threat to resist even if she could
thereby avoid suffering the same type or degree of
harm.
4. The Logic of Consent is aptly named. This is a book
about logic, about concepts. Its point is analytical clarity,
not normative persuasion. The framework that Westen
offers is extraordinarily helpful in understanding consent
to sexual crimes. It should also prove highly useful in
examining other legal doctrines involving consent. Some of
these, Westen discusses only in passing (for example, the
right to refuse medical treatment, and informed consent in
the sense of a duty to disclose risks and benefits of S's
consenting to a procedure or physical contact). And the
analysis of doctrines and concepts outside of criminal law-
including assumption of risk in tort law, consent in
contract law, and perhaps consent in political theory-
should also benefit from his sophisticated framework."8
88. Westen touches on the latter at 285.
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Let me end with a caution to prospective readers. This
is a challenging book. The conceptual analysis is sometimes
abstract, and the architecture of the argument is elaborate.
Moreover, in an effort to be both meticulous and thorough,
Westen writes in a style that is sometimes dryly
methodical, even mechanical. (I wish he had more
frequently used shorthand phrases rather than replicating
criteria each time he reinvoked them.)
But the depth, subtlety, and originality of the analysis
will richly reward the patient reader. Legal philosophers,
legal academics, judges, and legislators alike will profit
from this splendid book. And if the lessons that Westen
teaches are taken to heart in revising criminal law
legislation and doctrine, then ordinary citizens will benefit
as well. Conceptual precision can avoid confusion and
facilitate the accurate expression of underlying principles.
Enormous normative and factual disagreements will
persist, of course. But we are certainly better off if we know
precisely what we are disagreeing about.
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VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS. By Markus Dirk Dubber.
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Pp. xii, 412. $50 cloth; $24 (paper).
Reviewed by Sharon Cowant
INTRODUCTION
Victims in the War on Crime is a study of recent forays
in the war on crime, asking the question, as the title would
suggest, who are the real victims in this war on crime? It is
a lengthy and detailed engagement with some of the
questions that have been posed by criminal law and
criminal justice theorists in recent years, relating to the
increasing drive to criminalize and punish.1 For Dubber,
the war on crime is a war waged by the state, against those
who are deemed by the state to pose a risk of harm to the
community, where the concerns and desires of victims are
taken into account only insofar as they accord with the
state's preferred course of action. In this sense, the state's
t Lecturer in Law, University of Edinburgh. My thanks are due to the
following friends and colleagues for helpful comments and suggestions: Steve
Greenfield, Simon Halliday, Jackie Hodgson, Richard Jones, Justina Molloy, and
Matthew Weait. Particular thanks go to Victor Tadros for ongoing stimulating
conversation on these and other matters.
1. For a critical summary of the criminological literature on the increasing
trend towards punitiveness, see Roger Matthews, The Myth of Punitiveness, 9
Theoretical Criminology 175 (2005). See also Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and
Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offences, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 151, 152 n.5 (1995)
(citing Sanford Kadish as offering the original conception of over-criminalization
as being a "crisis" in criminal justice).
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recent battles in the war on crime have been fought on two
fronts: one, by simultaneously expanding the substantive
criminal law (in the form of possession and other related
inchoate offenses such as endangerment) and relaxing the
rules which constrain the policing of criminal law,
particularly the gathering and use of evidence; and two,
through the harnessing of the (negative) energy of the
Victims' Rights Movement in order to bolster the state's
claims that increased punitiveness is necessary and
legitimate. The book is in two parts and divides along these
lines, the first half concentrating on the criminalization
and policing of possession, and the second part focusing on
the role of the Victims' Rights Movement in recent crime
strategies, as well as attempting to develop a more
comprehensive theory of victims' (and offenders') rights
based on the notion of"personhood."
This review essay sets out to demonstrate both the
potential and the limitations of Dubber's powerful and
persuasive thesis. Many of the individual chapters are long
and some detailed consideration is given to the material
therein. This is followed by an analysis which focuses on
three specific themes within the book: the power of the
state; the concepts of personhood, autonomy, and harm;
and the application of the idea of the war on crime. Here
some conclusions are drawn about the way in which the
book is helpful in providing a starting point for many
contemporary debates within criminal justice studies. In
addition the essay assesses some of the key claims of the
book in order to provide a platform for developing, and
challenging, some of Dubber's ideas about the nature and
function of the criminal law, arguing that more work needs
to be done particularly in thinking through the project of
"personhood." Finally some comments are offered regarding
the style and structure of the book. The essay concludes
that the story Dubber tells is a compelling one, but one
which at times requires a more nuanced approach to the
complexities of the politics of criminal justice, and to the
conceptual framework of a theory of criminal law.
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I. THE STORY OF THE WAR ON CRIME
A. Part One: The War on Victimless Crime
The basis of Dubber's thesis in part one, as sketched
out in chapter one, is as follows. He claims that the war on
crime is in essence preventive-aiming to control risks of
harm before not just the harm but also the risks of harm
have materialized. This risk management strategy is
operationalized mainly through the introduction of new
offenses, but is also linked to the extension of the discretion
of those gatekeepers (primarily the police) who serve to
bring risky people within the jurisdiction of the criminal
process. The practical impact of a policy of targeting risks
in this way is an increase in incapacitative methods of
crime control-i.e., longer, consecutive, and "aggravated"
prison sentences. In addition, he argues, the war on crime
is communitarian in the Durkheimian sense that the
rejection of "deviant" individuals promotes community
safety and unity and authoritarian in the sense that it is
the powerful state that takes responsibility for dealing with
crime and preventing crime through risk management.
The community safety point is important, and
although his notion of deviancy is a little underdeveloped
and his reference to the vast criminological literature on
deviancy and labelling could be expanded (24), Dubber
makes a convincing argument about the importance within
communities of the relationship between crime and the fear
of crime. The middle classes, he states, are not most likely
to be victims of crime but are most likely to express a fear
of crime, thus providing them with reasons to support the
move to eliminate the fear or threat of harm as early as
possible. This is related to a further claim, developed
through reference to the early-twentieth-century work of
Francis Sayre, that society has moved in the last century
from a conception of criminality as based on individual
guilt to one based on "social danger" (28).
In chapter two, Dubber provides more detail on the
way in which possession offenses function in the U.S.
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Possession is said to be the weapon of choice in the war on
crime, and consequently a more critical understanding of
its operation is crucial. Criticism is levelled at both the
rules of substantive criminal law, as well as the ways in
which the rules are implemented in practice. Initially there
is a powerful (though as we shall see, perhaps inflated)
critique of possession laws as substantive criminal offenses.
The critique refers to firstly the tendency of possession
laws to punish behavior which is not in itself harmful and
is too remote from the harm it is thought will result from
possession, and secondly for the broad way in which the
offenses are drawn by the executive, so that mere presence
of an object or substance gives rise to a presumption of
possession regardless of knowledge of presence. Dubber
also rehearses the ways in which possession contravenes
traditional principles and requirements of criminal law-
that there is no harm in possession per se, that there is no
"act" as such, that there is generally no mens rea, and that
defenses commonly do not apply. Possession offenses, he
concludes, are sui generis (82-91).
Dubber goes on to suggest, connecting the substantive
concerns with concerns about the process of criminal
justice, that the real problem is the "control function" of
possession (84), i.e., its relationship with crime control
policies and discretion. This can be observed from a range
of practices. Possession operates both as an adjunct to
existing wide police discretion, and as a problematically
broad tool for stopping, searching, and criminalizing the
"risky" where that frequently translates as young urban
black men. Moreoever, the system of plea bargaining
functions as a convenient way of incapacitating people
faster and without the trouble of a criminal trial. People
are treated in the same way as other dangerous or noxious
objects (such as dogs or guns)-all are hazardous risks and
therefore the state is entitled to intervene to extinguish the
risks (40-42). But while the laws appear to apply to all
equally, and some middle class whites do find themselves
caught in the network of possession laws, the practice of
policing possession weighs disproportionately upon the
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already marginalized and disadvantaged-in particular
along racial lines (92-97).
Possession is only one way of policing the dangerous,
alongside police surveillance and stop and search, pre-trial
detention, and so forth (45). But possession offenses are an
important tool because, like the vagrancy laws which were
used frequently by police until constitutional challenges in
the 1960s (78), they allow the police to target specific
populations, and also to sweep in large numbers of
potential offenders in a kind of "fishing" exercise.' This is
achievable because of a gradual erosion of the constraints
on stop and search rules (for example, officers only need
reasonable suspicion---or indeed no reason at all if it is a
routine roadblock check for all cars-in order to pull
someone over). Thus, alongside federal sentencing
guidelines, hefty sentences for possession (which are longer
than they were twenty-five years ago (50)), imaginative
prosecution practices of "stacking" charges, and the
aggravating factor that possession adds to other offenses
(for example, gun possession can enhance a sentence given
for another offense, and as such is not subject to the same
proof requirements as an actual charge of possession (71-
72, 120)), possession offenses are a convenient and central
tool of the war on crime. This war is, in effect, a battle to
incapacitate as many dangerous people as possible. It is in
this respect that felons are never ex-felons, because ex-
felons who are caught with guns, for example, are always
automatically subject to criminal sanctions (73, 85).
This part of the book provides a comprehensive
account of the law and its implementation, and the
constitutional challenges that have been raised regarding
possession. The extensive lists of cases and rules will be of
great interest to U.S. criminal or evidence lawyers. It is
also an important critique of the law in this area. Some
further explanation would have been useful for the non-
U.S. reader, however. For example, Dubber makes
2. The nature of the relationship between vagrancy and possession laws is
teased out at 92-97.
2006] 659
BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:655
reference on more than one occasion to the fact that in
some states, simple possession of contraband can lead to a
mandatory life sentence, without explaining how this can
be so (e.g., 67). What would be interesting to the non-U.S.
criminal law specialist would be a fuller explanation of the
circumstances in which mere possession of an object could
lead to a mandatory life sentence.
Chapter three focuses on how possession offenses
function as a form of "nuisance control." Here the
discussion begins with the "victimless" nature of possession
offenses, where Dubber argues that seeing possession
offenses as victimless crimes obscures the fact that the
state behaves as though the state itself were the victim of
such offenses--even if only in terms of disobedience of its
laws (see also 118-20). This view-that the state perceives
itself to be the ultimate victim of crime-is a theme that
Dubber revisits throughout the book. The authoritarian
state sets itself up as representing community interests
and as such an offense which threatens or harms the
community, threatens or harms the state. Public or social
concerns are thus conflated with state interests (116) and
real victims are a cover for the state acting for its own
benefit (125). Following the "Pound-Sayre" model, he
claims that the elaborate system of criminal justice and its
focus on victims and offenders is only a "cover" for the
state's self-protective strategies (125). By setting the
risk/harm equation up in this way, the state then has the
broad-based justification needed to police possession. The
state is the "paradigmatic victim" of criminal law (123).
With regard to chapter three, although Dubber does
not explicitly himself make the connection, in places his
analysis comes close to Packer's "crime control" model of
criminal justice. This model emphasizes the efficiency of
3. Herbert Packer, writing in the U.S. in the 1960s, developed two models to
explain how criminal justice systems work-the crime control model and the due
process model. As with all models or ideal types, they are not pure descriptions
and cannot capture the criminal justice process in all its complexity, but they
provide a framework for making sense of criminal justice in practice. See Herbert
L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968).
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the criminal justice system in controlling crime. Efficiency
is measured in terms of speed of the process and final
resolution of cases, which involves securing convictions.
The overall aim is to prosecute and punish guilty offenders,
protect society, and maintain social stability. Packer
described this as a "conveyer belt" approach to justice, as
criminal justice agents pass the case along through the
process to a successful conclusion-i.e., conviction.4 The
model also illustrates the significant faith that is often put
in police and prosecutors to screen out the innocent (or in
Dubber's terms, the non-dangerous) and bring only the
guilty to justice through conviction.5 In this sense Dubber's
position is persuasive. However the text here is stylistically
deceptive: he writes as though he is simply explaining the
truth of criminal justice rather than providing a model for
understanding the complex processes of criminal justice.
This is rather problematic and relates to an issue to be
explored later, namely a lack of critical attention to the
complexities and contradictions inherent in criminal justice
techniques of power and control.
Chapter three (135-44) also examines the introduction
of the Model Penal Code and the part it has played in the
escalation of criminalization of certain behaviors, especially
regarding its role in defining "threats of threats" of harm
(136); identifying those who are dangerous or display
potential criminal dispositions, as legitimate targets for
crime control (135-37); and the provision of bureaucratic
sentencing guidelines which constrain judicial discretion
(128-29). He notes the history of the Model Penal Code's
rejection of strict liability in criminal proceedings and the
Code's application of strict liability only to "violations," i.e.,
civil offenses. However he also observes the Code's
4. Id. at 159.
5. Roach, who has built on Packer's ideas, claims that contemporary policies
that support the crime control model are part of more general move towards the
criminalization of politics. See Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process,
89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 671 (1999). Caplow and Simon call this "governing
through crime." Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison
Policy and Population Trends, 26 Crim. & Just. 63, 78 (Michael H. Tonry & Joan
Petersilia eds., 1999), cited in Matthews, supra note 1, at 177.
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susceptibility to reinterpretation by states that have
extended the strict liability aspect to "violations" that
result in a term of imprisonment-i.e., reintroducing strict
liability for administrative offenses which give rise to
custodial penalties (133-35). He makes a clear and
convincing argument (reminiscent of claims made in
chapter two) as to how presence of an object can be deemed
possession, which can in turn be read as an attempt, even
without any conduct on the part of the defendant (139-40).
Dubber further identifies the jury as having potentially
contradictory roles-on the one hand the jury is
"fundamentally inconsistent with the Model Code's (and by
implication the state's) general bureaucratic approach"
(131), but on the other hand, the jury can become an
"insider community" who empathize strongly with the
victim (because they themselves are potential or actual
victims) and therefore are allies of the state in the project
to incapacitate the dangerous offender. The point becomes
overstated however when he concludes that "[a]s a result,
[the jury] merely reinforces the communal hatred captured
by the state's accusation, labeling, and eventual disposal of
the outside threat to the community of victims" (131,
emphasis added).6
The argument is sustained in the following pages in
relation to Dubber's critique of juries (131-33) where he
turns to the example of the Nazi People's Courts to justify
his scepticism towards juries. It is difficult to disagree with
the suggestion that should the People's Court provide the
model for a contemporary criminal trial, we would want to
abandon juries completely. While it is true to say, as he
does, that juries can facilitate and prop up rather than
challenge state oppressive practices, there are many rather
more complex arguments against (and in favor of) jury
trials which need explication, and a voluminous body of
critical literature on the pros and cons of the jury trial to
attend to, if the issue is to be given proper consideration.
6. Much later in the book he refers to the jury as a kind of "focus group"-an
interesting idea which could have been explored further (208).
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As such the treatment of the subject is rather brief. This is
an example of a problem, discussed in more detail below,
regarding the abstraction of an issue from its place within
a wider body of critical scholarship. More generally,
Dubber's meticulous attention to the text and development
of the Model Penal Code, and the principles on which it is
based, is central to his argument and is well executed.
However this section could perhaps have been more
usefully introduced in an earlier part of the book since it
may help us to understand the plethora of rules and cases
on possession which are related in detail in chapter two.
B. Part Two: Vindicating Victims Rights
The second part of the book examines the role of
victims in the criminal justice process and the way in
which the Victims' Rights Movement (VRM) has utilized a
certain characterization of victimhood in order to politically
mobilize. His main thesis is that the most important aspect
of both victim- and offenderhood is the individual person,
or what he calls personhood, and that seeing both victims
and offenders first and foremost as persons challenges
many of the contemporary discourses on crime, such as the
victim-offender dichotomy, as well as the criminal justice
process itself. To describe someone in the first instance in
terms of victim- or offenderhood rather than in terms of
their personhood negates their autonomy; rather we must
acknowledge that "victim" and "offender" are temporary
labels that attach through the criminal justice process
rather than distinct categories of persons. Adversarial
processes tend to exacerbate the conflict between victims'
and offenders' rights (210). Victims and offenders have
rights, not as victims and offenders, but as persons, since
"[r]ights are aspects of personhood" (154). The aim of the
criminal law is to restore the autonomy of victims and
respect the autonomy of offenders, i.e., respect the
personhood of all participants in the criminal justice
process. The second half of the book then is a discussion of
what it would mean to "treat victims like persons" (155),
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including an analysis of the politics of the contemporary
VRM. The underlying thesis is that the law of victimhood
(exemplified by compensation statutes) and the law of
offenderhood (contained in systems of punishment) are two
apparently different discourses, but which actually describe
the same event from two different points of view-the
victim's and the offender's. In order to create a criminal law
based on personhood we must find a way of bringing these
two perspectives together, not by conflating them, but by
making them complementary.
Chapter four recounts the ways in which the criminal
justice system has developed in the last couple of decades
to take more account of the victims of crime. The shift
towards victims is demonstrated by the inclusion of victims
(or relatives of victims, sometimes termed "indirect
victims") in parts of the punishment process (such as
watching executions, or feeding into parole eligibility
decisions). It is also visible in other practices such as the
adoption by some states in the U.S. of a victims' bill of
rights and other instruments intended to give victims a
voice in the criminal process such as victim impact
statements, as well as the growth of a very active and vocal
VRM. However, the VRM is for the most part an expression
of middle-class white communities' fears about crime,
which make only certain kinds of crime visible (177-78).
The VRM, Dubber argues, is closely connected to the war
on crime, in that it has portrayed the paradigmatic victim
as being the helpless subject of a crime of interpersonal
violence who needs the state's help (175-84). Ironically,
then, to be the most deserving of state intervention, the
victim would have to be dead, thus making it difficult to see
what the victim's rights could be in this situation (185-88),
and making a nonsense of the inclusion of "victim impact
statements" in a homicide case (207). Casting the debate in
this way, with such high stakes, encourages public
empathy and identification with a "helpless" victim (180-
84), and this is necessary to mobilize the VRM and to
ensure moral judgement of the offender. It also justifies
punitive state intervention (to help the helpless). The
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VRM's focus on these particular victims taps into public
fears about safety from violent crime (anyone of us could be
a victim of violence at any time), thus allowing the most
visceral response to violent offenders-as an expression of
fear and hatred-to be legitimized. Restorative justice as
an alternative form of disposal to incarceration has not
really been embraced in mainstream VRM politics, says
Dubber (167). 7
Both the state and the VRM then are involved in a
process of construction of both victimhood and of
appropriate-i.e., emotional-responses to victimization.
Emotions are not to be discounted, says Dubber, and the
VRM is right to centralize empathy (197-98), but we should
have an emotional response to both victimization and to
punishment, i.e., to victim and to offender (159). An
emotional response solely to the victimization experience
has nothing to do with the proper function of the criminal
law-that is, moral judgement (207). We must also find a
way for the state to incorporate emotions appropriately
within the criminal justice process. Otherwise such
emotions are channelled as hatred towards the offender
(207-08). The VRM must be disentangled from the state's
efforts in the war on crime, in order for proper
consideration of the personhood of victims and offenders to
be given. While identifying with victims is important, so too
is identifying with offenders (199).
Chapter five, "Vindicating Victims," examines the law
relating to victim compensation and some of the available
definitions of victim for the purposes of that law. There are
some compelling passages here, for example the
comparison between being able to speak about a victim at a
funeral and the input of victims' families at capital
sentencing hearing (214-15). Here is where Dubber gives
flesh to the bones of his argument made repeatedly in the
7. This may not be the case to the same extent out with the U.S. context. For
example, in the UK the Victims' Rights Movement has recently been cautiously
optimistic about the potential benefits to some victims of restorative justice. See
Martin Wright, The Court As Last Resort: Victim-Sensitive, Community-Based
Responses to Crime, 42 Brit. J. Criminology 654 (2002).
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first half of the book, that the state sees itself as the
ultimate victim of crime. The tardiness of the development
of this argument is one reason for the reader to inquire as
to whether the second half of the book, or material therein,
might have been more suitably placed up front,
foreshadowing the issues for discussion of possession and
the war on crime. However, chapter five offers persuasive
arguments about the purposes for which the category
victim is defined, explaining that "victim" for the purpose of
compensation (which is paid by the state) is interpreted
narrowly, while for the purposes of restitution (which is
paid by the offender) "victim" is more broadly defined to
include even the state itself. In addition he directly
compares similar concepts that are used in different senses
in victim-based accounts as opposed to offender-based
accounts of criminal law and makes some notable points,
for example regarding harm. To count for the purposes of
punishment (i.e., offender-focused accounts of criminal
law), harm does not have to be actual but can be attempted,
whereas for the purposes of compensating victims, many
states require that harm must actually be completed rather
than merely attempted. As Dubber rightly concludes, "the
inclusion of threatened harm only in the punishment
provision says less about the difference between
punishment and compensation than about the contested
nature of threatened harm both in the law of punishment
and of compensation" (242).
Chapter six, the final chapter, is lengthy, and provides
more detail about the criteria on which victim
compensation schemes are based, as well as a more narrow
focus on the comparison between schemes of compensation
and systems of punishment. Throughout the chapter
Dubber compares the treatment of an offense from the
perspective of victims' rights/compensation law with the
treatment of an offense from the criminal justice
perspective, i.e., the law of punishment. This chapter flows
well and includes more detail on some of the ideas
introduced earlier in the book, including his central notion
of "personhood." It is by far the most theoretically engaged
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chapter. It also provides detailed arguments (which are
referred to early in the book) relating to how and under
what circumstances the state can define itself as the victim
of crime (e.g., for the purposes of restitution or
compensation). Arguably, again, this chapter, or some of
the material in it, could have been brought forward in the
book, in order to explain the concepts used and the claims
made throughout the book, and to clear ground for the
detailed arguments on possession and the politics of
victims' rights.
Overall, the project of the book-to offer us an analysis
of recent state interventions in crime and criminal justice,
and to build from this a theory about how victims and
offenders should be treated in the criminal justice system-
is a worthwhile one. Dubber presents us with a strong
critique of contemporary criminal justice strategies of crime
control, and emphasizes the importance of centralizing the
humanity ("personhood") of both victims and offenders
within the criminal process. In so doing he makes some
powerful assertions which require close attention. The
remainder of this essay undertakes that task.
III. BEYOND THE WAR ON CRIME: PERSONHOOD,
PUNISHMENT AND THE STATE
There is much in Dubber's book that is worth detailed
consideration, and this essay cannot do justice to Dubber's
ideas in their entirety. Here I will reflect on three ideas
that are central to the book. First, Dubber's conception of
the state and its role in the war on crime; secondly, the
concepts of personhood, harm, and autonomy; and thirdly,
the war on crime itself. These particular areas have been
chosen because they have the potential to enhance existing
debates on crime and criminal justice, and because in their
exposition they are open to contestation. The essay
concludes with some thoughts on the style and structure of
the book.
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A. The (Decontextualised) State
One of the conceptual difficulties with the book is
Dubber's continual reference to the "state," without placing
the state into a contextual discussion of who or what that
might be-either by way of a theoretical analysis of the
operation of power, or in practical terms, through reference
to particular criminal justice agencies, or particular
political regimes or presidencies. In relation to the first
point, the lack of theorizing on the power of the state,
Dubber's notion of the state seems to be similar to that of a
sovereign (even though he explicitly shakes off America's
historical legal connection with the sovereign-based law of
eighteenth-century England), in that the state is seen as all
encompassing and all powerful, where power works
hierarchically-"top-down." He says, for example:
In the war on crime, offenders and victims alike are
irrelevant nuisances, grains of sand in the great machine of
state risk management.
The true victim in the war on crime is not a person, not
even "the community," but simply the state itself.
Surrounded by pesky nuisances in the form of hordes of
persons, be they offenders or victims, it maintains its
authority and enforces that obedience which is due its
commands. (26, emphases added)
Because this is part of the introductory chapter, it
might appear that this is simply a powerful opening
statement that will be explored and supported later in the
book. But similarly overstated propositions are common
throughout the book yet are never unpacked. For example,
Dubber makes broad claims about "the general tendency of
modern criminal administration to bend, if not abandon,
principles of criminal law" (125). Further, at the end of
chapter four, conflating the state with prosecution
practices, he writes:
Both defendants and victims lose in a game that is played
by the state for the purpose of hiding its awesome power
BOOK REVIEW
over defendants and victims alike .... It is the state
prosecutor who becomes intoxicated with his own power and
uses every weapon at his disposal to annihilate the
defendant and his proxy, the defense attorney. The wishes
of the victim are relevant only insofar as they confirm the
prosecutor's judgement. (201-02, emphases added)
Such bold statements as these are not given practical
or theoretical grounding. This makes one sceptical about
the scope of Dubber's argument, even where there is a
persuasive claim at its core. The theoretical neglect of the
intricacies of power implies an abstract decontextualised
body-the state-which is all powerful and which must be
obeyed. Much has been said about the nature of power that
contradicts Dubber's portrayal. The most obvious example
of critical work in this area is that of Michel Foucault.
Foucault's conception of power is that power is exercised
through relationships rather than held and controlled by
individuals, flows throughout society rather than being
imposed from top to bottom, and is productive rather than
repressive. 8 Power has no "invincible unity" but is multi-
dimensional and unstable.9  It is about changing
relationships rather than static conditions/relations."
Therefore, power is inherent within all social relations:
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything,
but because it comes from everywhere .... [Plower is not an
institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain
strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one
attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular
society.1 1
In short, Dubber's notion of the state, of power, and of
the relationships between states and subjects, are each
presented uncritically and without reference to the large
8. For further discussion in a feminist context, see Jana Sawicki,
Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power and the Body (1991).
9. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality 93 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
10. Id. at 99.
11. Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
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body of literature, philosophical, political, sociological and
legal, that problematizes these concepts. Admittedly, as
Stuart Green in his review of Dubber's book points out,
Dubber does not aim to provide a "full-scale foundational
theory of criminal law and the state," 2 but some
engagement with theoretical work on the complex nature of
state power seems necessary.
In terms of the practical questions about the power of
the state, we might at this point conceivably wonder, who
is this state behind the war on crime? Is it faceless
bureaucrats? Specific politicians with ideological axes to
grind? Crime fighting police officers who are trying to
tackle the problem at street level? Reactionary judges? Who
is the faceless "modern criminal administration" that flouts
principles of criminal law (125)? And why now? There is no
satisfactory answer to this "who is the state?" question,
because Dubber does not engage with it. He does attempt
briefly to historicize the war on crime by tracing proactive
and concerted "punitive" responses to problems of crime
back to Nixon (and beyond), and by linking present
incapacitative practices to previous rehabilitative ones
(124), but we are still left in a vacuum, full of references to
a contemporary war that seems to have no leader. Dubber
expends a considerable amount of energy relaying the
number of provisions, judgments, practices, and
institutions that support the war on crime, including the
Supreme Court (67). While this accounting exercise is
important and politically engaging, it demonstrates a
particular trend in criminal justice/criminological literature
to document examples of punitiveness, 3 but to neglect the
equally if not more important question of how to talk about
the state, and the war on crime, whilst recognizing
competing trends within the enormously complex machine
12. Stuart P. Green, Victims' Rights and the Limits of Criminal Law, 14 Crim.
L. Forum 335, 340 (2003).
13. See Richard Jones, Populist Punitiveness and the Politics of Criminal
Justice, seminar at Faculty of Law, University of Sydney (March 2004) (on file
with author).
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that is criminal justice.14 Each agency has its own separate
function, remit, and goals. Different parts of the criminal
justice system will have different occupational cultures,
working practices, organizational aims, and will conform to
different patterns at different times depending also on, for
example, government policy, budget and resource
constraints, and so on. To talk about the state or the war
on crime without recognizing these issues weakens
Dubber's arguments significantly.
The decontextualization of the state from both theories
of power and the complexities of its practical operation is
connected to a more general neglect of context. While the
book is manifestly political in its persuasive critique of the
parameters and application of criminal law by the state
and its agents, it is strangely depoliticized in its lack of
attention to the context of surrounding contemporary
sociopolitical conditions. This problem arises throughout
the book-for example at the end of chapter three where
Dubber briefly engages with a hugely complex historical
process of shifts in criminal justice policy between
rehabilitatitive, incapacitatitive, and retributive ideals:
A shift from a presumption of corrigibility to one of
incorrigibility produced a concomitant shift in official
response from rehabilitation to incapacitation. Eventually,
extreme affliction sanctions became the norm, correctional
measures the exception. Prisons were transformed from
correctional institutions run by penologists into warehouses
supervised by inventory managers." (145-46)
This decontextualizes, dehistoricizes and mechanizes a
particularly complex network of political processes. This
would be sufficient were it a summary of a preceding (or
forthcoming) argument, but as an entire treatment of the
issues concerned it is not. Where he does provide some
discussion of historical context, for example in relation to
the story in chapter three (of how what Dubber sees as
14. Cf. Matthews, supra note 1, at 183, who has described approaches similarly
lacking in critical analysis a "crude form of mechanical functionalism .... "
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punitive and draconian laws on possession have developed),
it is enormously useful. Here he explains that drug laws
have come about through a combination of policing Chinese
immigrants and the threat of opium at the end of the
nineteenth century. This, argues Dubber, is the beginning
of the policing of threats and risks through possession
offenses, and it is linked to the regulation and policing of
the immigrant "other" as well as the poor (115). While it
seems a little strange to be discussing the history of the
present system a third of the way into the book (it seems to
me for example that chapters two and three could have
been usefully reversed), the discussion does provide
interesting reading as well as the much needed wider
historical and sociopolitical context that is missing from
some of the rest of the book. 5
B. Personhood, Autonomy, and Harm
1. Personhood
Dubber's thesis in the book rests on the concept of
personhood, which he says forms the basis of a proper
theory of criminal justice that respects all actors within the
criminal process. Part of the general problem here is
Dubber's failure to fully reflect on the assumptions and
principles which surround and ground the concept of
personhood. It is impossible to know what he means by the
term, because there is no discussion (or reference to other
discussion) of how best to characterize personhood. He
suggests that personhood is the capacity for autonomy
(199)-but this raises the further question of what is meant
by autonomy (discussed below). The concept of personhood
is referred to thoughout the book, and the fullest discussion
we have of the term is in chapter six, i.e., in the final
chapter of the book. Here he discusses the relationship
between personhood and humanity (258-60). Evidently
15. He does not extend the analysis to the history of criminalization of other
drugs other than to say, "Eventually, the instrument of police through possession
spread from opium to other dangerous drugs. . ." (114).
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non-humans are not persons, he says, but it is not adequate
either to reduce the category of persons to humans. In fact
humanity is necessary but not sufficient for personhood, at
least in the context of being an offender; only a person who,
with capacity, commits an act/omission can be guilty of an
offense. So for the purposes of offenderhood, "[o]nly
persons, defined as human beings endowed with the basic
capacity for autonomy, can act" (258). This appears to lead
us again back to autonomy. But we must agree, according
to his theory, on a definition of persons that will
accommodate both victims and offenders. And so he turns
to other examples, this time statutory definitions of
homicide where "person" corresponds with "human being"
(i.e., not the unborn). Reducing these victim- and offender-
based definitions to their common denominator, he comes
to the conclusion that "we are left with the following simple
definition of the person, as victim and as offender: a human
being" (259). Almost immediately Dubber rightly rejects
this as a sufficient definition, but this is as far as he goes.
He acknowledges that the relationship between personhood
and humanity is complicated (260) but does not attempt to
further explain what characteristics are required for
personhood. This is clearly an area that requires further
conceptual analysis, particularly if the concept of
personhood is the foundation of his theory of criminal law.
During his attempt to build a theory of criminal justice
intervention based on personhood, Dubber raises the
particular question of the use of race as an individual
characteristic of victimhood. Here there is in my view a
fundamental problem with his reasoning. His position is
that individual characteristics such as race distract from a
focus on personhood. So for example, he describes as "most
troubling" the evocation of empathy for a particular victim
on the basis of a racial connection between the observer
(public) and victim. Shared race, he says, is not relevant to
the moral judgement of an offender. Only personhood
(rather than race) of the victim is relevant to the criminal
process of judgement of criminal liability. Victims have to
be recognized by the criminal justice system through the
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general category of persons rather than in their
particularity as victims. He states: "Racial characteristics,
however, are irrelevant to personhood" (193). He makes
this claim because he sees the VRM/state-driven evocation
of empathy described above as an attempt to reduce
personhood to race. While it seems clear that "personhood"
can never be reducible to one characteristic, it seems to me
equally clear that race cannot be discounted. It cannot be
true to say that race is irrelevant to personhood-such a
position implies that one is born a "person," then takes on
other characteristics such as race, gender, sexuality, etc.,
as one develops and matures. This implies that a person is
a blank sheet awaiting life's script (sex, gender, race) to be
written in later on. It seems more plausible to argue that
"personhood" becomes visible, takes on significance
through, cultural and social characteristics such as race
and gender. As Judith Butler has argued in relation to
sex/gender, there is no "body as mute, prior to culture,
awaiting signification .... ,16
In other words, subjects, persons, are produced through
discursive categories such as race. The problem here may be
one of expression or interpretation of the text, but in claiming
that "[tio be a member of one race or another has as little
effect on one's status as a person as where one happens to
be born or where one happens to live (or have lived) at a
particular moment in time, what language one speaks, how
tall one is, or what clothes one wears," (193) Dubber seems
to suggest that personhood is an abstract concept
disconnected from all those social elements he relates above.
It is one thing to say that personhood or dignity should be
recognized regardless of race, or that race should not affect
one's designation as a person who is due respect. But it does
not follow that race is not a distinguishing feature of
personhood. It is true that victims deserve rights because
persons deserve rights. But to suggest that race is not a
feature of personhood might have the consequence that
16. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity
147 (1990).
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everyone is treated equally as "a person" regardless of
characteristics such as race, characteristics which
distinguish the kind of person that they are. In other words,
failing to recognize differences in personhood can result in
policies of formal rather than substantive equality, policies
which have been long criticized by feminists amongst others.
Dealing with violations of autonomy through the criminal
justice system might be said to properly require treating
different kinds of violations differently, and violations might
be substantively different depending on factors such as race
or age. Such differences need not be taken into account
merely at the sentencing stage but could be built into
substantive criminal law. 7 Specific harms should arguably
have specific (criminal) labels. There is no doubt that we
must take care that problematic stereotypes which have
already played a part in marginalizing individuals and
communities, including racial stereotypes, are not built into
the criminal justice system. 8 But this does not mean that we
can discount such factors as irrelevant for all purposes in the
criminal justice system. In saying that "personhood" and the
seriousness of the offense are sufficient for developing a
theory of victimhood (194), Dubber loses sight of the fact that
factors such as race are bound up both with personhood and
with the impact or seriousness of the offense.
This difficulty is clearest in his descriptions (160-73) of
some of the places in criminal law where the victim has a
role to play, and here Dubber includes offenses that are
targeted at particular victims-e.g., hate crimes (162-63).
Dubber suggests that hate crimes are an example of the
17. For instance, the French Penal Code (FPC) allows for certain characteristics of
the victim to form the basis of a specific offense (and to dictate the sentence rather
than leaving it to the discretion of the sentencer). See, e.g., Code Penal [C. Pdn.] art.
222-14 (Fr.), available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=33 (English
translation) (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) (it is a criminal offense to perpetrate "habitual
acts of violence" upon a child of fifteen years or a person whose vulnerability due to
their age, illness, infirmity, physical or psychological weakness, or pregnancy, is
obvious or known to the offender).
18. See here the literature on the problems of importing racial and cultural
factors into the reasonableness requirement within the provocation defense, for
example, Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility ch. 13 (2005).
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tendency in American criminal law to focus on specific
categories of victim as requiring special protection. This
approach in criminal law, he says, contradicts his thesis
that both victims and offenders should be dealt with by the
criminal process as persons, rather than according to
particular characteristics they might have. The way in
which the passage on hate crimes is written implies that
Dubber thinks that such offenses should not form part of
the criminal law, though he does not overtly say so. He is
particularly uncomfortable with hate crimes when the
offense operates to criminalize as a hate crime, an act by an
offender who mistakenly believes that the victim belongs to
a specific (protected) category (a category based on, e.g.,
sexuality or race). It is not clear what purpose this short
section on hate crimes serves in the book as full arguments
as to the relevant issues are not rehearsed. At the very
least such an important and sensitive issue requires
further attention, including some reference to the heated
and lengthy debates over the purpose and legitimacy of
hate crime legislation. 19
He returns to this idea towards the end of the chapter
(198-201), in claiming that in criminal law certain grounds
of identification between the general public and the victim
(such as race, gender) are morally insignificant in the same
way that they are insignificant in discrimination law. This
appears to be an unsustainable comparison. Discrimination
law prohibits unfair treatment based on, for example,
gender. But that does not mean that gender is
insignificant, as the debates on formal versus substantive
equality show.20 In discrimination law, the legal response
19. In the UK context, see, e.g., Maleiha Malik, "Racist Crime": Racially
Aggravated Offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Part II, 62 Mod. L. Rev.
409 (1999). In the U.S. context, see, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Why Liberals Should
Hate "Hate Crime Legislation," 20 Law & Phil. 215 (2001). For a recent argument
on the benefits of looking beyond the criminal law in dealing with hate crimes (in
the German context), see Rainer Strobl et al., Preventing Hate Crimes:
Experiences from Two East-German Towns, 45 Brit. J. Criminology 634 (2005).
20. See for instance, Gillian Calder, A Pregnant Pause: Federalism, Equality
and the Maternity and Parental Leave Debate in Canada, 14 Feminist Legal
Stud. (forthcoming 2006).
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requires that we examine the treatment of the victim. As
such we must see the victim in her specificity, taking such
characteristics as race and gender into account." The same
approach could be advocated, as suggested above, in
relation to the response of the criminal law. There,
although we might want to avoid essentializing victimhood,
or particular characteristics such as race, seeing a victim in
her own particular specific social position surely is a
justifiable aim of the criminal process. It is overly
simplistic to say that race cannot be relevant in any sense
in distributing criminal justice. At least we should engage
with the places in criminal law and criminal process where
erasing race (i.e., formal equality) might in itself be open to
a charge of (indirect) racism.
2. Autonomy
In relation to autonomy, Dubber suggests that the
state can only legitimately intervene in response to crime if
the victim wishes the state to intervene to redress the
violation of autonomy. This is consistent with his thesis in
the first part of the book regarding the victimless nature of
possession offenses as posing a problem for criminal law,
but it is a problematic assertion. Dubber goes on to later
say that a victim is not always the best judge of when state
intervention is necessary, and gives the example of a victim
of domestic violence who does not want to press charges
21. For example, Nicola Lacey calls for discrimination rights in the UK to be
based on the disadvantage suffered rather than membership of a group such as
"women." The focus then becomes the particular effect of different treatment on
that person rather than the fact of different treatment itself. Those in the "group"
claiming rights need not have anything in common other than the fact of a
resulting shared disadvantage, not even the characteristic in question (such as
race); one need not prove membership of an identity-based group as the instance
of discrimination based on perceived membership is sufficient. This conception
allows us to take into account the impact of discriminatory treatment on a person
given their own particular position in society without essentializing the
characteristic on which the discrimination is based (the essentialization of
victimhood being one of Dubber's fears). See Nicola Lacey, From Individual to
Group?, in Discrimination: The Limits of Law 99 (Bob Hepple & Erika M.
Szyszczak eds., 1992).
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(195). However, he does nothing to resolve the tension
inherent in simultaneously claiming that the state can only
intervene to protect a victim's autonomy, and yet also
denying that autonomy by claiming that the state can
intervene even when the victim does not desire it-at once
affirming and denying an individual's autonomy. Nor does
he deal with other problematic cases, such as injuries
consensually inflicted through sadomasochistic practices;
theft of an item which the "victim" did not know that she
owned; requesting to be killed-or more extreme, agreeing
for a portion of one's flesh to be eaten and then to be
killed.2 ' How does his understanding of autonomy
accommodate these examples? He states that victims'
decisions about whether or not to proceed against offenders
should be reviewed but does not state on what basis or how
(196).
He further suggests that the prosecutor decides
whether to prosecute based on whether she thinks that
interference with the victim's autonomy needs redress
(196) (despite the fact that he earlier argues that
prosecutors, as elected officials with wide powers of
discretion, are soldiers in the war on crime who make
decisions primarily in relation to the perceived need to
incapacitate the dangerous). However, the main difficulty
is that there are two somewhat different expressions of the
argument (195): first, "A victim whose sense of autonomy is
not affected by the experience of a crime, who laughs off the
offender's clumsy attempt to treat her as a non-person, is in
no need of state assistance in the form of a legal response,
in the form of either punishment or compensation"; second,
"Unless there is harm to a person's autonomy, there's no
need to fix it" (emphasis added). Arguably there is a
difference between a victim whose "sense" of autonomy is
affected and a victim whose actual autonomy (or perhaps
more accurately, capacity for/right to autonomy) has been
harmed. As Gardner and Shute have argued in the context
22. I am referring here to the notorious case of Armin Meiwes, a German
cannibal who was convicted of murder in 2004. See Manslaughter Verdict for
Cannibal, BBC, Jan. 30, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/L/hiworld/europe/3443293.stm.
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of rape, the defendant may violate the victim's right to
autonomy even if she was not aware of the violation as
such-for example if she is unconscious when raped and
never subsequently finds out.23 Violation of the right to
autonomy does not require that the victim has a sense of
that violation. Otherwise 'it would appear that being
murdered in one's sleep does not involve a violation of one's
autonomy.24 Further, Gardner and Shute argue that even
where there is no feeling of violation there is still a
criminal wrong, and this wrong does not depend on the
victim's idea of what is done to her.25 For them, it is this
sheer instrumentalization of a person that amounts tc a
"denial of personhood."
26
Dubber's use of the term autonomy does not include
reference to critiques of the notion of autonomy and
questions about its relation to the concept of personhood. In
the context of sexual autonomy, for example, Nicola Lacey
has argued that the liberal notion of autonomy
problematically allows no space for the expression of
affective and corporeal aspects of sexual harm-in other
words autonomy is usually linked to notions of free will,
and of choice and consent. This underplays the role that
bodily integrity plays in sexual autonomy. Autonomy is
important, but currently autonomy "dominates at the
expense of the development of a positive conception of what
kinds of sexual relationships matter to personhood."27 A
further question arises as to whether in order for any
formal right to autonomy to have effect, the context of
choices and the substantive elements of the right have to
also be present-i.e., what does a right to autonomy mean
in practice? Reconstructing autonomy in positive terms
would mean acknowledging its relationship with the
23. See John Gardner & Steven Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in Oxford
Essays on Jurisprudence 193 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
24. I am grateful to Victor Tadros for this example.
25. See Gardner & Shute, supra note 23.
26. Id. at 205.
27. See Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and
Social Theory 117 (1998).
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capacity to realize "life plans" as much as with formal
choice and the negative freedom not to have rights
interfered with.2" However, Lacey takes the view that even
if we adopt a positive model of autonomy and freedom, the
concept of autonomy is too closely bound to its historical
foundation in the abstract choosing subject and the
consequent concealment of the body. For this reason she
would favor the phrase sexual integrity rather than sexual
autonomy.2 9
As stated earlier, the main problem is the lack of
attention to a fuller exposition of the concept of autonomy.
Although he states that "Crime is the assault by one person
upon the autonomy of another" (218) (itself a narrow
conception of crime, as argued below), autonomy is never
defined, although a (rather confusing) discussion about
what Dubber perceives as a distinction between
"vindicating" and "restoring" the victim's autonomy ensues.
Here he states that the criminal justice system vindicates
autonomy rather than restores it; to suggest that it restores
autonomy implies that the offender has damaged the
victim's autonomy, thus conceding too much ground to the
offender (204). The distinction is not explored in any detail
and he goes on to contradict this position in relation to
homicide victims, whose autonomy he admits has been
destroyed. The distinction therefore seems not to stand up
to scrutiny, but it would make more sense if we knew how
he is defining autonomy. He later states that "[t]he
punishment of negligent crimes threatens to violate, rather
than vindicate, victims' rights insofar as it obscures the
central function of the criminal process: the reaffirmation
of the victim's autonomy as a person" (229). Of course this
is again consistent with the argument in part one of the
28. Id. at 119.
29. Likewise Jennifer Nedelsky has argued for a concept of "embodied
autonomy." See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts, and Possibilities, 1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 7 (1989). There is also a
wealth of literature on the concept of "relational" autonomy and on valuing
dependency. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth (2003); Marilyn
Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (2003).
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book that crimes of strict liability, victimless crimes, and
constructive crimes all pose problems for the requirements
of traditional substantive criminal law-so does a criminal
standard of liability based on negligence. But quite how, for
example, punishing a company for criminal negligence in a
homicide case violates a victim's autonomy is not clear, and
the question of why an offender cannot be said to
negligently interfere with a victim's autonomy is not
explored.
3. Harm
A further central, but underdeveloped, concept in
Dubber's book is that of harm. In relation to the arguments
in the first half of the book, one is provoked to ask the
following questions: What is wrong with the
criminalization of the possession of guns or drugs? Are they
not harms against which the state is justified in
legislating? Are possession laws per se problematic, or is it
the way they are currently formulated and implemented?
Is the real problem the inherent discretion within the
policing of possession? Dubber's arguments would lead us
to conclude that he does not think that the criminal law
should concern itself with those who carry illegal guns or
substances, and that we should abandon or at least
question criminalizing possession of both drugs and guns
(he does not in principle distinguish in his critique of
possession laws between drugs and guns). However, he
does not explicitly advocate decriminalization. Moreover he
does not explain the basis for his belief that such
possession should not properly be a matter for the criminal
law. Are such offenses harmful, wrongful, both, or neither?
Is harm the best peg on which to hang such offenses?
Questions of harm are not directly addressed. 0 At a
general level we are left wondering what principles might
govern decisions about what behavior to criminalize. More
30. For a recent and excellent effort to distinguish between harms and wrongs
in criminal law, see R.A. Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 13
(2001).
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particularly one might ask whether there are important
differences when considering the decriminalization of drugs
as opposed to guns. 1 Explicit attention has been given to
both these issues by other writers, but Dubber does not
attend to them. Doug Husak has suggested that in order to
expand the use of the criminal sanction it is necessary to
provide principled arguments for the move. The same is
also true of the need to support a proposal to constrain or
remove substantive criminal offenses. As Husak states, "A
detailed account of the specific instances of legislation that
should be rejected as incompatible with a liberal theory of
law requires at least two supplementary theories: first, a
theory of moral rights, and second, a theory of wrongful
conduct."32 How then are we to support Dubber's argument
that the expansion of the criminal law as regards
possession is misdirected (and indeed that we should
narrow the concept of crime itself) if we do not know the
principled basis on which he makes this claim (other than a
very broadly interpreted liberal aim of desiring less state
intervention in our lives)?33
Here Dubber's account is part of a more general
problematic tendency, referred to above, to divorce an issue
from a broad and sophisticated literature which considers
it. This is also apparent in relation to hate crimes, as
described earlier, and again in a later discussion of
whether or not corporations or other entities can count as
"persons" for the purposes of the criminal law. In chapter
five Dubber states that corporations can only suffer
economic loss, not physical harm, and therefore cannot be a
victim requiring the protection of the criminal law.
Equally, as an "apersonal" entity, a company cannot inflict
physical harm and therefore cannot be guilty of a criminal
31. That there may be different arguments justifying the criminalization of
drugs as opposed to the criminalization of weapons such as guns, is clearly set out
by Doug Husak. See Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the
Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 23 Law & Phil. 437 (2004).
32. See Husak, supra note 1, at 157.
33. Husak amongst others has written extensively on what these principles of
(over)criminalisation might be. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 1; Douglas N. Husak,
Legalize This!: The Case for Decriminalizing Drugs (2002).
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offense (216-20). However, he makes these statements
without any reference whatsoever to the burgeoning field of
corporate liability studies4.3  The arguments, both
conceptual and practical, for and against criminalizing
corporations, are many and complex. In the light of that
literature, Dubber's claims appear somewhat under-
defended. The reason he does give for taking the anti-
criminalization view refers again to his concept of
personhood. Companies, for example, do not have
autonomy and therefore should have nothing to do with
state punishment (218). They can cause victimization and
loss but this is not criminal victimization and so is not the
business of the criminal law. Persons, not acts, cause (and
suffer) criminal victimization (223). Negligent homicides
caused by companies (or individuals for that matter) are
"not crimes in the true sense of the word" (228), hence
"their victims are not victims of crimes" (229). So for him,
companies do not have the kind of personhood that either
requires vindication by the criminal law or that can inflict
harm on persons. However, the relationship between his
notion of personhood and the harm that criminal law is
concerned with needs to be teased out in more detail and
supported by reference to the existing theories and
arguments about corporate criminal liability.
The application of his anti-criminalization perspective
would lead to the conclusion that offenders should not be
criminally liable for offenses such as embezzlement or
fraud against a company. Even more worrying, it would
suggest that serious harms committed by corporations (not
just corporate homicides but also large scale polluting
practices such as those performed by Union Carbide in
Bhopal) are somehow not as significant or deserving of
severe punishment as less serious harms committed by
individuals. And Dubber states his position without
supporting evidence or reference to existing debates--other
34. The literature is literally vast, but see, e.g., C.M.V. Clarkson, Kicking
Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls, 59 Mod. L. Rev. 557 (1996);
Unmasking the Crimes of the Powerful: Scrutinizing States and Corporations
(Steve Tombs & Dave Whyte eds., 2003).
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than his dismissal of the pro-corporate-criminalization
stance as being part of the over-criminalization zeal and
the "rush to punish" (218-19). Conflating the punitive "war
on crime" with debates on how to address the very real
social (and arguably criminal) harms perpetrated by
companies and other "apersonal" entities is a fundamental
error. Even if we accept Dubber's contention that there is
such a war on crime, arguments for criminalizing
companies are not simply driven by incapactitative urges
but are based on principles of responsibility for harm
caused. While he is right in saying that the current system
of corporate criminal liability tends to disproportionately
impact upon small companies and businesses (219), this is
not by itself a sufficient reason to reject the principle of
corporate criminal liability and responsibility altogether. 5
C. The War on Crime and the War on Terror
Dubber's thesis has some interesting applications
outside of the remit of possession, victims' rights, and the
war on crime. Particularly, Dubber's themes have
particular resonance in relation to the "war on terror."36
Since September 11, 2001, there has been an expansion of
the criminal law in relation to terrorist offenses, notably in
the U.S. and the UK, an expansion which, from his
arguments, would clearly be problematic for Dubber. There
are many parallels between Dubber's argument about the
war on crime and the present approach to legislating
against threats of terrorism taken by the U.S. and UK
governments. In the UK, for example, there have recently
been lengthy and heated debates over plans to extend
35. General concerns about a narrowing of the concept of crime were also
raised by Stuart Green in his review of Dubber's book. See Green, supra note 12.
36. Upendra Baxi, amongst others, would distinguish between the "war on
terror" and the "war of terror" engaged in by western governments. Baxi has
termed the war on terror the "new political theology." See Upendra Baxi, Siting
Truth, Justice and Rights in the Two Terror Wars, Keynote Speech at Translating
Terror: Globalisation and the New Planetary Wars, a joint conference of the
Centre for Translation and Comparative Cultural Studies, and the Centre for the
Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Warwick University (Nov. 12, 2005).
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police powers to detain terrorist suspects for ninety days
without charge." In the end the government's proposals
were defeated by a healthy majority," but in terms of an
extension to the possible detention period, the Bill as it
stands still proposes a maximum of twenty-eight days.
Internment, detention without charge, was an ultimately
unsuccessful feature of the English government's attempt
to police Irish Republican uprisings.39 A similar critique of
internment is made in contemporary debates in the
ongoing war on terror, regarding the extension of police
powers of detention.0
Dubber's concerns are noteworthy in this context; his
critical examination of the policing of possession offenses
emphasizes the way in which discourses of threat and risk
have been invoked by the state to justify intervention (in
the form of the criminal law) at increasingly earlier stages
in causal chains of conduct, without the traditional
criminal law requirement for mens rea, in the name of
social welfare (20, 28). This analysis informs current
debates over the criminalization of a range of behaviors
that appear to suggest a terrorist threat to security.
Likewise his suggestion that one of the ways in which the
state extends the arm of the criminal law is to identify, or
even profile (66) certain categories of individuals (or
individuals within certain "high crime" areas (52)) as
37. See Terrorism Bill, 2005, § 23(5). The grounds on which a terrorist
suspect's detention may be reviewed and extended in the UK are set out in
Terrorism Act, 2001, § 23, sched. 8.
38. See Patrick Wintour, After Eight Years in Power Tony Blair Hears a New
Word: Defeat, Guardian, Nov. 10, 2005, at 1.
39. See Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Report of a Committee to
Consider, in the Context of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Measures to Deal
with Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 1975, Cmnd. 5847. Internment was initially
proposed in the wake of the inception of Northern Ireland as a separate state,
under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 5, (N.
Ir.).
40. See A. Sivanandan, Why Muslims Reject British Values, Observer, Oct.
16, 2005, at 30; Michael Meacher, Blair Can't Govern Alone. He Must Learn to
Listen-Or Fail, Guardian, Nov. 17, 2005, at 32. For a comparison of the UK
government's approach to dealing with the IRA with current responses to
terrorism, see Ben Brandon, Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: 120
Years of the UK's Legal Response to Terrorism, 2004 Crim. L. Rev. 981.
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showing a dangerous disposition towards crime. The
presumption here is that such individuals pose a sufficient
risk to justify intervention in the form of surveillance,
targeting, arrest, interrogation, and eventually charging
and prosecution. The process of intervention, and indeed
the assessment of dangerousness, is dependent on the
discretion of police officers "on the beat" (22). Similar
conclusions can be drawn from a study of the terms of the
terrorism debate; beliefs, both popular and propounded by
governments, about the impending threat of terrorism,
have been employed in order to rationalize the increasingly
hysterical response to perceived risks, in the form of what
some would describe as draconian legislation in the UK.
Strategies of early intervention in potentially risky
behavior (such as attending certain political meetings) or
indeed the focused policing of specific populations perceived
as posing a particular risk (such as Muslims), have both
been the subject of damning criticism by those worried
about the parameters of the war on terror." Dubber is
correct in identifying these practices as worrying in the war
on crime, and such concerns apply equally in the war on
terror. The similarity between discourses of crime control
and discourses of risks/threats of terrorism is uncanny. For
example, risk in both arenas is seen as harm in itself
rather than merely a possibility of harm. State intervention
is justified in both cases, even where "the actual
manifestation of harm remains unpredictable and
uncertain."42  Both crime generally and terrorism in
particular have been used to generate public fear about
risk, which is in turn used justify a highly intrusive
amount of surveillance (by the state, and of each other),
and state intervention at earlier points in the causal chain
41. See Adam Tomkins, Legislating against Terror: The Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001, 2002 Pub. L. 205. See also House of Lords and House of
Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Review of Counter-Terrorism
Powers, 2003-4, H.L. 158/H.C. 713, http'//www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtrights/158/158.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
42. See Gabe Mythen & Sandra Walkate, Criminology and Terrorism: Which
Thesis? Risk Society or Governmentality?, Brit. J. Criminology, Advance Access,
July 28, 2005, http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/rapidpdf/azi074vl, at 3.
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of behavior. The Durkheimian argument used by Dubber to
describe the communitarian function of crime control
practices-the rejection of "deviant" individuals in order to
promote community safety-is also relevant here. The only
difference is that both the terror threat and the anti-terror
measures extend far beyond the domestic criminal law
context, confounding conventional geographical boundaries
as well as those relating to criminal liability. In fact one
might argue, as Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate have
done, that it is the preexisting crime control policies that
have made the process of extending anti-terrorist measures
relatively easy-they are simply an extension of existing
penal policies.43 Dubber's work does give us a starting point
to analyze the phenomenon that is the "war on crime," and
understanding the operation of the war on crime will in
turn inform our analysis of contemporary discourses on the
war on terror.
IV. STYLE AND STRUCTURE
Finally there are some stylistic issues to draw to the
attention of potential readers. Overall the book is very
lengthy; the first half, on the criminalization of possession
offenses, is around 150 pages and the second half, on
victims' rights, almost 200 pages long. The book is
extremely well written in the sense that the story of the
book is easy to follow, but the reading experience is not as
fluid as it could be, due to the style in which the book is
written. The book combines arguments from previously
published material in the form of journal articles (one on
policing possession and the other on victims in the criminal
justice system). The initial impression is that the two
articles have been expanded beyond their natural scope
and length to provide a basis for the book, or at least that
some further work needed to be done to integrate the two.
This impression is not challenged by an enduring feature of
the book-the repetitious manner in which Dubber makes
43. Id. at 4, 11.
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his claims. His story about the proliferation and expansion
of criminal offenses is a powerful one, and one which needs
telling, but there is a frustrating amount of reiteration of
ideas, phrases, and conclusions. This is true for example of
the text relating to his claim that possession offenses are
crimes against the state, and that both victims and
offenders can be nuisances-inconveniences which clog up
the system of dealing swiftly and efficiently with risks (i.e.,
dangerous people) (98-100, 189, 213). This is not only an
issue of method but also of structure. The extent of the
repetition in chapter two may have been mediated had
chapters two and three been reversed, for example. The
second half of the book flows more easily than the first, and
when the discussion there connects to claims made earlier
in the book, Dubber refers us to those claims rather than
repeat the same arguments again, lessening the repetitive
feel of the first half. In addition, some of the substantive
arguments and theoretical concepts referred to in the first
half are explained in more detail in the second half. This
strengthens the feeling, indicated earlier, that the
structure of the book could perhaps have been reversed, or
at least edited so that explanatory material in the second
half precedes its use in the first.
Dubber tends also towards a certain hyperbolic and
overstated style of writing, which almost reads like
conspiracy theory. At the end of chapter three, for example,
he suggests that the Model Penal Code in its present form
obscures the more explicit aims of previous drafts of the
Code-i.e., previous drafts unequivocally relied on the
protection of interests of the society and public welfare to
justify intervention, whereas the current proposed Code
does not refer to these utilitarian concerns but is based on
the protection of individuals. His analysis of this shift is
not that the interests of society have been neglected by the
current Model Penal Code but that the Code text is
deliberately disingenuous (142-43). The state wants us to
believe that the autonomy and individual rights of victims
and potential victims are prioritized by the Code while in
fact the Code is a central part of the state's project to
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protect itself. This kind of overinflated claim makes it
difficult to accept what is at the heart of his contention and
a sustainable point-that texts such as the Model Penal
Code are subject to fluctuating political forces during the
drafting process. Likewise towards the end of chapter four,
he states:
Generally speaking, victims are an inconvenience to the
state. They demand attention and compromise the efficiency
of the criminal disposal process. Helpless victims, by
contrast, pose no such challenge. They are eager for state
assistance and easily manipulable. As a result, they
constitute a valuable source of legitimacy for the state's
pursuit of its self-aggrandizement. (189, emphasis added)
That the aims of the VRM and of the state's war on
crime overlap has already been stated, and the point
behind the above statement is thus defensible, but the
terms in which he makes a claim tend on occasion to
distract from its credibility.
CONCLUSION
Overall the book provides a passionate and powerful
contribution to criminal law and justice studies, charting
the course of contemporary over-criminalization by way of
an examination of both the operation of possession offenses,
and the way in which discourses of victimhood have
legitimized state intervention. In addition there is an
attempt to offer a theory, that of personhood, which should
found the basis of criminal law, applying to both victims
and offenders, and which would offer respect, dignity, and
the right to autonomy to all actors within the criminal
justice process. The way in which Dubber expresses his
enthusiasm sometimes distracts from the argument, but
the book forms an important part of the broader field of
critical studies in criminal law and criminal justice.
Further work needs to be done to unpack some of the
central concepts of the book, most crucially personhood,
and more attention needs to be given to existing critical
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scholarship on notions of the state, harm, and autonomy.
And there are some issues of style and structure which
require consideration. However, Dubber's book not only
plays a role in provoking a healthy critique of the practices
of criminalization, but also helps us to understand more
generally the problematic nature of the expansion of
criminal justice intervention into many areas of
contemporary life. This is especially true in the present
political climate, where, as Beck has said, "the borders that
divide domestic from international, the police from the
military, crime from war and war from peace-are
overthrown.""
44. See Ulrich Beck, Terror and Solidarity, in Re-ordering the World: The
Long-Term Implications of 11 September 112, 115 (Mark Leonard ed., 2002).
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The Three Dimensions of Freedom, Crime,
and Punishment
PERSON, SUBJEKT, BURGER. By Michael Pawlik.
Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2004. Pp. 124. EUR 49.80/SFR
86.00 (paper).
Reviewed by Hanno F. Kaisert
Ever since the protection of individual freedom
replaced justice as the primary criterion for the legitimacy
of government, criminal punishment, as one of the most
drastic exercises of governmental authority, has been held
against that standard, too. As a result, any diminution of
freedom through punishment must at the same time be
justifiable as a realization of freedom. So long as the loss of
the criminal's freedom is traded off against gains in the
protection of everyone else's freedom, consequentionalist
accounts provide an appealing strategy of vicarious
justification. But once we require that for complete
justification freedom must not only be realized for everyone
else but also in the person of the criminal, a more
sophisticated and inclusive strategy is required.
Michael Pawlik, professor of criminal law and
philosophy of law at the University of Regensburg,
Germany, takes up the challenge of disentangling the
paradox of punishment and freedom in his latest book
Person, Subjekt, Burger (Person, Subject, Citizen),' in
which he presents a highly original retributive theory of
punishment. Pawlik's theory is rooted in the legal
philosophy of Hegel and Fichte, whose concepts of
t Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP, New York. Adjunct professor, Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law. All opinions expressed in this article are mine alone.
1. Michael Pawlik, Person, Subjekt, Burger: Zur Legitimation von Strafe
(2004). All translations are mine; internal citations have been omitted.
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recognition and of the subject he recasts in a framework of
communication theory, inspired by the works of Ginther
Jakobs2 and Niklas Luhmann.3 By applying his theory to
questions of criminal law doctrine such as self-defense,
defense of others, provocation, and inchoate crimes, Pawlik
succeeds not only in providing a plausible solution to the
problem of vicarious justification, but also in bridging the
gap between theory and practice.
This article begins with (I) a sketch of the overall
design of Pawlik's theory, followed by (II) a discussion of
three defining characteristics of his argument, and (III-IV)
a critical examination of two of Pawlik's central claims, one
relating to the connection of censure and hard treatment
and the other to his rejection of consequentionalism.
I. THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM, CRIME, AND
PUNISHMENT
In a state of freedom, individuals enjoy certain rights
that protect them against arbitrary interference by others
and by the government. Such rights are guaranteed and, if
need be, enforced by the state. At its most basic level, the
law protects the individual as a person. Persons are defined
by their potential. They have not yet committed themselves
to any particular way of life and are thus not yet confined
to any particular identity. In that sense they are
existentially free. That open, abstract, not-yet-defined, "you
can be anything you want to be" state depends on the
availability of options, that is, on the largely unencumbered
potential for action (76-77). The law protects the potential
of the individual as a person, for example, through property
rights and the freedom of contract. Once a person makes
certain choices about him- or herself and begins to move
along a path of establishing a distinct biographical identity,
2. See, e.g., Ginther Jakobs, Norm, Person, Gesellschaft: Vordiberlegungen
zu einer Rechtsphilosophie (1997).
3. See, e.g., Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System (Klaus A. Ziegert
trans., 2004). Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (John Bednarz, Jr. and Dirk
Baecker trans., 1995).
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he or she morphs, over time, from a person into a subject
(77-78).' While the freedom of the person is about
potentiality, the freedom of the subject is about actuality.
Using Hegel's terms, one could say: The freedom of the
subject is more concrete than the freedom of the person.
More concisely: The subject is the truth of the person. (78)
The law protects a subject's actuality by providing
additional safeguards, such as due process, civil rights,
freedom of speech, etc., against arbitrary interference with
the manifestations of the subject's choices. Both as a person
and as a subject, the individual is a beneficiary of the legal
order, as the law protects both options and choices.
However, that state of freedom cannot be maintained if
everyone merely chooses to exercise his or her rights as a
person and as a subject. Maintaining the state of freedom
requires active participation in securing the continued
existence of its necessary conditions. That factual
requirement renders plausible a normative duty to
contribute to the "project of freedom through law" (85),
which is a duty of the individual as a citizen. Pawlik calls
this civic obligation a duty of loyalty,s the central
requirement of which is to "maintain a state of generally
secured lawfulness" (83), that is, to obey the law, to render
minimal assistance to others in emergencies, and to pay
taxes. The state uses tax revenues to provide internal and
external security, as well as a minimum level of general
4. Note that individuals are never solely persons or entirely subjects. Rather,
they are persons in some respects and subjects in others, a mix that will likely be
unique for each individual.
5. Note that acting from duty is not required; only actions according to duty
are (84). See also Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 6:219 (Mary Gregor
ed. & trans., 1996) (1797). ("That lawgiving which makes an action a duty and
also makes this duty the incentive is ethical. But that lawgiving which does not
include the incentive of duty in the law and so admits an incentive other than the
idea of duty itself is juridical.").
6. A general duty of minimal assistance is a requirement of German but not
of U.S. criminal law. See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [German Penal Code] Nov. 13,
1998, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGB1.] 3322, § 323c, translation available at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm#323c (last visited August 1, 2005).
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welfare, so that most everyone will be able to enjoy the
options that a state of freedom provides (83). Social
freedom is a state of legal rights and duties.
The criminal violates the rights of others as persons
and as subjects; in addition, he or she flouts the civic duty
of loyalty. Corresponding to the three dimensions of
freedom, there are three dimensions of the criminal wrong.
The wrong of the person lies in the "culpable interference
with the legally protected freedom of action of another"
(76), that is, in diminishing the victim's potential for action,
for example, by stealing his or her money. Diminution of
options by transferring wealth, however, is only one aspect
of the wrong committed by the thief. The wrong of the
subject lies in treating the victim solely as a means to an
end (78). Theft implies that the victim's goals (here,
keeping his or her wallet) are subordinate to and thus less
deserving of respect than the criminal's goals (here, taking
the money). The wrong of the subject thus "cuts deeper into
the claim for recognition of the victim than a (mere)
personal wrong: a wrong of the subject is (also) culpable
expression of disrespect for the victim's plan of life" (78). 7
The wrong of the citizen, finally, is of a qualitatively
different nature. On a personal and subjective level, crime
is an interpersonal affair. The wrong lies in the arbitrary
diminution of the victim's (personal) freedom of action and
in the disrespect for the victim's (subjective) moral
standing. In contrast, the failure to contribute to the
common project of freedom through law is a transcendental
wrong. It undermines the necessary conditions of
everyone's personal and subjective freedom. It is thus an
affair between the criminal and his or her entire
community.
7. For a similar view of the interpersonal aspect of the criminal wrong, see
Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1677 (1992) ("A person behaves wrongfully in
a way that effects a moral injury to another when she treats that person in a way
that is precluded by that person's value, and/or by representing him as worth far
less than his actual value; or, in other words, when the meaning of her action is
such that she diminishes him, and by doing so, represents herself as elevated
with respect him, thereby according herself a value that she does not have.").
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By denying proper recognition to [the victim as] a subject,
[the perpetrator as a citizen] also breaches the duty of
loyalty owed to other citizens .... The specific plus of the
wrong of the citizen lies in the violation of the law as law,
understood as the existence of freedom. (86-87)
In a nutshell:
One and the same criminal act, the culpable violation of a
duty, may be discussed on different planes of interpretation:
as unjustified diminution of someone's potential to act, as
disregard for someone else's plan of life, and finally as a
breach of the civic duty to contribute to the maintenance of
a common state of freedom. (75-76)
Legitimate punishment is a reaction to all three
dimensions of the criminal wrong, and as such it is the
restoration of the three underlying dimensions of freedom.
The wrongs of the person and of the subject require
interpersonal compensation for material damages and for
injury to the victim's status as a moral agent (88).
Conceivably, those wrongs could be dealt with by a torts
system. But responding to the wrong of the citizen requires
something different that goes beyond interpersonal
compensation.
With the breach of the primary obligation of active loyalty,
an implied secondary obligation arises: The criminal must
accept that the inseparability of the nexus between enjoying
one's freedom and performing one's duty of loyalty will now
be affirmed at his expense. Such affirmation is put into
effect by taking away certain freedoms from the criminal in
response to his breach of duty. (90-91)
Punishment proper thus makes a "necessary contribution
to the restoration of the legal order as a state of freedom,
which was attacked by the criminal" (76).
Enduring punishment is the convicted criminal's
unique contribution to maintaining a state of freedom,
owed to the community as a whole and enforced by the
state as the community's agent. Punishment proper thus
69520061
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restores a state of freedom: the money is returned to the
victim (person), his or her entitlement to equal respect is
reaffirmed (subject), and the criminal is made to honor his
or her duties as a member of society (citizen).
II. THE PROJECT OF FREEDOM THROUGH LAW
For Pawlik, freedom is necessarily freedom through
law. Law is defined in terms of freedom and (the reality of)
freedom is defined as a state of law.' The individuals in
Pawlik's theory are always and already part of a
community. Pawlik does not invoke a pre-social natural
state and the corresponding Hobbesean concept of negative
freedom. In Pawlik's world, freedom-including freedom of
the person-is social freedom. This starting point allows
Pawlik to plausibly make three related claims, which give
his theory its distinctive design: (i) only freedom-affirming
laws are valid; (ii) the criminal wrong lies in the subversion
of freedom, not in gaining an unfair advantage; and (iii) the
criminal is and remains part of society, which places
significant limitations on the range of permissible
punishments.
For Pawlik, the basic criteria for the legitimacy of
punishment and of societal order are the same.
The state and its laws derive legitimacy from enabling
freedom.... Punishment as a specific exercise of the power
of the state must pass muster under the test for the
legitimacy of the state itself-the test of freedom. In other
words, one has to show that punishment makes a necessary
contribution to the task of safeguarding the freedom of the
people, that it gives "reality" to that freedom, as Hegel put
it. The state of affairs that punishment intends to restore
must therefore not be described in the abstract as a state ofjustice, rather it must be portrayed as a state of lawful
distribution of freedom. (56-57)
8. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right 29 (T.M.
Knox trans., 1967) (1821). ("An existent of any sort embodying the free will, this
is what right is. Right therefore is by definition freedom as Idea.").
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Freedom is defined in terms of interpersonal and
institutional recognition; we voluntarily concede everyone
else a position identical to that from which such recognition
originates, and we require the maintenance of the
necessary conditions of such recognition (69).1 From a
legislator's point of view, Pawlik's account is both limiting
and enabling. It is limiting, because there is no legitimate
punishment in an unfree state, and even in a free state,
criminal punishment must not be used as a purely
preventive measure; no "duty of loyalty" is owed to a law
that fails to promote freedom.1 ° It is enabling, because
punishment may be imposed on those who subvert the
conditions of personal and subjective freedom, i.e., those
who refuse to participate in the project of freedom through
law.
The very theory of recognition that places limitations
on the validity of the criminal laws also allows Pawlik to
clearly identify the specific property of the criminal wrong
as a failure to contribute, which is a form of transcendental
free riding. Importantly, what's offensive about the free
ride is not that the free rider gets an unfair advantage
(which others, given the opportunity, would also like to
enjoy), but rather that he or she undermines the conditions
of freedom enjoyed by the criminal and others alike without
which a state of freedom cannot be maintained. Because
punishment for failing to perform one's duty of loyalty
affirms the nexus between the state of freedom and each
individual's participation in maintaining its conditions, the
criminal's loss of freedom (as perceived by others) now
represents his or her contribution to the common project,
which resonates with the metaphor of punishment as
"paying one's dues."
9. For an analysis of interpersonal and institutional recognition in Hegel's
philosophy of law, see Hanno F. Kaiser, Widerspruch und Harte Behandlung 98-
111 (1999); Robert R. Williams, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other
(1992).
10. For example, within Pawlik's theory, criminal prohibitions against
consensual sodomy or criminal laws permitting the indefinite detention of
suspected terrorists would be invalid.
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Another requirement for justifiable punishment is that
the criminal must not be expelled from society into a
natural state. "Punishment acknowledges the persistence
of the criminal's role as a citizen: He will not be excused
from his responsibility for society" (95). This requirement of
institutional recognition as the flip side of the individual's
inability to unilaterally renounce the bounds of society
stands in the way of "enemy jurisprudence," which is a
troubling consequence of most contractual and purely
interpersonal theories of recognition. 1 Within the realm of
prima facie justifiable punishments, Pawlik's three-tiered
account of the criminal wrong also provides useful criteria
to answer the question how much punishment is
permissible. The extent of permissible punishment is
determined by the material damage (absent in the event of
an attempt), the significance of the disregard displayed for
someone else's moral standing (more in cases of
manslaughter than of theft), and, finally, the "extent of
disloyalty vis-A-vis the project of freedom through law" (92).
The latter permits consideration of provocation (the victim
impermissibly pushes the limits of the criminal's loyalty)
and of voluntary attempts of the criminal to mitigate the
effects of his or her crime (marginalizing the breach of duty
as an isolated event).
III. CENSURE, HARD TREATMENT, AND THE FAILURE OF
CONSEQUENTIONALISM
Two areas in which Pawlik's theory of punishment
requires further elaboration are (i) the justification of hard
treatment as a necessary part of punishment, and (ii) the
reasons for dismissing consequentionalist accounts.
First, the connection between censure and hard
treatment has been a persistent problem for virtually all
retributive accounts. Most theories fall into one of three
categories: (a) hard treatment as a conventional symbol for
11. The excessive punishments meted out in the "war on drugs" or the near-
permanent exclusion of sex offenders and other undesirables from society come to
mind.
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censure;12 (b) hard treatment as the embodiment of
censure;13  and (c) hard treatment as prudential
supplement. 4 Pawlik rejects (a) because hard treatment as
a conventional symbol for censure fails to capture the
notion that "[the object of recognition (and its denial) are
not norms but relations of real (and thus materialized)
freedom" (68). At a later point he seems to embrace (b)
when he writes that
[tihe surer a society is of itself, the more crime is perceived
as a "fragile and isolated" occurrence, the milder
punishments may be. This leaves a broad range for social
and cultural evolution. However, the punitive sanction must
always be somewhat drastic, because only in conjunction
will norm-affirmation [i.e., censure] and "hard treatment"
amount to a normatively adequate response to the type of
violation of recognition, which has been identified as the
wrong of the citizen. The name of that answer is:
punishment. (91)
It is important to note that Pawlik does not turn the
notion of freedom into an ideal entity. His normative theory
is communicative throughout, not ontological. But it
appears that Pawlik's theory of meaning is not
unqualifiedly nominalist, as the true expression of a
concept seemingly requires some form of real-world
manifestation; blowing a kiss means something different
12. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving 100 (1970) ("To say that the
very physical treatment itself expresses condemnation is to say simply that
certain forms of hard treatment have become the conventional symbols of public
reprobation.").
13. See, e.g., Anthony Skillen, How to Say Things with Walls, 55 Phil. 509,
517 (1980) ("Feinberg vastly underrates the natural appropriateness, the non-
arbitrariness, of certain forms of hard treatment to be the expression or
communication of moralistic and punitive attitudes. Such practices embody
punitive hostility, they do not merely 'symbolize' it.").
14. See, e.g., Uma Narayan, Appropriate Responses and Preventive Benefits:
Justifying Censure and Hard Treatment in Legal Punishment, 13 Oxford J.Legal
Stud. 166, 181 (1993) (noting that hard treatment "can function so as to provide
these moral agents with additional prudential incentives for not breaking these
laws, given the facts of human frailty and proneness to temptation"). See also
Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (1993).
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than kissing someone, censuring a criminal means
something different than locking him or her up for two
years. The implications of combining a communicative
theory of crime and censure with a theory of meaning that
is at least in part non-nominalist require further
exploration.15
Second, Pawlik's rejection of consequentionalism is of
particular interest. Like many retributivists, Pawlik backs
into his position by finding fault with consequentionalist
accounts. The core of his criticism of negative general and
special prevention is the problem of vicarious justification.16
As long as [the proponents of negative general prevention]
make their case from within a framework of rational self-
interest, which is attractive as it does not require much in
terms of assumptions, they must limit their argument to the
interests of all (criminally tempted) members of society with
the exception of the convicted criminal himself. The
punishment of the criminal is a demonstration for those
other members of society that crime doesn't pay. No longer
is there communication with the criminal but rather
through him. He is used ... "like discarded rags to make a
scarecrow." The criminal is thus no longer treated ... as a
member of society with equal rights. In that fashion, one
cannot justify legal punishment, but merely an act of
exclusion.... [Therefore,] [t]he concept of deterrence adds
nothing to the justification of punishment. (25-26, 29)
Pawlik does not require actual consent by the criminal
as a condition of legitimacy; he merely requires that such
consent be conceptually possible. Thus, a theory of the
subject pursuant to which the criminal cannot will to
receive (massive) hard treatment is deficient, as it fails to
address the criminal as a moral agent. This criticism is
entirely valid if lodged against naturalistic accounts of the
15. One possible framework for such exploration has been suggested by
Charles Taylor, Hegel 11-29 (1975). Taylor contrasts the nominalist approach to
meaning with an anthropological and linguistic theory of self-expressive conduct.
16. See also Kaiser, supra note 9, at 37-39. Pawlik correctly identifies theories
of positive general prevention as explanatory, rather than justificatory in nature
(39-43).
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subject as a trivial machine, as found, for example, in
Hobbes's De Homine and De Cive, and in crude variants of
utilitarianism that only take into account bodily states of
pleasure and pain.17 But those accounts are little more than
straw men in today's sophisticated and methodologically
conscious discourse of consequentionalism and behavioral
economics. An actor's set of preferences is not confined to
bodily pleasures or to the avoidance of physical harm, even
though such states will certainly be part of most actors'
preference sets. Few consequentionalists would therefore
deny the individual's faculty for noninstrumental moral
reasoning. Most would agree that the convicted criminal
should remain a moral agent with the capacity to find
moral or spiritual redemption, that he or she should,
conceptually, remain a member of a family, a citizen, and a
(potential) participant in the political discourse with rights
and obligations. The prison is a normative legal space, not
a trial of strength in a natural state. The point is that even
if criminal punishment is conceptualized in a purely
instrumental fashion, normative identities remain
available to the convicted criminal that allow him- or
herself to understand the meaning of the hard treatment.
Thus, the convicted criminal is not solely used as a
scarecrow. This is not to say that Pawlik's criticism of
pervasive consequentionalism is methodologically
mistaken, quite the contrary. With respect to certain
outsiders such as sex offenders and suspected terrorists,
Pawlik's criticism is right on target; it also serves as a
powerful check against disproportional (yet conceivably
effective) punishments. But as a categorical rejection of
preventive theories of punishment and their underlying
consequentionalism, it falls short, as consequentionalism is
17. See, e.g., Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen ch. 1, para. 7 (Richard Tuck &
Michael Silverthorne eds. & trans., 1998) (1641) ("Amid so many dangers
therefore from men's natural cupidity, that threaten every man every day, we
cannot be blamed for looking out for ourselves; we cannot will to do otherwise. For
each man is drawn to desire that which is Good for him and to Avoid what is bad
for him and most of all the greatest of natural evils, which is death; this happens
by a real necessity of nature as powerful as that by which a stone falls
downward.").
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not conceptually confined to explanation. Pawlik's claim
that "[t]he concept of deterrence adds nothing to thejustification of punishment" is too strong (29, emphasis
added).
Pawlik's rejection of instrumental theories of
punishment is a consequence of his even further-reaching
assumption that mere instrumental interaction is
insufficient to sustain a society. With respect to the
individual, he claims that "[tihe pathos of detachment fails
as a general mode of existence" (77). In other words,
abstract potentiality and the corresponding freedom of
action is a deficient mode of being. With respect to society,
a legal order to which individuals relate in a purely
instrumental manner is highly unstable, as it remains tied
to a framework of stimulus and response with its
"interrelations of fleeting perceptions and external
constellations." Within that framework, performing one's
legal duties is contingent upon whether such performance
will make the individual better off. (35)
Consequently, negative duties of non-interference are
insufficient, and active participation in the "project of
freedom through law" is required.
Pawlik presents his assumptions in almost anecdotal
form without further elaboration. Upon reflection, however,
it is not necessarily intuitive that "the pathos of
detachment" is unsuitable as a general way of life and that
instrumental interaction is, in fact, unstable. An
instrumental theory of the law and the state does not imply
an entirely instrumental social universe. It merely states
that some social systems may indeed operate with
instrumental models of the individual and of society. That
alone neither amounts to a general way of life, nor does it,
without more, rob such systems of legitimacy.'" Similarly, it
18. In fact, one might argue that, in a multicultural, multiethnic, and highly
differentiated society, it is neither possible nor desirable to have a legislator
identify a set of common purposes beyond a certain minimum level of physical
safety. Depending on the degree of societal differentiation, the commonality of
such purposes is bound to be restricted to the shared preferences of the largest
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is questionable whether instrumental interaction is in fact
quite as unstable as Pawlik assumes it is. The market, as
the paradigm of decentralized, instrumental exchange, may
well be sufficient as the kernel of a modem, albeit minimal,
civic society.1" Concerns about the stability of purely
instrumental relationships have played a prominent role in
Hobbes' concept of the state of nature as a zero-sum game.
But that model is flawed, because in a situation of scarcity
and competition, the emergence of a property system and
the mutual realization of comparative advantage through
trade and functional differentiation is at least as likely as a
"war of every man, against every man." 0 It is thus not a
foregone conclusion that the legal system should bear a
special responsibility for organizing and actively
maintaining social cohesion; it is conceivable that social
cohesion stems primarily from extralegal practices and
basic value orientations2' and that the role of the legal
system and the state need not go beyond protecting basic
individual liberties.
IV. SUMMARY
Pawlik's slender volume of 124 pages contains an
impressive collection of original thought, at the center of
which stands the highly practical three-pronged concept of
the criminal wrong. The fundamental normative question
that Pawlik raises is whether and to what extent a free
society is defined by institutional detachment from common
goals or by affirmatively embracing and thus requiring
participation in the maintenance of common goals specific
and/or most influential minority.
19. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). For a radical
version of the argument that all traditional functions of government can better be
performed through private arrangements, see David D. Friedman, The Machinery
of Freedom (2d ed. 1989).
20. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 13, para. 8 (1996) (1651).
21. See, e.g., Robert Ingelhart & Wayne E. Baker, Modernization, Cultural
Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values, 65 Am. Soc. Rev. 23 (2000);
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291 (2003).
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to a free society.22 Pawlik opts for the latter by introducing a
normative concept of freedom based on both interpersonal
and institutional recognition as a candidate for that
common goal. Pawlik's contribution significantly advances
the integration of punishment theory into a broader
framework of subject theory and political philosophy. Such
integration is all the more valuable, given that the theory
of recognition, as a foundation for legal and political
philosophy, has not always received the attention that it
deserves. Pawlik's communicative, non-ontological reading
of Hegel, in particular, should be of interest not only to
specialists in punishment theory but also to a broader
audience of legal and political philosophers.
22. In other words, the question is whether difference or unity should be at the
center of political philosophy.
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